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Abstract
This thesis is a metatheoretical discussion of approaches to the study of speech perception.
It consists of three separate reviews, and an argument connecting them. The first review is
of speech perception research as carried out in the information-processing approach, that of
almost all work in this area over the last thirty years. The second is an overview of cognitivist
philosophy, the conceptual foundation of the information-processing approach. The major
tenets of this foundation are that cognition can be seen as computation, with information
being represented symbolically, and the representations processed according to formal rules
before being interpreted. The third review is of some relevant parts of the phenomenological
philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ronty.
Detailed arguments are presented against the appropriacy of cognitivist philosophy as a
foundation for speech perception research, using the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
The major factor in this inappropriacy is found to be cognitivism's view of the perceiving
subject as a symbol-manipulator, for whom the task of speech perception is basically one of
transformation of one representation of speech {eg acoustic) into another (semantic). Such a
view neglects, among other things, the necessity of accounting for the possibility of there
being any representation at all. Providing this account involves consideration of the nature of
the human subject and its relation to the world. It is argued that, since descriptions are not
given by the world in itself {ie there is no "neutral" description), but rather arise from a
relation of meaningfulness between a person and the world, a human being must be more
than a formal system. This discussion involves consideration of the researcher as a human
subject, and the conclusion that descriptions of speech should give explicit consideration of
the subject for whom the description is relevant, and especially should maintain a strict
distinction between the perspective of the researcher and that of the subject being studied.
The last part of the thesis shows the consequences of these arguments for speech
perception theory, first by analysing the effects of the information-processing framework on
speech perception research; and secondly by outlining an alternative framework for speech
perception research based on more appropriate assumptions about the nature of human
beings, arising from the preceding arguments. In particular, the task of speech perception is
seen not as transformation but as constitution of descriptions. Finally some comparison is
made of the interpretation of observations about speech perception in the two frameworks,
and some suggested directions for future research are indicated.
Introduction
This thesis is about speech perception, that is, about how human beings come to
understand meaningful words, sentences, orders, insults, and so on in the speech of their
fellows. In the years since World War II, a considerable amount of research has been carried
out on this topic, almost all according to an approach which sees the basic task involved in
speech perception as one of information-processing: cues or features extracted from the
speech signal are processed or transformed into representations suitable for accessing
meanings in a mental lexicon. The key to understanding how this processing is achieved is
given by the analogy of cognition (including perception) with computation - an analogy which
underlies not only speech perception research but all of cognitive science. The overall theme
of the present thesis is the argument that this approach is not appropriate to all the purposes
that it has been put to in studying speech perception.
The subtitle of the thesis gives the best guide as to how I would like the argument to be read:
the project reported here has been very much one of analysis and exploration. It is an
attempt to understand, clarify and explicate some underlying assumptions of the information-
processing model of human speech perception. My original motivation in undertaking this
analysis was a general dissatisfaction or unease with information processing models as an
account of human speech perception (initially with regard to the recognition of word
boundaries in connected speech). Although there were numerous models and theoretical
approaches around, none of the ones I encountered overcame this unease. Wider reading in
cognitive science persuaded me that my dissatisfaction stemmed from some aspect of the
metatheoretical rationale for the information-processing approach in general, rather than
from features of any particular model based on this approach. This thesis is the result of my
attempt to understand the metatheoretical position I disagreed with, and pinpoint the reasons
for that disagreement. It can be seen as an extended argument in justification of my reaction:
"But people aren't like that!".
It will become clear that in this quest, I found it necessary to delve rather deep among issues
that are sometimes thought to be "purely philosophical" and to bear little relevance to speech
perception theory. I would like to stress though that my aim throughout has been very
specific, and that the issues I have addressed have been treated precisely because of, and
with respect to, their relevance to speech perception. This is not meant wholly as defence
against an anticipated accusation of irrelevance, but rather to divert any suggestion that the
issues I have discussed should be seen as general issues, or that my arguments should be
assessed as if they were general arguments. In fact, one of the major philosophical themes
of this thesis is the domain-specificity of any framework or foundation, and the impossibility
of any general, objective "first philosophy". I would not wish to defend as generally true my
conclusions about the nature of human beings and of the world. My claim is that these
conclusions are valid in the domain of speech perception research. Their relevance to other
domains would have to be demonstrated by other arguments.
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There is though an element of defensiveness in my insistence on the relevance and focus of
my research. There is, even today, an opinion about that philosophy is one thing and
practical progress another. There are certainly areas of both of which this is true. But, as I
hope to demonstrate in what follows, the study of human language and cognition are not in
this category. For one thing, it is something of an overstatement to suggest that practical
progress is a major goal of work in these areas. Much research is undertaken with the (very
valid) aim simply of increasing understanding of ourselves and our world. In these cases the
definition of what is "practical" becomes rather blurred. For another thing, they are topics of
enormous conceptual complexity, and clarity about conceptual issues is vital if confusion is
to be minimised. Given these considerations, I think there is more danger in too little
"philosophical" work than in too much. It is as a contribution to increasing clarity of this kind
that I would most like the present research to be regarded.
Having given this general orientation to the work that follows, I will now turn to a brief
chapter-by-chapter overview of the argument that follows.
In Chapter 1, I define a starting point by setting out what is known about human speech
perception as seen in the information-processing approach: the basic understanding of the
communicative situation and the task faced by the perceiving subject in understanding
speech; the main research questions and issues of debate arising from this - that is, the task
faced by the researcher in understanding speech perception; and an appraisal of the current
status of speech perception research in the opinion of its practitioners. At the end of the
chapter, I present my own opinion that the information-processing model is less than
satisfactory as an account of human speech perception, and isolate the main reason for this
as involving its presuppositions about the perceiving subject. This suggests a need to
examine the metatheoretical presuppositions of the approach, which are (with some
qualifications) those made explicit in cognitive science, a more general discipline which
deals with all aspects of cognition according to the guiding principle that cognition is
essentially a species of computation, or symbol-manipulation.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of cognitivist philosophy, often used as a metatheoretical
justification for information-processing assumptions in speech perception research. The
structure of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter 1 - first the central tenets are set out;
then the main questions and debates are discussed (with the focus on issues relevant to
speech perception); and finally the climate of self-opinion within cognitivist philosophy is
assessed. At the end of the chapter, I begin a more detailed argument in support of my belief
that there are major problems involved in thinking of the process of perception as one of
symbol-manipulation achieved by a formal system. If speech perception is looking up a
mental lexicon, who is playing the role of the people involved in use of a real dictionary - the
writer and the reader? The cognitivist account rests on implicit but problematic assumptions
about the basic nature of the world and of the human subject. The discussion turns
therefore to phenomenological philosophy, renowned for its treatment of subjectivity.
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Chapter 3 is partly taken up with another overview. It provides brief and very focussed
summaries of relevant parts of the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.
Each summary is followed by a discussion of the significance of the work in relation to the
problems raised in the preceding chapter. These discussions taken cumulatively constitute a
strong argument for the view I call radical antifoundationalism. This view takes very seriously
the opinion - often expressed, in fact, in cognitivist philosophy - that the world and the things
in it have no particular meaning, or essence, or description, in and of themselves; these are
given only by the interaction of a subject with the world.
Chapter 4 takes up and expands these points, exploring the ramifications and implications of
radical antifoundationalism in some detail. Its most significant implication in the present
context has to do with the nature of the subject who interacts with such a world - the subject
could not be a formal system, or operate (only) according to formal principles. Radical
antifoundationalism also has implications for a view of science, stressing the domain-
relativity of concepts and methods, and the need, in developing or assessing some scientific
endeavour to consider the characteristics of the subject in the sense of topic or domain. The
latter part of the chapter considers some of the tenets of cognitive science from the
perspective reached with these arguments, with specific reference of course to those tenets
which play a role as part of the philosophical justification for an information-processing
approach to speech perception.
Chapter 5 returns the discussion to the subject of speech perception. The first part
demonstrates how the rationale for the information-processing approach does indeed
depend on an understanding of the nature of the world and of the perceiving subject such as
that just found to involve so many conceptual problems, and how some of the key difficulties
faced within speech perception research can be traced to these very conceptual problems.
In fact, it is here, rather than in Chapter 1, that I discuss some of the issues that motivated
the analysis which became this thesis, as described above (giving some weight to a point I
make in Section 4.3.3). The second half of Chapter 5 suggests an alternative approach to
speech perception which takes as its starting point an understanding of subjectivity, both of
the hearer and of the researcher, like that developed in the course of the argument.
Naturally, I am committed to the framework I develop in Chapter 5 as an interesting and
fruitful approach to research in speech perception - but I would like to make clear my attitude
to it. It was only at a certain stage in the development of the work reported here that it began
to be clear that my analysis was pointing in the direction of an alternative to the information-
processing approach: uncovering crucial presuppositions suggests that changing these
presuppositions would define a starting point for a genuine alternative. My primary
motivation in undertaking this study has not been the provision of a "better" way of doing
"practical work" in speech perception. The aim, as already stated, has been one of
understanding and clarification.
Towards the end of Chapter 1 - the chapter which reviews existing research on speech
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perception - I suggest that the attitude of contemporary speech perception researchers can
be characterised as one of humility in the face of the magnitude of the problem of explaining
the ability of human beings to understand speech. This attitude is something that the
framework developed here has in common with the information-processing framework. I am
reminded of the time when, as a beginning undergraduate, I was taught in biology classes
about the body's regulation of the hormone system: my feeling then was one of relief that all
this went on whether I understood it or not, and my understanding was in no way responsible
for control of the operation. Though in one way, we all understand speech perception with
amazing depth and intimacy, when it comes to understanding in the sense of explicit
explanation, our total combined achievement probably falls something short of the ability of a
first-year humanities student to understand hormones. Given this situation, it is relevant to
consider the criteria of explanation we should best impose upon our work. There is a
tendency to think that understanding is worthless unless it can be formulated as an explicit
and comprehensive theoretical model. But "explanation" itself is relative to the person being
explained to. To see a model as an explanation of a phenomenon itself requires a leap of
faith in the analogy supporting the model. Personally I believe that we are not up to the
stage of making specific models of bits of speech perception - because we lack sufficient
understanding of a broader framework in which to interpret them. Given this situation, criteria
such as "how does my idea stand up as a theory according to certain presuppositions about
what makes good science?" are (though certainly not unimportant) less important than "how
does the idea make sense in terms of an understanding of speech as communication
between human subjects?". I for one am rather content that the only real test of our
understanding - trying to engage in conversation by acting according to the theory - is, like
regulating our own hormones, impossible.
vii
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REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN SPEECH PERCEPTION
1.1. Introduction
In this first chapter, I provide an overview of the kind of research that has been done on
speech perception in the Information-Processing (IP) framework, to be used as a basis for
the discussion of the rest of the thesis. Later, I will give detailed comments in appraisal of
the IP framework. In this review, however, I am concerned to provide a comprehensive and
sympathetic description of human speech perception research as seen by IP; so the facts,
questions and problems discussed here are facts, questions and problems within IP, rather
than about IP.
The review is a broad rather than a deep one, and does not attempt detailed coverage of
every piece of research with a bearing on speech perception, or every model proposed. Its
aim is to outline the framework and general characteristics of IP research, standing back to
look for similarities, where a more narrowly focussed review would see differences. It is
concerned to make explicit the common assumptions and approach to problems shared by
IP researchers, and mark out the range of possible answers, indeed, possible questions,
which arise within the framework. So where there is general agreement about a particular
topic it is mentioned rather briefly; where there are debates, disagreements or puzzles, the
issues are sketched and an idea given of the range of proposed solutions or directions
towards solutions.
The review is restricted to speech perception research in the IP framework. Other work on
perception, contemporary or historical, is not covered in this chapter. It is true that not all the
research reported here can strictly be said to have been carried out within the IP framework,
since some of it was done before the IP research programme was fully formulated. These
early findings are included because they have been interpreted within the IP framework, and
in fact, as will be clear, contributed to its development.
The chapter is divided into several sections. First there is a brief description of what is meant
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by "IP framework", and how this view sees speech perception in a broader context of human
perceptual and cognitive abilities. Next there is a short characterisation of speech perception
as seen within the IP framework - a common core of understanding about speech perception
from which most current work takes its starting point. Third, there is a section exemplifying
some of the issues and debates that are currently alive in speech perception theory. Fourth,
there is a section which looks in more detail at an area of speech perception research -
study of word recognition - in the light of the more general overview of the early sections.
Finally, I consider the status of IP in the self-appraisal of IP researchers, and the directions
speech perception research seems to be moving in.
1.2. The Information-Processing Approach
The task of defining and situating the IP style of speech perception research is not a
straightforward one: both this field and the ones to which it is most plausibly related are
diverse and rapidly changing areas of study. It can perhaps be loosely classified as a branch
of psycholinguistics, which can in turn be loosely classified as a branch of cognitive science,
an interdisciplinary research programme concerned with the study of all aspects of human
cognition. It is the relationship of speech perception research to cognitive science, rather
than psycholinguistics, that will be focussed in this thesis, so the looseness of the
intermediate classifications need not be of great concern (see Chapter 2).
The central cohesive theme of cognitive science is the drawing of an analogy between
human cognition and computation - or information-processing, or symbol-manipulation1.
"Information-processing" is thus a general characterisation of human cognitive activity,
according to which information is represented symbolically, and the symbols "processed" - ie
transformed in various ways and combined with knowledge stored as representations in
memory - to produce complex, intelligent behaviour as output. It is this idea, with its
ramifications, which provides a setting or framework within which speech perception can be
conceptualised and studied - the perspective from which hypotheses and empirical
questions can be formulated, and according to which observations and experimental results
can be interpreted. In very broad outline, the relevant framework is as follows.
Speech communication is seen as a process of message transfer, in which the speaker
converts a meaning (the message) into sound (articulatory gestures with acoustic
consequences) which is transferred to the ear of the hearer. The hearer receives the sound
and matches it against meanings, similar to those of the speaker, stored as part of his or her
own linguistic knowledge. The goal of speech perception is thus the retrieval of the
speaker's meaning; the sounds are the raw material the hearer has to work with, and the
hearer's knowledge and processing system, as it were, the tools to be used to achieve the
goal. This overall view of communication is often called the "speech chain" (Denes and
1The background of cognitive science will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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Pinson 1963), and the various branches of speech studies identified according to it. Speech
perception is the "decoding" operation of matching the sound against meanings, or
transforming the sound into meaning, or extracting meaning from the sound.
"It is clear enough, in general, what the goal of speech understanding is: to map from a
speech level onto some message level, or interpretive representation." (Marslen-Wilson and
Tyler 1981)
"Recognition involves matching an input to a pre-stored representation. In the case of
speech recognition the input is an auditory representation and the pre-stored representation
is conceptual; speech recognition consists in the translation of sound to meaning." (Patterson
and Cutler in press:36)
The question addressed by IP research then is how this translation or mapping is achieved.
A central, defining tenet of IP is that it cannot be a straightforward matter of directly matching
units of sound against units of meaning: the relationship between the signal and the
message is too complex and variable for that. (I will discuss this in detail in the next section.)
Rather, the units of the speech signal have to be transformed before a shape is achieved
which can be used to access the stored meaning. This transformation is seen, in the
framework of cognitive science, as a kind of information-processing: the hearer extracts cues
(or information) from the signal (speech wave), and processes them through several stages
of transformation (or "recoding"), making use of the hearer's knowledge of the language, the
world and the situation, Finally, a "canonical" form is achieved which can be matched with a
form stored in the mental lexicon (that part of long-term memory concerned with knowledge
of words and their meanings) and associated with the meaning stored there.
As the words are put together, further (syntactic) processing, involving hypotheses,
inferences and predictions is carried out to put together the whole message-meaning.
These processes interpret what has been heard, and guide the perception of the speech still
coming in. Thus a conceptual representation of the speaker's meaning is built up, and the
hearer comes to understand the speaker's message. From there, further inferences can be
made in relation to the communicative situation, and a pragmatic interpretation of the
speaker's intentions can be made if the message is non-literal, ironic, evasive etc.
A rough distinction has sometimes been drawn between "speech perception" and "sentence
processing"2, the former being to do with the recognition of cues, and their combination into
linguistic forms up to the level of the word (and perhaps mainly in the province of
phoneticians); and the latter with the understanding of strings of words and construction of
semantic representations (perhaps mainly the province of psycholinguists). Most
researchers involved with either aspect would stress, though, that the two levels are not
strictly separable, and increasingly the two groups are encroaching on each other's
territories, especially where they converge in the domain of word recognition. The focus of
ZA third division is also sometimes recognised: that of discourse interpretation. For example: "Discourse
processing has only recently become a major focus of attention, though studies of word and sentence processing in
a discourse context go back some ten years or more." (Flores d'Arcais and Schreuder 1983:3-4, their emphasis)
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this chapter is on the IP account of word recognition (see Sec. 1.6), though the discussion
does range a little more widely in both directions.
This has been a very general, simplified account of the IP view of human speech perception.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will review the research carried out within this framework,
and point out some of the elaborations and issues which have arisen.
1.3. Central Findings of the IP Approach
1.3.1. The Speech Signal
A major consideration in developing such an account of human speech perception is the
nature of the speech signal itself3, since this can be assumed to have an important bearing
on the nature of the processing that needs to be carried out to transform that signal into
discrete units of a form which can be matched against entries in the mental lexicon. In fact,
discoveries about the speech signal were an important factor in the development of the IP
model. Until the spectrograph and pattern-playback were available, it had been assumed by
those who thought about speech perception4 that the signal must be composed of, or
decomposable into, phonemes, the smallest unit of language, and that perception was a
simple matter of recognising and concatenating these into word-forms to be matched with
their meanings. Acoustic phonetic research, however, demonstrated fairly conclusively that
that is not the case. Phonemes were not simply "given" in the signal, but had to be actively
recovered or reconstructed by the hearer.
The earliest findings (eg Joos 1948, Potter Kopp and Green 1947, Liberman 1957) of these
new techniques involved the discovery that, contrary to expectations, the speech signal is
not naturally or obviously divisible into any clearly defined, linguistically relevant units. In an
acoustic description, the signal is a quasi-continuous stream; the breaks or segmentations
that do occur are not obviously correlated with any of the units or segments that appear to
the hearer to be "there" to be matched with their meanings. This fact is traditionally called
the "segmentation problem". It is neatly stated by Sawusch 1986:51 (who also provides
detailed discussions of both this and the non-invariance problem discussed next);
"The subjective experience of understanding spoken language includes the organization of
the speech signal into a sequence of discrete units: phonemes, syllables, and words. The
speech signal, however, is continuous, reflecting the continuity of articulatory movement in
production."
Another, related, early discovery about the speech signal is called the "non-invariance
problem". In few, if any, cases is there an obvious, invariant, one-to-one relationship
3"The first task of any perceptual study is to define the stimulus." (Studdert-Kennedy 1974:2354)
4I am of course limiting my discussion entirely to what is relevant to IP, ignoring, for example, prior "discoveries"
of instrumental and auditory phonetic research which were not taken up as a basis for perception research (see for
example, Laver 1970:55ff).
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between an acoustic feature of the signal, and a linguistic feature of the message. This is the
result of "coarticulation": in the production of speech, the exact form of a speech sound is
influenced not only by the linguistic segment intended, but also by its neighbouring sounds
and its structural position. Separating out these influences to attain the original intended
segment is often very difficult to do and results in considerable ambiguity - there is a many-
to-one relationship between surface realisation and underlying intention.
These two facts - segmentation and non-invariance - are considered to be part of the
defining problematic of speech perception research, and are referred to in almost every work
on speech perception5. They provide the rationale for the IP model: it is because of these
properties of speech, according to IP, that speech perception cannot be a simple process of
matching "templates" stored in the memory against the incoming signal, or of "filtering out"
the variable or redundant parts of the signal to be left with the message alone. Combining
these observations with the outline given above, the central question of IP can be stated as
follows:
How, given the facts of segmentation and non-invariance, does the hearer retrieve the
discrete units that encode the meaning of the speaker's message?
The general orientation of research, as already mentioned, has been to assume that the
hearer's identification of the speaker's linguistic units is achieved by extraction of cues from
the speechwave which provide the necessary information to base a reconstruction on. A
sub-goal of IP, then, is the identification of the cues used by the hearer, and description of
the signal in "psychologically real" terms. It is usually agreed (Studdert-Kennedy 1976:245)
that at the lowest level speech is represented in some way similar to a spectral description
(as opposed to, say, a time-amplitude description). This has meant that spectrograms and
synthesis based on spectral features have been used extensively in identifying cues to
speech sounds. Acoustic cues have been sought by study of spectrograms, and by carefully
manipulating synthetic speech and noting the effects of different features on perception. In
this way it has been found that, for example, formant pattern is an important cue for vowels,
silence and release burst for stops, random energy in various frequency bands for fricatives,
etc.
Specifying exactly what the cues are, though, beyond such rough descriptions is more
problematic, and still constitutes an important focus of research. The problem, as stated
above, is that coarticulatory effects cause the cues for different segments to depend on what
other segments are adjacent, so that cues are "smeared" or "spread" over several
segments. Thus, any particular time-slice of speech may well contain cues for more than one
segment. Conversely, any particular segment can have several possible cues, with different
ones being relevant in different contexts. This is assumed to be in keeping with the general
5See Pisoni and Sawush (1975:17) for just one example of an account very similar to the one I have given here.
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tendency of language towards redundancy. Cues are often said to be in "trading
relationships" with one another.
"It has been well known for many years that several cues may signal a single phonetic
contrast ... Thus it is possible to demonstrate that when the perceptual utility of one cue is
attenuated, another cue may take on primary effectiveness in signaling the contrast under
scrutiny because both cues, it is assumed, are phonetically equivalent." (Pisoni and Luce
1986:18)
This means that, from the researcher's point of view, very often there is more than one way
of describing an aspect of the speech signal. It is not always at all clear which is the most
salient as far as the perceiver is concerned. A good example of this kind of issue can be
given by a case where the problem does seem to have been resolved, to some extent at
least: the cue for the feature "voicing" for stops and some other sounds. There are various
signal characteristics associated with phonological voicing of stops (voice bar, aspiration,
strength of release burst, etc), none of which was acceptably reliable as an indicator of the
phonological feature. However, since the work of Lisker and Abramson (1964), many would
now agree6 that what is most salient to perception of the voicing of a segment is the
relational cue of "Voice Onset Time" (VOT). The other characteristics of stops can then be
accounted for as byproducts of the timing of voice onset.
This issue of cue specification is very closely related to another major problem in the
description of the speech signal: that of deciding the size of the unit of speech relevant in
perception. Since this is a topic of current debate, it will be discussed in the next section.
As well as issues concerning individual cues, there is also a more general topic of debate
about the description of the signal. It has seemed to some that a description of the speech
input based on the acoustic (or auditory) nature of the signal, being so difficult to relate to
any obvious linguistic units, is not the most appropriate way to represent the speech signal.
The most famous alternative suggestion has been that an articulatory aspect of speech
should be preferred as the basis of the description. The well-known Motor Theory was based
on the salience of articulatory over acoustic representations (Liberman et al 1967). Though
Motor Theory in its original formulation now has few adherents, many speech researchers
favour the idea that low levels of the processing system use some kind of articulatory
representation of the signal. The claim is that underlying the "multiplicity, variety, and
equivalence of cues for each phonetic percept" (Liberman and Mattingly 1985:10) (acoustic
variability), there is invariance in the articulatory gestures that cause the sounds. Focussing
on the articulation thus allows a more economical specification of relatively invariant features
of speech and a neat account of various well-known phenomena of speech perception. This
(controversial) suggestion has recently come back to the centre of discussion with the
growth of the "Ecological" approach to speech perception - see Sec. 1.8 below.
6Though VOT is by no means unproblematic in phonetic theory - see for example Darwin (1976:189).
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1.3.2. Processing
As has been seen, a basic premise of the IP approach is that speech perception cannot be a
matter of simple template-matching. This is often phrased as the statement that there is not
enough information in the speech wave itself to fully specify the message. Speech
communication often takes place in noisy environments, so that some of the information is
lost in transit; speakers often speak less than maximally clearly. But even without these
everyday sources of degradation of the speech signal, any given stretch of speech is,
according to IP, open to a large number of possible alternative interpretations, both at low
levels of decision as to which segments it contains, and at higher, syntactic and semantic
levels of ambiguity.
So before the relevant "template" can be accessed, some transformation or processing is
required to achieve a "canonical" (ie matchable) form from the input. According to the IP
view, this processing (or computation) is active and "intelligent" - ie involves the application
of knowledge of various kinds, and makes use of inferences and predictions to increase the
efficiency of the process.
In this section I will describe some of the central characteristics of this processing as
understood by the IP view. Again, issues of debate and current development will be left till a
later section.
The processing is generally assumed to take place over a series of several stages or
"modules" - though the exact number and arrangement of these is debatable (see below),
resulting in proposals of various different kinds of models. At each stage, information or
knowledge is represented for a time, and serves as input to the subsequent stage. At each
stage the representation is more abstract than at the stage before, so the storage space
required is less, the amount of information stored can be greater, and the duration of storage
longer.
"The central assumption of our information-processing model is that a number of
processing stages occur between stimulus and response. These processing stages are
assumed to be successive and each stage operates on the information available to it. The
operations of a particular stage take time and transform the information, making it available
to the next stage of processing." (Massaro 1975:599-60)
The basic IP model has three stages of processing, resulting in intermediate levels of
representation between auditory representation (sound) and semantic representation
(meaning), as shown in Figure 17.
Information flows in general from the bottom of the diagram to the top. The first level of
auditory representation is usually considered to provide a rather complete representation of
7As explained below, few speech researchers, if any, would support so simple a model as this. However, I follow
general practice in putting it forward as a starting point for discussion and elaboration (eg Eysenck 1984:3,















Speechwave »» auditory representation
Figure 1: The Basic IP Model of Speech Perception
The input speech-wave is represented and transformed, through several stages of
intermediate representation, into a series of forms which can be matched with
representations stored in the hearer's mental lexicon, to give access to their meaning, and
thus to the speaker's message. Modifications of this model are discussed in the text.
the speech input, and to be of very short duration. Such a storage module (called for
example a "sensory register") needs to be postulated so that information in the speech wave
can be integrated over some time. It is clear that speech is not recognised directly from left
to right (using a metaphor from writing) in an instant-to-instant manner: as has been seen,
the effects of coarticulation mean that cues to a single unit are commonly spread over a
considerable duration. Also the speech being attended to has to be separated from
background noises of various kinds impinging on the ear at the same time, often including
other speech (the "cocktail party" situation)8. The capacity of this first store is small and
information held in it is subject to overwriting or masking by other sounds.
The first stage of processing is the extraction of the relevant cues from this representation,
and results in a more abstract representation of the signal in terms of featural units of some
kind (see below). Subsequent processing involves the application of "low-level" phonetic and
phonological knowledge, and results in a representation on the order of a phoneme string -
though whether the elements of the string are phonemes or some other unit is debated -
probably with some boundary markers, allowing some preliminary parsing into morphemes,
words, or some unit suitable for lexical access. Again the demonstration of many "right-
context effects" (instances where identification of a particular segment is influenced by
acoustic information which follows it) makes it unlikely that this process can be conducted in
a strict left-to-right fashion9. Storage at this level is often thought to have a capacity of "7 +/-
2" units, or "chunks" (where the units can be of varying sizes), based on a classic article by
Miller (195b): and a duration, unless overwritten or otherwise interfered with, of up to several
minutes.
One process that must have occurred by this level, though which level it is carried out at is
not clear, is that of normalisation. It is clear that there are considerable individual
differences in people's voices - even when the dialect is the same, speakers' physiology and
speech habits mean that the absolute values of many variables (pitch is only the most
obvious example) will differ. Acoustic feature recognition is therefore unlikely to involve
features defined in terms of absolute acoustic values (Pisoni 1981). This difficulty is usually
treated by assuming that the perception mechanism can normalise according to some
(probably very complex) computational principle so that different tokens of the same item are
mapped onto similar representations. The details of the principle according to which this is
done and the stage of processing at which it takes place are comparatively little-studied,
however (Peterson and Barney 1952; Ladefoged 1967, Studdert-Kennedy 1974:2357). A
closely related problem is that of rate normalisation: many phonemic and other contrasts are
signalled by duration differences, but duration is strongly affected by overall rate of speech.
8Work on auditory grouping, sound location etc is reviewed by Darwin (1976).
9Though as will be seen below, some (eg Cole and Jakimik 1980) disagree.
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Finally, lexical access retrieves the meanings of the words, and syntactic processing10
allows a complete semantic or conceptual representation of the speaker's message to be
constructed. It is this last stage that is stored in long term memory, for an indefinite period
and with varying degrees of accuracy. This is the reason that in general people remember
the gist of what they have been told, but not, barring exceptional circumstances, the exact
words in which the information was conveyed to them, or the actual sound of the utterance
(Ellis and Beattie 198^)-
The accessing of the meaning of the sounds, though in a sense the last stage of processing,
is rarely nowadays thought of as the end of processing, but rather is assumed to interact
with lower levels of processing subsequent speech in an ongoing way - most particularly by
predicting and constraining the possibilities of what will be perceived next. One of the best
known facts about speech perception is its susceptibility to top-down influences - often
called context effects. Traditional examples of top-down influences11 are that well-formed,
semantically sensible sentences are more intelligible in noise than syntactically or
semantically anomalous ones (Miller and Isard 1963); or that having a preconception as to
the meaning of a sentence heard in noise can radically alter the way it is heard (Bruce
1958). The well-demonstrated effect of "phoneme restoration" is a particularly good
example of this kind of phenomenon (originally demonstrated by Warren 1970). A
correlative, and equally well-attested, observation also attributable to top-down effects is that
short stretches of speech - especially if extracted from a casual conversation - are often very
low in intelligibility if heard without any contextual information. Putting the stretch back into
its context, however, makes it sound perfectly intelligible (originally Pollack and Pickett
1963).
Also, as mentioned, a remarkable characteristic of speech as viewed by IP research is its
great ambiguity at all levels. Without the operation of "top-down" knowledge, the number of
possible parsings for any given stretch of speech would be too great for them all to be tested
in the timescale of normal speech perception.
Effects like these are generally accounted for by postulating that some preliminary
consultation of the lexicon and even syntactic processing are already operating at least as
early as the phonological stage - if not, as many would say, even earlier - and the results
made available to lower stages. In other words, information can flow from the "top" down, as
well as from the signal "up": once something has been understood of the message,
information about its syntax, meaning, etc, is used to make predictions about what will come
next, impose constraints on possible or likely interpretations, and generally guide the
10Study of sentence processing and the structure of the mental lexicon are both important areas of research in
psycholinguistics, but, as mentioned earlier, I will not deal with either in detail here. See for example Levelt 1978,
Garrett 1978 on the former; Aitchison 1987, Rubenstein 1974 on the latter. On inference and interpretation, see
Clark 1978. On processing of non-literal meanings and discourse- and text-understanding, see for example Flores
d'Arcais and Schreuder 1983.
11Reviewed in, for example, Freund (1975).
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processing of subsequent speech. Various kinds of monitoring and error-correcting
processes are also in operation, allowing backtracking, replaying, etc, if the interpretation
seems to be getting very improbable.
1.4. Empirical Questions and Methodology
1.4.1. Questions
Given a basic framework like the one just outlined, many questions arise about how exactly
it works - some of which have already been foreshadowed. Much speech perception
research can be described as filling in the details of the general IP model. For example, the
cues extracted from the signal as the first stage of processing must be specified; the kinds of
representation used for storage of the information obtained at each level of processing, and
the capacity and duration of each store must be determined; the knowledge available to
each level or module must be worked out - most especially the kind of knowledge embodied
in the mental lexicon; and of course the details of the kinds of processes that take place, and
their exact temporal sequence, must be shown.
The present review is, as mentioned in the introduction, not primarily concerned to detail all
the research done with the aim of answering such questions. Though much has been
achieved in all of the areas mentioned, especially the first, definitive answers are not yet
available for any of them. In many cases, different emphases and orientations can lead to
very different kinds of answers, and a number of alternative positions have arisen with
respect to issues such as what is the best formulation of the question, or the best approach
to finding an answer to it. It is these kinds of issues which will be discussed in more detail
below.
1.4.2. Methods
The question of how to go about answering questions about the IP model is itself a
problematic one. Almost all the mental processing postulated happens below the level of
conscious awareness, and cannot be directly observed by either the subject or the
researcher.
One level of which subjects can be assumed to have some reliable introspective information,
according to IP, is the final one - they can be asked "What do you hear?". Correlatively, one
of the levels over which the experimenter has the greatest control is the first one - the actual
speech wave which the processing system is presented as input. By measurement and
manipulation of the signal, or by synthesis, the experimenter can be sure of exactly what the
input description is, and by elicitation can observe the output. It is not surprising then that the
most detailed and best understood information about the perceptual mechanism as seen by
IP has to do with the acoustic cues which cause the various linguistic percepts (work
reviewed for example by Darwin 1976, Fischer-J^rgenson 1958).
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In investigating other levels of perception, the methodological problems are much greater.
Even if it were possible to elicit from subjects some description of what was going on in their
heads as they perceive speech, such introspective data is notoriously unreliable. From the
IP perspective, it is far better to observe subjects' behaviour in various circumstances and
thus infer what knowledge is being applied, what processing strategies being followed, etc.
A large range of methods for investigating intermediate levels of processing has been
devised. In general, the idea is to "intrude on the ordinary flow of information" (Bever
1983:303-4), observing the effects of depriving the system of knowledge it usually has
access to, or pushing it to the limits of its processing capabilities. The basic idea is to ask
subjects to identify what they hear under many different controlled conditions. The
researcher might interfere either with the signal, which can be done nowadays in very
sophisticated ways, or with the conditions under which it is heard. The subject can be asked
to identify sounds, or simply to say whether they are same or different.
The lowest, most physiologically determined levels are observed by techniques such as
masking, adaptation or dichotic presentation (see Darwin 1976 for a review).
The contribution to the eventual percept of lower levels generally can be inferred by ensuring
that subjects are deprived of any higher level (contextual) information normally available
from syntax, semantics or context - achievable for example by use of short, isolated or
meaningless stimuli.
The higher levels of syntactic and semantic processing, conceptual representation and
memory are studied by observing the interpretation given by subjects to different controlled
clauses, sentences or texts (Olson and Clark 1976). Some of the techniques used are
reviewed by Levelt (1978).
Recently there has been increasing interest in "on-line" experimental tasks - which show the
development of a percept from moment to moment: gating, shadowing, phoneme
monitoring, listening for mispronunciations are examples. This is based partly on the
criticism that in the more "static" techniques, subjects' responses may be influenced by
properties of memory or other factors, rather than really tapping intermediate stages of
processing; or that they may be using reflective or explicitly learned knowledge, rather than
"tacit", implicit knowledge (Morais et al, 1979).
A generally fruitful kind of method used in IP is observation of the kinds of errors that the
perceptual system is prone to under different circumstances. The patterns of breakdown
allow inferences to be made as to the nature and normal functioning of the system.
Perceptual errors can be observed in natural situations, or elicited in laboratory conditions.
For example, hearing errors, or "slips of the ear" are interpreted by IP as showing the kinds
of units of representation used at different levels (Fromkin 1973 and 1980; Cutler 1982).
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An extension of this kind of procedure involves observation of the response of the
processing system to errors deliberately incorporated into the input signal - such techniques
as listening for mispronunciations, shadowing speech which contains errors, or simply
observing the degree to which mispronunciations can affect perception (Tent and Clark
1979).
Finally, a considerable amount of IP research has involved investigation of phenomena
observed in the laboratory - such as categorical perception (Liberman 1957, Repp 1984) or
click location (Ladefoged 1967; Freund 1975 reviews the work; Olson and Clark 1976
consider the methodological and interpretational problems involved).
In studying intermediate processes by techniques such as these, the designing of
experiments is of critical importance. The aim after all is not simply to find out how subjects
behave under particular experimental conditions, but to extrapolate to the nature of the
speech perceptual mechanism in general, and particularly to its functioning in everday
spontaneous conversation. Studying perception of conversational speech poses such
difficult methodological problems as to make it unfeasible on a large scale - though of course
it is important to verify results obtained in the laboratory on "real" speech. For these reasons,
almost all research on speech perception has taken the form of laboratory experiments12.
Ideally the experiment is seen as a test of a hypothesis arising from a theory about speech
perception in its larger context. Given this view, it is important to be sure that hypotheses are
well-formulated in terms of the theory, and that the experimental design is a true test of the
hypothesis. The task has to be cleverly worked out, variables carefully controlled and
inferences cautiously drawn. For all these reasons, it is inevitable that materials and
conditions will often be "unnatural" to some extent. This means that extrapolation and
generalisation from experimental results to claims about the operation of the processing
mechanism in everyday, spontaneous conversation is fraught with danger of
misinterpretation.
"... we should be cautious about interpreting tasks in which we ask our subjects to do
slightly unnatural things." (Haggard 1975:10)
The kinds of problems faced by researchers in interpreting experimental results can be
illustrated briefly with one particularly notorious example13 - that of the Reaction Time (RT)
paradigm. A very simple measure of the relative complexity of processing undergone by
various kinds of input is the length of time taken to complete a process. RT experiments
exploit this reasoning - in general they measure precisely the amount of time subjects take to
perform a simple task, such as pressing a button for true/false or yes/no, which requires
1zThis is a source of dissatisfaction to many psycholinguists, but considered to be unavoidable, since the
opposite problem of lack of control would cause even greater problems (eg Olson and Clark 1976:63). Or at least to
have been unavoidable in early days of speech perception experimentation - some consider the situation is now
beginning to be remedied, with innovative experimental designs allowing more naturalistic speech and contexts to
be studied (Pisoni 1986:155).
13Similar problems surround the history of "phoneme monitoring" experiments - see for just one example
Studdert-Kennedy (1976:252).
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some perceptual processing of a stimulus. However, stating what processes are going on
during the time it takes the subject to react is much more problematic. Some such tasks that
were used in the sixties to support detailed hypotheses about the (Chomskyan)
transformations being performed by the system are now interpreted very differently. Though
RT methods are still used14, much greater caution and sophistication are required for their
interpretation.
In general, psycholinguists are very aware of the problems of interpretation and the "theory-
laden" nature of observation (see section 1.7 below). However it is felt that they can be
countered by rigour of method and interpretation. It is therefore considered very important to
formulate strong, falsifiable hypotheses, control experimental variables stringently and
interpret results according to sound logical criteria; as well as to design well-specified
models and make assumptions and the theoretical orientation of an experiment as explicit as
possible. Morton (1981), Massaro (1987) and Seidenberg (1985) discuss these matters
particularly explicitly and give a "feel" for the style of reasoning used in speech perception
research.
1.4.3. Modelling
One way of encouraging the kind of rigour just described is by use of computer models.
Since perception is, as explained above, seen as a kind of computation, implementation of
theories as computer models is possible. A very important aspect of methodology in the IP
approach is thus the development of models of the speech processing system, which can
then be implemented and tested as computer programs. In fact, the way the IP framework
lends itself to modelling of this sort is often claimed as one of its advantages, since it
ensures that theories will be well-specified and formulated in terms of testable hypotheses -
highly desirable conditions for a scientific enterprise.
"The main advantage of the [IP] theoretical framework is that it forces consistency in
methodology, interpretations, and conclusions." (Massaro 1975:600)
This means that research in Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) is of relevance to human
speech perception theory15, since the design of a working ASR system would be a very
convincing candidate as a (sufficient) description of the human processing system.
An example of the influence of ASR on IP theories can be seen in the large Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) project conducted in the US in the seventies (Klatt 1977),
which was widely analysed as to its implications for human models (see for example the
papers in Cole 1980, Perkell and Klatt 1986, Nusbaum and Schwab 1986).
uFor example, Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981:104) consider that RT tasks "provide the best technique for
pinning down the exact temporal properties of speech understanding processes" since they "tap the listener's
representation of speech at a specific moment in time."
^Influences in the opposite direction are also important, but outwith my scope here.
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Unfortunately full-scale models of perception have so far resisted implementation as ASR
systems. There is some controversy within IP as to the extent to which this is due to
technological problems as opposed to conceptual ones (see Sec. 1.7). Certainly the kinds of
problems that have been encountered in attempting such modelling are considered to have
been illuminating for human speech perception theory - for example in highlighting the extent
of the ambiguity of the signal, the importance of time- and speaker-normalisation, the
problem of control and error-recovery, or the issues in knowledge representation and
access.
In any case, designing and implementing a full working system is a very large task, requiring
research to be at a late stage of finalisation. For these reasons, theoretical modelling, rather
than actual implementation, of all or part of a system is one of the more common forms of
presentation of ideas and argumentation for an approach.
1.5. Issues and Research Topics within the Field
1.5.1. Introduction
Naturally, within the scope of broad agreement about the general explanatory framework of
IP, various issues and problems have been encountered and tackled in different ways by
different researchers, giving rise to debates and differences of opinion, interpretation and
emphasis. In this section I sketch some topics representative of these kinds of issues and
the range of opinion as to how they should be dealt with. Some of the issues will be raised in
a more specific context in the next section on word recognition.
First I mention some general issues to do with the kind of model best suited to accounting for
perception. Then I look briefly at two central questions posed by the IP framework - that of
invariance in the speech signal and that of the unit of representation of speech in the
processing system.
1.5.2. Architecture of Model
The number and arrangement of the modules needed in a model of speech perception (the
model's "architecture") is one area of continuing debate. It is now generally accepted that a
simple 3-stage, serial architecture (such as the one shown in Figure 1 above) cannot
account for many of the attested phenomena of speech perception. I will talk briefly here
about two aspects of the issue of how it should be amended - firstly, how many modules or
separate stages of processing it should have, and secondly what general kinds of
processing the system should do, especially the question of degree to which processing is
interactive versus autonomous, and active versus passive. Again, I will not be looking in
detail at particular models; various reviews are available: Paap (1975), Sanders (1977),
Pisoni and Luce (1986), to name but a few.
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1.5.2.1. Number of Modules
There is a large range of variation in number of modules among the models proposed by
different groups. The examples in Figure 2 might give some idea of the range of proposals.
Some consider it useful to have a larger number of relatively specialised modules (eg Morton
1981). Others suggest it is more plausible that a human system would have a smaller
number of separate stages of processing (eg Klatt 1980).
One kind of debate has to do with the necessity or otherwise for postulating particular
modules in the system. An example of this kind of issue is seen in the debate about the
lower end of the model: whether feature/cue extraction should itself be seen as a one- or
two-stage process. Some argue that the first stage of auditory or physiological
representation must be followed by a more specialised module operating on the basis of
acquired knowledge about language, recoding the information to give a phonetic
representation. Others believe that at the lowest levels, phonetic categories have their basis
in physiological or auditory properties of the processing system, so that the first
representation is already phonetic in nature, and no recoding is necessary16.
Evidence for the first view (the "dual process" view) comes from the observation that
speakers with different native languages "hear" in different ways. Different languages have
different patterns of coarticulation, so for the hearer, undoing the effects of coarticulation to
retrieve the canonical form involves more than knowledge of universal rules of articulatory
"inertia". The second view is supported by evidence that pre-linguistic babies, and even
animals, respond to speech stimuli in ways that seem similar to adults' response; and by
work on adaptation which gives evidence for the existence of physiological feature-detectors.
Work in categorical perception speaks to this debate, though results can be used in support
of either view (see eg Repp 1984, who reviews the arguments for both sides, though he
himself is in favour of the dual-process model. Paap 1975 and Sawusch 1986 also review
the evidence, the latter presenting an even more complex "lower end").
Similar kinds of debate surround the need for separate levels of morphological and
phonemic analysis (eg Jarvella and Meijers 1983), and the separate processing of syntactic
and semantic information (eg Flores d'Arcais and Schreuder 1983).
A trend in the treatment of these issues has been a call for more concentration on process
than on structure (eg Cohen and Nooteboom 1975). In fact this shift of emphasis is
sometimes said to differentiate research in the 1980s from that of the 1970s. If it is possible
to specify in detail the processes that the system performs, the question about structure wiii
be answered in the process. In any case it is thought likely that there might be rather little in
the way of fixed structure, allowing the flexibility of the system.



















Figure 2: Varieties of IP Model Architecture
A: A model showing some interaction and parallel processing (from Pisoni and Sawusch
1975); B: A prosodically-driven model with analysis-by-synthesis (from Bannert 1987); C: A
model integrating speech perception with reading, and production of spoken and written
responses (from Morton 1981).
A different but very important kind of question about the number of modules concerns the
existence of a separate control module. The need for control of the overall processing
strategies has been emphasised by work in ASR. For example, one of the ARPA systems,
HEARSAY, considered to have a particularly promising design in its "blackboard"
architecture, which allowed many different kinds of knowledge to be salient at once, was the
one which suffered most for lack of an effective control system. Ranking information for
degree of salience, and making it available to the relevant processes in the appropriate
sequence proved very difficult. One effect was that if the system made an error, it frequently
was not able to recover from it (eg Klatt 1980). Any model which uses "strategies" or
"heuristic" principles would seem to imply the need for an effective control mechanism.
The most obvious way to deal with control in human perception is to have a separate module
with a control mechanism. Some models - especially those of the Analysis-by-Synthesis
type, which need some kind of comparator process (eg Bannert 1987) - take this approach.
If this is not done, some other account of control has to be given. Many however do not
explicitly address the problem of control, which is a cause of concern among some speech
perception theorists. Noordman (in press) identifies control as one of the key problems
facing speech perception modelling in the immediate future. It is closely related to the
question of the role of attention in human speech processing (see Nusbaum and Schwab
(1986), who give a detailed review and discussion of both issues).
1.5.2.2. Varieties of Processing
As mentioned above, the effects of syntactic and semantic context on speech perception
have been known from the earliest days of speech perception research. Such effects are
widely agreed to be the result of "top-down" information flow: ie "higher" levels of processing
influencing "lower" levels17. It is also fairly well attested that low level information can have
a direct influence on perception of higher level units (see eg Freund (1975) for a review of
some acoustic cues to grammatical structure).
As well, it seems that some stages can be bypassed, or their order varied, at least in some
circumstances. A good example is the level of phoneme representation. Phoneme
monitoring experiments, as well as other evidence, suggests that the phoneme level is not
always accessed in order before higher levels - ie those with larger units (eg Marcus in
Studdert-Kennedy 1980). Others (eg Warren 1983) have suggested that the phoneme might
not be an intermediate level at all.
These effects suggest that it is not always the case that all stages are traversed in order,
with acoustic features being combined to give small linguistic units and larger linguistic units
being built up on the basis of information in the intermediate stages.
17See for example Jackendoff (1987, ch. 6) for a clear statement of relevant arguments. Also see Flores d'Arcais
and Schreuder (1987:10ff) for some more sophisticated examples of top-down effects than those already
mentioned.
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Again, then, a simple serial model of speech perception - with information flowing from
module to module in one direction only, and the units of representation getting larger and
larger - is widely agreed to be overly simplistic. Most researchers would say that allowance
must be made for some degree of interaction. The question is, how to model these kinds of
interaction. A common approach to this issue is to formulate it as a question about the
interaction of top-down ("active") and bottom-up ("passive") processing: in what ways, and at
what levels, do they operate together or separately?
A generally accepted principle (eg Ohala 1986:386) is that bottom-up processing is the most
efficient, and that bottom-up recognition should be postulated to the extent that the speech
signal allows it. The crux of the issue then is to specify exactly how far the signal does allow
this: in other words the issue of the existence of invariants in the speech wave is crucial (see
below).
The standard view for many years was that the most important characteristic of speech was
the variability of its units. This has usually been taken to imply a very active model with a
considerable top-down component. An unfortunate feature of some such models has been
that they can end up postulating a really enormous amount of top-down processing,
involving a great deal of very specialised, sometimes rather ad hoc knowledge. As well as
the general implausibility of such models in psychological terms, one of the lessons learned
from the ARPA project (eg Pisoni and Luce 1986:24) was that an over-emphasis on
prediction and confirmation strategies could have the effect of severely constraining the
range of inputs the system could cope with.
One way out of this problem is to suggest that context effects should be accounted for not by
active processing and knowledge application, but by changes in the susceptibility of the
system to features of the input18. In this way, relatively "passive" processing can be used.
Recognition of a particular unit can be facilitated by "priming" of some of the stored
representations, for example by some aspect of the context, or simply by frequency of
presentation. "Primed" representations are then accessed more readily on the basis of less
information reducing the need for active, computation-based transformation of information. A
prominent and influential example of a model operating on this principle is Morton's logogen
model (eg Morton 1979), of which more below.
This issue of the interaction of modules also has a wider aspect. "Context effects" in speech
perception are not limited to those that can be accounted for by interaction of bottom-up and
top-down linguistic processing. Many involve the application of general knowledge - about
18Another response to the problem of overly top-down models is to propose a system which is more able to make
use of available bottom-up information. More on this in the next section on invariance.
language19, or about the world and the situation. Such knowledge is presumably not stored
individually for every specific kind of cognitive process, but shared by all processes that
need it. This widens the scope of questions of interaction between modules to include
integration with modules relevant to other kinds of process than speech perception.
There are several commonly discussed topics, which I will exemplify. First, there is the issue
of the integration of information received in each of the two ears. Many experiments have
investigated effects on processing of presentation of different stimuli to the left and right
ears. The integration process seems to take account of various kinds of knowledge and
expectations (see Pisoni and Luce 1986, for one review of this research). Another question
has to do with the integration of cues for speech perception which are available from sources
other than the speech wave itself, the most obvious being visual cues. There is the well-
known "McGurk effect" (described for example in Studdert-Kennedy 1980:55) where visual
cues to labial consonants can override auditory cues to some other place of articulation.
Some speech perception researchers believe that an adequate model should be built around
the integration of auditory and visual information (eg Massaro 1987). Also well-known but not
fully investigated is the contribution of gesture, perceived visually, to the understanding of
speech (McNeill, 1987).
There is also the question of the integration of speech perception with other linguistic
processes - most obviously related being speech production, and reading20. To what extent
can these processes share modules? On the one hand, it can be considered parsimonious
to suggest that such closely related activities should share processing mechanisms to a
considerable extent. Accepting this imposes external constraints on perception models by
opening questions as to how compatible the IP model is with what is known of other areas of
human mental processing. For example, the relationship of the kind of initial representation
assumed in processing models to what is known of auditory physiology and psychoacoustics
is beginning to be tackled (Patterson and Cutler in press, Pisoni and Luce 1986:6ff,
1987:37). On the other hand there are benefits in modularity: a system with overly free
information flow poses, as has been seen, problems of control21.
A general trend with regard to both of these kinds of issues is the emphasis on the high
degree of interaction between different modules - both at different levels of the speech
perception system, and in different areas of the cognitive system as a whole - and the
19For example, some (eg Ohala 1986) emphasise the extent to which hearers' "tacit" knowledge about speech
and its production is in operation even at the lowest stages. See also Darwin (1976:212) on the effects of hearers'
knowledge of characteristics of the vocal tract; Pisoni and Luce (1986:12-13).
20This topic is discussed for example by Darwin (1976:207); Paap (1975:194) who criticises the notion that
perception is just a matter of running the production machinery backwards; Spoehr (1981) who is specifically
interested in the relation between reading and listening; and at length in Allport et al 1987. It is also stated as a
major research topic by Noordman in press:2).
21A broader form of this kind of issue is the debate on "Is Speech Special?" - do our linguistic faculties operate on
the same principles as our general perceptual abilities (especially psychoacoustic sensitivities), or are they in some
way qualitatively different? Studdert-Kennedy (1976:244) and Lane (1965) present opposing views on this question.
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possible relevance to ail stages of processing of many different kinds of knowledge. Some
researchers (eg Haggard 1975:7, Spoehr 1981:244ff) take the view that all these interactions
are best accounted for by the proposal that speech perception uses not a serial but a parallel
architecture22. However, details of such architecture are difficult to ascertain and specify
(Levelt and Flores d'Arcais 1975:347) and they are difficult to implement with current
computer technology, so the belief in parallel processing is based on what seems generally
likely, rather than on an explicit model23. It seems clear that central issues will be
compatibility of representations and problems of access and control. Specification of the
nature of the representation of speech at various levels, and the relationship between those
representations has been a major concern of phonetic research for many years
(Fischer-Jorgensen 1958:466), but is still not fully understood. Indeed the notion of
interactivity itself is stiil not entirely clear, one issue being whether modules should have
access to each others' processes as they are being carried out, or only to the results of their
processes. Flores d'Arcais and Schreuder 1983 review some of the issues in relation to
different kinds of architectures. As I mention again below, the principle of autonomous
processing in separate modules is strongly defended by some (eg Norris 1982, Samuel
1986).
1.5.3. Invariance versus Variability
It has already been seen how a model with more emphasis on passive, bottom-up processes
can be considered simpler, and thus more desirable than one which requires a great deal of
top-down processing. The history of speech perception research, indeed of acoustic
phonetics in general, has been one of a search for invariant features of the speech signal
that would allow postulation of relatively direct perception of linguistic units. The fact that this
search has so far failed to uncover uncontroversial invariants of this kind has led many to the
conclusion that the search itself is misguided in some way. This whole issue of the degree
to which speech can be said to contain invariant as opposed to variable cues to its linguistic
units, and how cues are used by the perceptual system is currently a key topic of debate in
speech perception research (viz. Perkell and Klatt 1986).
As already mentioned, a long-time standard view has been to emphasise the degree of
variability in the realisation of linguistic units in speech. However, there are several schools
of thought which suggest that this view is based on an inappropriate perspective on the
signal. Many believe that looking at the speech wave in a different way shows it to have
many more invariant features and thus allows a model requiring considerably less
computation. Such approaches were given impetus by the well-known success of Victor Zue
^An extreme form of this view is seen in the influence of PDP ("parallel distributed processing", "massively
parallel", or "connectionist") modelling on speech perception theory - more below.
23A feeling I believe to be widespread is expressed, in an informal conference discussion, by Levelt and Flores
d'Arcais (1975:348): "We do not propose to put a lexicon already on the basilar membrane, we only want to
emphasise the notion that from early stages processing may take place simultaneously."
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(eg Cole et al 1980) in learning to "read" spectrograms with a high degree of accuracy, a
task which had been considered to be impossible since early studies on "Visible Speech" (eg
Potter Kopp and Green 1947, Shockey and Reddy 1974). This ability fuelled a challenge to
the view of the signal as "impoverished" and radically variable, and allowed postulation of
models with more bottom-up information (Nusbaum and Schwab 1986:120ff give a good
discussion of this issue).
This kind of thought takes several different directions. Again I will exemplify some.
Some researchers believe that the traditional mode of signal description, in terms of isolated
cues, is to blame for the apparent lack of invariants. What is needed, according to this view,
is a much richer description of the signal, especially involving temporal or prosodic
characteristics, which, it is often felt, have been unduly neglected until recent years. This
might allow more invariant cues to be specified. However, others express some
disillusionment with this idea believvjy that prosodic cues have not
fulfilled the promise of giving the invariants that segmental ones could not.
Another well-known approach suggests that it is the particular orientation to the speech
signal, focussing on steady states connected by transitions, which makes speech appear
more variable than it is. If, instead, the focus is turned on the fine acoustic detail in the
periods of rapid change between steady states, it is suggested, invariant properties of the
spectral structure can be uncovered. The best-known proponents of such a view are
Stevens and Blumstein (eg Stevens 1984; Blumstein 1986), who tie their account of
invariants to the theory of Distinctive Features (Jakobson Fant and Halle 1963), and to his
own Quantal Theory of speech production. The invariants he discovers are therefore
acoustic correlates of the Distinctive Features.
"...a great deal of information is carried by these one-eighth inch time slots in the
spectrogram - much more than one would expect on the basis of the space they occupy in
linear time. The auditory perceptual system seems to give special attention to these events
that are packed with properties that identify a number of consonantal features." (Stevens
1984:11)
The demonstration of these kinds of invariants is best accepted for stops, though it has been
applied to other sounds. A summary of the work is given by Pisoni and Luce (1986:7-10);
some disagreements by eg Darwin (1976:185,187).
Another way in which it is sometimes argued the traditional description obscures invariants is
in paying too little attention to the articulatory origin of speech. This view is taken especially
by those who support a Motor Theoretic view of speech perception24 (eg Liberman and
Mattingly 1985). Again there are criticisms, either of the existence of articulatory invariants or
of their usefulness to the system (eg Paap 1975). Still another suggestion is that the search
for invariants should focus more on the auditory representation of speech (Lindbiom 1987).
24Or the "Ecological" account of perception - discussed more fully below.
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On the other hand, there are many who choose to emphasise the role of top-down
processing, for various reasons. Cole and Jakimik (1980) consider that interaction of higher
and lower level processes is needed "even when the acoustic input is crystal clear"
(1980:139): even for a clear signal there are numerous possible parsings. The hearer's
knowledge is needed to ensure that the correct one is made.
Others simply believe in the variability of speech.
"If [speech were not highly variable at the phonetic level] listeners would have no reason to
construct the elaborate knowledge base [that his experiments show in operation] that allow
them to factor out fortuitous variability." (Ohala 1986:396)
Some in fact suggest that the traditional focus on the invariant features of speech has been
to the detriment of perception theory, and that variability is itself an important source of
information to the perceiver (eg Church 1987). This view is taken by both the alternative
approaches to speech perception discussed below. Labov (1986) believes that rather than
looking for invariants, we should be trying to understand the sources of variability. There is
also the well-known phenomenon that in many circumstances, the hearer needs only a
general impression of an "auditory contour" to identify the speech (eg Studdert-Kennedy
1980:57).
Perhaps the generally held position is moderate on both scores: on the one hand, the move
toward richer or alternative descriptions of the signal is welcomed - if the information is there,
it makes sense that the hearer would use it - though without great optimism about the
existence of a specifiable set of invariants. On the other hand, existence of some invariant
acoustic-linguistic relationships seems likely (eg sibilants would be good candidates), and
again it can be assumed that the hearer might use these as "anchor-points" in recognition.
Such units would be particularly useful if they allow alignment of boundaries. Coker and
Umeda (1975) build this notion into a model which uses "synch pulses" to align input and
"transcription".
1.5.4. The Unit of Perception
The problem of what the unit is that the speech signal is segmented into is still a major
unresolved issue, and no general agreement has been reached as to the size of the unit the
perceptual system operates with. Most of the units of linguistic analysis have been
suggested and supported with some evidence, as well as some new units arising from
psycholinguistic and ASR work (for a detailed review, see Lehiste 1972; Patterson and
Cutler (in press) review units; Pisoni and Luce 1987:26 review some of the issues). Here I
mention some of the most-discussed units and some of the arguments for postulating them.
Since the feature is, to many, the smallest unit of linguistic analysis, it has seemed an
obvious choice as the unit in which the speech wave is initially represented. Since use of
features changes the dimension of segmentation, relative to that of the phoneme, they are
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useful in accounting for the fact that segment boundaries are so unclear in the speech wave,
giving a neat explanation of coarticulation as "feature spreading".
Some (eg Stevens 1971) support the binary Distinctive Feature set as the basis of
perception, claiming that, in listening to speech the hearer has to decode the signal to
recover the original Features and thus build 'up the speaker's message. He acknowledges
that in natural speech information about the Distinctive Features is often lost or distorted, but
still: "They have the important function of providing a framework that underlies the production
and perception of speech." (Stevens 1971:232).
Others oppose the rigid binary set of Distinctive Features, and propose instead more
"natural" phonological features, or a parametric representation (Pisoni and Luce 1986:4-5),
perhaps based on physiological feature detectors (eg Cooper 1979; see discussion in
Darwin 1976:195ff; Crowder 1981:176 argues against them, as does Studdert-Kennedy
1981:53). The problem then of course is to specify exactly which features or cues are used.
Here too there is not yet a single well-accepted answer.
Another traditionally popular unit is the syllable. It is argued in its favour that most effects of
coarticulation are found within a CV syllable, and the syllable as a unit is therefore less
variable than phoneme-sized units, posing fewer problems in factoring out production effects
and retrieving the intended form. On the other hand it is often pointed out that many
coarticulatory effects spread far beyond individual syllables, and that syllable boundaries are
no easier to define than segment boundaries. Studdert-Kennedy (1974, 1976, 1980) is a
strong supporter of the syllable as the basic acoustic unit, though cautioning that this is a
very different statement from saying the syllable is a basic linguistic unit (eg 1976:253).
There have also been new units - diphones, demisyllables - developed as modifications of
the syllable (hoping to overcome the problems of syllables) for use in ASR.
Despite the long-established problems in postulating the phoneme, or some similar
phonological segment, as the unit of segmentation, some consider that the difficulties are
outweighed by its advantages. Principal among these is its "psychological reality", as
evidenced by hearing errors and the existence of alphabetic writing systems, for example
(see Paap 1975:194) or empirical evidence like that from phoneme-monitoring experiments
(Paap 1975:176; Nooteboom 1981). Others counter that the psychological reality of
phonemes may be overemphasised by the fact that most psycholinguistic research is
conducted in cultures with alphabetic writing systems; and that the phoneme-monitoring
work and hearing error evidence are open to other interpretations.
A possible half-way suggestion that has arisen from ASR work is that initial segmentation is
into broad class units - roughly phoneme-sized, but analysed only to the level of "voiced
fricative, front vowel" etc (eg Ringeling and Eefting 1987). This allows more robust front end
processing, but still narrows down the number of candidates for lexical access considerably.
Another suggests that some kind of context-sensitive allophone is used.
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Pisoni and Luce (1987) give strong arguments and detailed evidence in favour of some
phonological segment:
"...units like phonemes which are defined within linguistic theory are probably not good
candidates for processing units in real-time analysis of speech. However, units like phones,
allophones or context-sensitive diphones may be more appropriate..." (Pisoni and Luce
1987:26)
The idea that the word is a unit even at low levels of processing has many advantages. It
would certainly be very useful in explaining all kinds of "real-word effects" (many
experimental results show biases in subjects' responses if the material is a real word as
opposed to a meaningless sequence of phones: see Samuel (1986) for a detailed and
interesting review), and would simplify the processing needed for lexical access. However,
the problems of using words as units are also very great - their immense variability, the
difficulties of providing a formal definition, and the lack of clear word-boundary cues in the
speech wave, being the main ones. Also the fact that there are so many words -
segmentation into sublexical units means a far smaller set of basic units (Patterson and
Cutler in press:43). For all these reasons, it is usually preferred to account for "word effect"
phenomena by postulating that information from the mental lexicon is available to lower
levels, or that lexical access begins as soon as any information is available from the signal
(this is considered in greater detail in the next section).
Despite the problems though, it is sometimes said that the word is unduly neglected as a
theoretical possibility (Nooteboom 1981, Cohen 1986), and that more attention might help
overcome some of the problems.
"The only invariant at stake in speech behaviour is anchored through meaning, and in this
respect words, as units of meaning each with its phonological structuring, are taken to be
suitable candidates for constituting the building blocks of speech." (Cohen 1986:525)
For completeness, I should also mention the clause as a postulated unit of processing. As a
basic unit of speech it is of course ruled out by the obvious facts of its internal structure, and
the fact that parts of clauses are clearly comprehensible. However, its salience as a
processing unit in a weaker sense is well-accepted (Flores d'Arcais and Schreuder 1983).
The fact that the definition of the unit of perception has remained an unresolved problem for
so long has led some to suggest that it is not the best formulation of the question, and to
look for more creative solutions. Some think it is unlikely that one, single, unit is always
relevant, and suggest rather that different sized units play a role in different circumstances.
"The debate over the choice of a perceptual unit can be resolved if a strict distinction is
made concerning the level of linguistic analysis under consideration. The size of the
processing unit in speech perception varies from feature to segment to clause as the level of
linguistic processing changes. Thus debate over the question of whether there is one basic
or primary unit is, in our view, inappropriate since there are, in fact, many units that are used
at different levels by the speech processing mechanisms." (Pisoni and Luce 1987:11-12)25
"Similar views are expressed in Pisoni and Sawusch (1975); and by Barry (1981:235): "... the unit of perceptual analysis cannot
be defined rigidly in terms of a particular linguistic unit."
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Some believe the problems of segmentation could be overcome by postulating a system in
which explicit segmentation is not a necessary stage of processing. A fairly detailed model of
this kind has been proposed by Klatt (eg 1980): LAFS or Lexical Access from Spectra. In this
conception, initial processing gives a representation in terms of sequential spectra, and the
lexicon is accessed directly from these. This is made possible without transformation by the
fact that the lexicon includes representations of alternative pronunciations. Thus the
phonetic and phonological knowledge the system needs is "precompiled", saving the need
for transformation into an intermediate phonological representation for lexical access.
Finally, some suggest that emphasising segmentation into discrete concatenatable units is a
poor formulation of the problem (eg Sawusch 1986:56). It decreases the extent to which
coarticulatory information can be a help rather than a hindrance to the hearer (compare the
remarks at the end of the section on invariance). Norris and Cutler (1985) argue that what is
important in word recognition is not categorisation of the speech wave into a series of units,
but rather the ability to use phonetic cues to identify when a boundary has been passed and
a new unit is being processed. Stressed syllables, they argue, can be used for this purpose.
It is not the case that the stressed syllable is itself a boundary marker, but often the
occurrence of a stressed syllable indicates that a boundary has been passed. Also the
occurrence of stressed syllables is fairly predictable by the hearer from the rhythm of the
speech. (Different languages of course have different patterns of stresses that their users
have to learn.) Stressed syllables are also generally very information-bearing, both in the
reliability of their acoustic information; and in the sense that knowing the phonological
structure of a word's stressed syllable can greatly reduce the number of possible candidates
that arise. This latter point has been demonstrated in some much-quoted research by Zue
and colleagues (eg Huttenlocher and Zue 1983).
1.6. Word Recognition
1.6.1. introduction
So far the discussion in this review has been very general - necessarily, considering the
breadth of coverage that is needed for the argument of the rest of the thesis. In order to give
some more detailed appreciation of the trends and developments of work within the IP
approach, I would like now to focus on one central area of research - that of word recognition
- for discussion in a little more depth.
The basic problem of word recognition is similar to the problem of recognition of every other
unit: the fact that there are no explicit and reliable markers of the boundaries between words.
Certainly in the experience of the hearer, word boundaries are clearly "there" - to the extent
that naive listeners often think they are marked, as in writing, by brief silences. However, it
has been known for a long time that in reality, such pauses are rare, and in an acoustic
record of speech many (if not most) boundaries are not obviously or distinctly marked at all.
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This means that many sequences of segments are ambiguous with respect to their division
into words - a fact that lies at the heart of many punning jokes, as well as being implicated in
sound change (Cole Jakimik and Cooper 1980 give numerous examples of the "marezy
dotes and dozy dotes" kind).26
In this respect word boundary marking is an unusual aspect of speech production. It is
normally the case that the speaker is relatively careful in providing good quality information
for those aspects of speech that are most necessary in the hearer's decoding operation, but:
"...despite all the examples ... of speakers constraining their output in many and varied
ways to make things easier for the listener, the one thing which speakers could do which
would be particularly useful for listeners, namely provide precise information as to where one
word ends and the next begins, they do not." (Cutler 1987:31).
The question is, then, how do hearers recognise words27 - ie match them with entries in the
mental lexicon and access their meanings.
Some languages seem to make the hearer's task fairly easy - eg by always stressing some
particular syllable of each word, or by having a simple phonotactic structure. In English the
situation seems to be particularly difficult, due to our complex phonology.
"In English, where relatively unconstrained syllabification and free stress patterns exist,
word-boundary disambiguation is more critical than in languages where fixed word-stress or
more restricted syllable structure reduce potential ambiguities to a minimum." (Barry
1984:529)
I will discuss briefly two general approaches to this problem - which I call a phonetic
approach and a psycholinguistic approach, principally because historically most work in the
former has been done by phoneticians (traditionally interested in specification of cues used
in recognition of phonological units) and in the latter, by psycholinguists (traditionally
interested in sentence-processing) (Pisoni and Luce1987:22). This is certainly not a strict
division, and increasingly the two are joining forces.
1.6.2. Phonetic Approach
The first - and older - approach arises out of an understanding of speech perception like that
given in the basic serial model outlined above, in which the incoming signal is used to
construct a representation in terms of small linguistic units, which are then combined to
make larger units of a form which can be matched with the representation stored in the
mental lexicon, allowing access of the semantic and other information stored with that form.
^This has also of course been of interest to phoneticians for a long time. Garding (1967:5ff) gives some historical
background, as does, more briefly, Barry (1981).
27ln fact, of course, "word" is not the best word here: whether the relevant unit is the word or some other unit is
debatable. What is important is that it should be the unit of lexical access. In common with most current practice I
will use "word" as a cover term, in the absence of consensus about the relevant unit. Cf Flores d'Arcais and
Schreuder (1983:26): "The isolation and identification of single word units is an essential phase in the process of
understanding a sentence. Whatever the psychological status of a word may be, at some point we have to isolate
and recognise the words in sentences and look up their meanings in our mental lexicon."
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Achieving lexical forms from a long unsegmented string of phonological units would be
computationally very costly - if every possible combination had to be checked against the
lexical entries - and very open to ambiguity and error. It could be expected that speech
perception would be more efficient if information as to where words begin and end is
available in the signal, and retrievable at low levels of processing. Otherwise word boundary
decisions would need to be made at high levels, presumably involving some complex
disambiguation and hypothesis testing processes. A considerable amount of work on word
recognition has therefore been concerned to specify the extent to which the speech wave
contains cues that could aid the hearer in low-level segmentation into word-units. One kind
of acoustic cue that would presumably be particularly useful would be those marking where
one word ends and another begins.
"To understand speech, we must hear words, and to hear words, we must know where they
begin and end." (Nakatani and Dukes 1977:714)
A major focus of work in the phonetic approach then has been to specify the extent to which
the signal does actually contain such low-level cues to word boundaries, and the extent to
which hearers can make use of what cues there are.
One of the earliest studies was by Lehiste (I960)28. She used a now-classic technique. First,
she recorded phrases which contained strings of segments identical except for the position
of the word boundary (or "juncture") (eg "white shoes" vs "why choose"; "grey day" vs "grade
A" etc). Next the minimal strings were excised from the recordings, and played in random
order to subjects who were asked to identify which of two possible phrases they thought they
were hearing. Their responses were scored, and spectrographic observations made to
determine which cues subjects seemed to be using in making their judgements.
Since then, this has become a standard paradigm, and the results of subsequent word
boundary experiments on English are frequently compared to hers, similar phrases often
being used to make the comparison easier. Results are interpreted as showing the
percentage of word boundaries that are available to the hearer from cues in the speech
signal itself, since no higher level information is available to differentiate the excised
phrases.
For English, it seems to be the case that, overall29, subjects can retrieve between 65% and
85% of word boundaries in such experiments. It is generally accepted that the results
obtained depend on the kind of speech used - the more carefully enunciated the speech, the
more clear cues to word boundaries will be available. "Laboratory speech" is usually agreed
to be more carefully enunciated than "real speech", so that these experimental results are
28Though note that her intention in carrying out the study was not strictly related to speech perception as such.
Rather, she was concerned to make theoretical linguistic statements about the status of "juncture" as a phoneme in
structuralist phonology. Her results have since been interpreted with respect to speech perception theory.
^Compare Lehiste (1960), Barry (1981:278), Hoard (1966); O'Connor and Tooley's (1964) results are lower, but
they limited their data to contain only single consonant boundaries.
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higher than would be expected from spontaneous conversational speech. For this reason,
some experimenters have embedded their word boundary pairs into more natural sounding
contexts, rather than having a speaker read the phrases in isolation. In practice, this has
usually meant that the speaker reads a specially constructed passage {eg Barry 1981). This
is felt to be not entirely satisfactory, but necessary, since using conversational speech
presents too many problems of control.
Closer examination of these percentage scores shows that some kinds of boundaries are
more consistently detectable than others. Spectrographic analysis and speech synthesis30
have given a good deal of knowledge about the kinds of cues that signal a word boundary in
various segment types. For example, stop clusters usually provide fairly reliable cues ("bead
sticking" vs "beads ticking"); nasals between two vowels usually make the boundary very
difficult to locate ("an aim" vs "a name").
There seems to be some consensus that post-junctural cues (ie those marking word
beginnings) are more reliable than pre-junctural (marking word-endings)31. Some studies
also suggest that most of the acoustic information needed to identify the boundaries is at the
juncture itself, at least for English {eg Nakatani and Dukes 1977; though Cohen 1988 finds
little evidence for this). On the other hand, there has been a long tradition (since the early
work by Lehiste) of emphasising the importance of prosodic cues - which might suggest that
information from a longer stretch is also relevant.
Research has also been done on a wide range of other languages {eg Lehiste 1964;
Garding 1967; Quene 1985; Shimizu and Dantsuji 1980). Insofar as these studies allow
comparison, the overall perceptibility of word boundaries seems broadly similar, though
languages vary considerably in the actual phonetic devices they use to signal junctures {eg
in Japanese word boundaries are signalled more by prosodic cues of pitch, amplitude and
duration than by allophonic variation (Shimizu and Dantsuji 1980). Word boundary cues
have therefore to be specified as part of the phonology of particular languages (Lehiste
1964:196).
These results generally are interpreted as demonstrating the need for a substantial top-down
component in word recognition - ie high level constraints and predictions based on syntactic,
semantic and situational knowledge are available to the lower levels. The effects of subjects'
use of statistical knowledge of word frequency (or familiarity) and phonotactic information
have been observed by many investigators in biases in the results they obtain {eg Girding
1967 passim; QuenO 1985).
"When effective cues are lacking, a listener may resort to grammatical analysis" (Girding
1967:62)
^Modern signal manipulation techniques allow perceptual experiments with natural (ie not synthesised) speech,
(eg Barry 1984). Cross-splicing has also been used as a technique (eg Nakatani and Dukes 1977).
31 Eg Garding(1967:34), Nakatani and Dukes (1977) but cf Barry (1984:535) who, while supporting this observation
in general, warns that it is probably "too undifferentiated".
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Extrapolation from these experimental results to the situation in conversational speech is
somewhat complex. Spontaneous speech is considered to be on the whole more "sloppy"
than read speech, and to have fewer distinct and reliable boundary cues (Shockey 1973).
For one thing the common process of cluster simplification can reduce the effectiveness of
many cues. As well, it is a well-known phenomenon of speech production that speakers
often restructure the phonology of connected speech: ^syllabification is a common process
and inevitably results in the hearer receiving misleading word boundary information (eg
[.meifil 'droud] for "Mayfield Road"; cf Garding's observation of this effect in her "context
material").
Thus, in conversational speech the hearer has less reliable bottom up information and
presumably has to do more top down pocessing to compensate. On the other hand the
amount of non-acoustic information in the conversational situation is much greater, and the
hearer can apply all kinds of knowledge from many sources in predicting and constraining
possible hypotheses as to the message content.
"Junctural distinctions vary considerably in their perceptibility, but under circumstances of
mixed presentation do not achieve scores suggesting clear junctural categories... This would
suggest that phonetic decoding of word boundaries is secondary to the clearly categorical
function of phoneme identification, and that top-down information has a more prominent
place in the perceptual strategy." (Barry 1984:534-5, his emphasis)
There is evidence that high-level information can in fact be more salient to word-boundary
decisions than acoustic cues (Austin and Carter 1988).
1.6.3. Psycholinguistic Approach
Recently, auditory word recognition has become a topic of increasing interest to
psycholinguistics, which had previously been more concerned with visual word recognition or
sentence processing (eg Frauenfelder and Tyler 1987:1). Psycholinguists thus come to the
problems of word recognition from a different perspective from that of the phoneticians; they
are more directly concerned with recognition of words in continuous speech. For example,
Cole and Jakimik (eg 1980) build an account of word recognition into an overall sentence
processing theory - their research aims to specify the "strategies" that the hearer uses in
coming to an efficient and probably correct decision about the speaker's message, including
obviously accessing the meaning of the words.
This has brought about something of a change of focus32 in the study of auditory word
recognition: whereas the phonetic approach was primarily concerned with the identification
of features or segments, so that interaction with the lexicon was secondary, the
psycholinguistic approach focusses on this very interaction, seeing word recognition as
involving a combination of information from the auditory input and from the lexicon.
32lt is important to emphasise however that there is no strict demarcation between the two approaches; it is
certainly not the case that the psycholinguistic approach has taken over or replaced the phonetic approach. Some
recent work indeed combines the two (eg Quend 1985).
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Thus this approach challenges the assumption that the form to be matched in the mental
lexicon must be completely specified before the matching can begin. There is considerable
evidence (eg from subjects' ability to "shadow" speech at very short latencies, and from
gating and reaction time experiments; Marslen-Wilson 1984 reviews the issues in detail) that
hearers begin to hypothesise words very soon after their beginnings have been heard33 -
certainly well before their ends, or the next word boundary marker.
This challenge can perhaps be phrased as a reformulation of the quotation given above in
illustration of the rationale behind the phonetic approach: to understand speech, we must
know where words begin, and then once we have worked out what the word is, we know
where that one ends and the next begins. On this view, then, word recognition becomes an
interactive34 or on-line task, carried out in real time, with information from both the
incoming signal and information stored in memory being relevant at the same time (compare
the phonetic approach, which assumes that the form to be used in access is fully specified
before access begins).
"...the lexicon is not consulted only after a word is identified; it participates in the selection
of the identified word." (Jakimik 1979:410)
The nature of the lexicon and lexical access obviously become key factors in such a view.
Several new distinctions have been introduced into the theoretical terminology. An important
concept is that of a word's "uniqueness point": the point in its left-to-right structure at which it
becomes the only word in the lexicon with that structure: eg for "spaghetti", this point comes
rather early in the word - no other begins with [spag] (Jakimik 1979); for "spike" the
uniqueness point is right at the end. Words sharing the same initial portions (often called
"onsets") up to some point are said, following Marslen-Wilson, to form a "cohort".
In some models of speech perception, a word is considered to be recognised when its
uniqueness point is reached. It is therefore the same as the "recognition point". In others (eg
Jakimik 1979), the recognition point can be varied in different contexts, so the uniqueness
and recognition points can be different. In this way, the well-known effects of the prior
context of syntax, semantics, or context in facilitating identification can be seen as a change
to the word's effective recognition point. Either way, an important result is that acoustic
information coming in after the recognition point is far less critical to the percept, and is less
closely attended to by the listener. This accords well with observations from hearing errors
and experiments such as shadowing and listening for mispronunciations.
The claim of such models is that words are recognised from left-to-right, and in sequence - ie
that recognition of one word is complete before recognition of the following word begins. This
goes against the more orthodox belief in the importance of right-context effects (see Cole
Mln Marslen-Wilson's view, around 200-250ms after the beginning; others claim access can begin even earlier
(eg Dermody et al 1987).
^Though still modular; a non-modular interactive model, TRACE, will be mentioned under "Alternative
Approaches" below.
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and Jakimik's footnote, 1980:153). It also suggests that lexical access is based around word-
beginnings (which is disputed by eg van der Vlugt and Nooteboom 1986).
Another kind of distinction this approach makes more explicit is that between the different
ways in which the lexicon can affect word recognition (Frauenfelder and Tyler 1987). One
way is by allowing information about which word-forms have entries in the lexicon to affect
recognition, but without access to the semantic and other information stored with the forms.
Another is actually to access the entry, so that information as to the word's meaning,
syntactic roles, etc can also be used. To what extent these are separate stages is debatable,
as is the question of whether the second stage is subdivisible into substages - eg if detailed
information about the syntactic and semantic relations the word has with other entries is
available later than the basic meaning of the word.
Such models have the obvious advantage that explicit boundary markers are less important
in segmenting the acoustic signal into accessible forms; the fact they are rare in
spontaneous speech is not so much of a hindrance, since these models are less dependent
on them. Any information about boundaries that can be gained from the signal can however
be assumed to be useful (Quene 1985). In fact one of the problems faced by proponents of
these kinds of models is that of ensuring that the system does not mistakenly "recognise"
short words contained within longer ones35.
Such a model accounts well for various phenomena, such as "priming" (where presentation
of one word can facilitate recognition of related words); and for the observed rapidity with
which prior context can influence perception of words. For example, Cole, Jakimik and
Cooper (1980) demonstrate how the same acoustic signal is segmented as one word or two
words depending on the context in which it occurs.
A currently popular mechanism for achieving the interactive effect is the activation model, of
which there are several different kinds. Morton's logogen model, described above, is an
example, and can be used to describe the principle of operation. Lexical entries are thought
of as units which can be activated by information of different kinds; when the activation rises
above a certain threshold, the word is recognised. Any kind of information - acoustic,
contextual, etc - can affect the level of a logogen's activation.
Marsien-Wilson's model (Marslen-Wilson 1978, 1987) is considered the most explicit and
fully specified such model. It differs from the one just described in that it operates on the
principle that at first many word candidates (a cohort) are activated to threshold, subsequent
information causing all but one to drop below the threshold. Thus when the beginning of a
word is first heard, all the entries in its cohort are activated to a certain level. As more of the
word is heard, or more contextual constraints are available, the activation level of those units
35Though there is evidence that shorter words contained like this id longer ones are "primed" to some extent (eg
Shillcock and Lowe 1988).
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with less support dies down, but the ones which do receive support are kept active. When
only one unit is left, that word is recognised and its entry accessed.
Such models face several types of problem. One is that of recovery from error. Since the first
stage of recognition is activation of a subset of the lexicon - to be narrowed down to one
candidate - if the correct word is not, for whatever reason, in that initial cohort, it will never be
recognised (Pisoni and Luce 1987:42). It is also not clear yet how well they cope with
mispronunciations or non-words, or ambiguous words.
The idea is still actively under development, with work being done to specify the interaction
of inhibitory and facilitatory effects (Marslen-Wilson 1987), the precise timing of interactive
processes (eg McAllister 1988), and other details. There is also considerable work being
done to devise experimental tests to distinguish the predictions of different types of model in
this class (eg Frauenfelder et al 1987).
Although this is a strong movement in psycholinguistics, there is also vigorous defence of
more autonomous models (eg Norris 1982). This issue of interaction versus autonomy is,
as will have emerged from the discussion so far, at the forefront of current psycholinguist
research - see discussions in Frauenfelder and Tyler (1987), Flores d'Arcais and Schreuder
(1983), Pisoni and Luce (1987), for example.
1.7. Current Status of Speech Perception Research
It could be said that the way you look at the progress of speech perception research
depends on whether you are an optimist, and see the glass as half full, or a pessimist who
sees the same glass as half-empty:
"The good news is that it has been possible to characterise even a fragment of [the]
internal processing. The bad news is that it is but a small part of the system that
psychologists eventually hope to understand." (Miller 1983:320)
Either way, I think speech perception research in the 1980's is characterised by an attitude
of humility in the face of the magnitude of the problem. Many workers in the field would
agree that a great deal has been achieved in the last thirty years' research: for example,
perception of CV syllables is now considered to be fairly well understood (eg Haggard
1975:30). There is more concern as to whether an equal amount of progress is likely to be
achieved by continuation of the same line of development. Perception of connected speech
in natural settings is, as has been demonstrated by work in ASR particularly, enormously
more complex than was originally thought. It seems possible, to at least some IP
researchers, that there is cause for concern about the validity of some aspects of the
metatheoretical framework of IP. In this section, I will discuss briefly how the status of IP as
an account of human speech perception seems to those who work within its framework.
Most of the observations made here will be taken up in considerable detail in the following
chapter.
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There are basically two kinds of concern: one about how well IP is doing what it is doing; the
other about whether what it is doing is the right thing to be doing. With respect to the former,
a common self-criticism is that models and theories are often poorly specified, and less than
satisfactorily explicit. Pisoni and Luce (1986) give some details of this general feeling; see
also Pisoni and Sawusch (1975:16).
"For the most part, theories of speech perception have been quite general and quite vague,
and often inconclusive, at least by the standards used in other areas of experimental
psychology. It would not be unreasonable to characterize these approaches to speech
perception as preliminary attempts at outlining what a possible model of human speech
perception might look like. Rarely have specific theories been offered." (Pisoni and Luce
1986:29, their emphasis)
The need to use theoretical models, rather than actual implementations, can allow some
hand-waving explanations - especially since most researchers focus (necessarily) on sub-
problems rather than attempting to account for speech perception as a whole. This need to
tackle individual aspects separately is perhaps also responsible for the feeling that the field
in general lacks unity and coherence. It is not always clear how various sets of observations
based on different experimental paradigms can be related to each other.
Another widespread kind of concern has to do with the problems of interpretation of
experimental observations discussed above. This has two main aspects. First, the
relationship of the experimental situation to the everyday conversational situation, and the
validity of generalisation of experimental results, is sometimes felt to be very problematic.
Need for control in the laboratory means that frequently subjects are tested with synthesised
speech, or else with rather unnaturally produced human speech - passages or phrases read
in a particular way; and it is very unclear how closely perception of this kind of speech
resembles perception of spontaneous speech {eg Catford in Perkell and Klatt 1986:161).
Also, the choice of materials used in an experiment is constrained by the need to control for
variables other than the one being investigated (the items' frequency, length, connotations,
etc). This can mean that experimental materials are unlike "real speech" in kind, as well as in
production. This problem of confounding variables is wittily but earnestly discussed by
(Cutler 1981 )36.
Another difficulty is caused by the fact that the tasks the subjects are asked to perform are
not always clearly related to the kind of task they would face in a "real" situation. This has
led to fairly frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the "paradigm driven experiment"
(Pisoni and Sawusch 1975:20 Levelt 1978:4,21), in which researchers become more
focussed on testing how subjects react in different experimental situations than in how these
reactions relate to the process of perceiving speech in natural settings.
Secondly, the relationship between an observation and its theoretical interpretation is also
known to be problematic. This is partly due to an increasing sophistication among speech
^Though compare Massaro (1975b:36) who finds this particular problem less perturbing: "Confounding variables
are easily spotted by the experimenter himself or his colleagues so that this is not a major problem in psychology."
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perception researchers with regard to issues in philosophy of science: the notion of the
"theory-laden observation" and the acknowledgment that scientific results take their validity
from a network of presuppositions, rather than being "absolutely" true (Haggard 1975; Olson
and Clark 1976:25: "Scientists are captives of their methods."). This means, as mentioned
above, that great care must be taken not to "see what you want to see" in interpreting
experimental results.
The appropriacy of incorporating knowledge from related disciplines - especially linguistics
and phonology - into speech perception models has increasingly become a contentious
issue (Olson and Clark 1976). There have been considerable changes within these "feeder"
disciplines themselves over the history of IP ; and in any case, some of the expectations
they raised failed to be satisfied within the speech perception domain (notably, there is now
considerable scepticism as to whether the units and transformations of linguistics are
relevant to psycholinguistics). It is increasingly felt to be crucial to maintain a rigorous
theoretical distinction between theoretical researcher's and language user's perspectives
(Linell 1982, Pisoni and Luce 1987). Another discipline whose relevance is beginning to be
questioned is Artificial Intelligence, which was, along with linguistics and psychology, one of
the major components in the development of cognitive science and the general IP model.
The strong links that existed between ASR and human speech perception theory, and
between linguistics and psycholinguistics are becoming weaker.
The surfacing of all these issues has led to a considerable amount of metatheoretical work
being done to make explicit the assumptions according to which research (one's own or
others') is carried out. This kind of thinking is hardly new to speech perception research of
course - viz. the long-standing debate over articulatory versus acoustic description; and the
"object of perception" (Ohman 1975) - but it has certainly increased greatly in both quantity
and quality in recent years. Some work is being done to tidy up terminological
inconsistencies (Frauenfelder and Tyler 1987) to make a framework in which results are
more commensurable.
The second part of the question, then, concerns whether, given all these issues, IP is
basically on the right track, or whether some major revision or reorientation is required. This
question, like all the others, is answered differently by different groups. Some - the topic of
■framtwort:
the review above - continue to work within the l^, attempting to maintain high standards of
control and rigour, and making (relatively minor) theoretical adjustments as needed. For
example, several parts of the discussion of issues, above, ended by reporting some
suggestion for changing the formulation of a question addressed by IP. This of course
contributes to the feeling of lack of unity - at least for the short term. Some researchers have
taken on the responsibility of outlining in some detail the broad framework within which their
own research will be conducted as a preliminary to embarking upon a better-integrated
programme of empirical work. This usually involves some changes from the "standard" IP
view. Examples are Massaro (1987), McNeill (1987).
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Others are led by their metatheoretical questioning to break away from the IP model, using
the analysis of IP's "pretheoretical assumptions" as a springboard to launch an alternative
approach, defined in relation to a "standard" or "establishment" IP approach, and claiming to
be based on more acceptable underlying assumptions, and thus to raise a different set of
empirical questions. I will briefly discuss two37 such approaches that are currently gaining an
increasing following among those interested in speech perception.
1.8. Two Emerging Alternatives To The IP Approach
1.8.1. Parallel Distributed Processing
Thd first of these rivals to IP is the Parallel Distributed Processing approach - "PDP", or
"connectionism" (see for example Elman and McClelland 1984, McClelland and Elman 1986,
Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). In its view of the overall goal of speech perception, PDP is
similar to IP, seeing the task involved as the achievement of matchable or canonical forms
from the speech input: perception is thus, as in IP, a process of forming representations of a
stimulus. The differences between IP and PDP lie in their understanding of how this is
achieved38. In particular, PDP is opposed to the serial, modular, symbolic processing of IP,
which is considered implausible as a mechanism for human perception. Though the moves
towards more interactive processing in IP are appreciated by PDP researchers, they believe
that a more radical change is necessary. The alternative proposed is related to the neurally-
inspired Al models of Rosenblatt and others, which enjoyed a period of favour in the 1960s.
PDP proposes a mechanism consisting of a very large number of maximally simple units -
each with only two possible states - massively interconnected by links which can either
inhibit or excite activation of the units (nodes) they connect to. These nodes are arranged in
a series of tiers or levels. Input takes the form of excitation of a set of nodes, which causes
other nodes to be activated in patterns according to whether they are connected by inhibitory
or excitatory links, and the strengths of those connections. An important feature is that the
strengths of links can change according to the kinds of input the system regularly gets - in
other words the system can learn to associate inputs with patterns of activation.
The current versions of such a model of speech perception (eg McClelland and Elman 1986)
have the nodes arranged in tiers corresponding to linguistic units of the level of feature
(based on Jakobsonian Distinctive Features, but scalar, rather than binary), phoneme and
word. Nodes within a level are connected by inhibitory links, whereas nodes between levels
37These are not the only existing alternatives to IP. However, the others of which I am aware (notably
Rommetveit 1968) do not address the problems of speech perception as understood here, so I will limit
consideration to these two.
mPDP is thus best seen as a technological innovation, though it does have some conceptual or philosophical
concommitants. The philosophical framework as such will be discussed later (Chapter 4), so here I will comment
only on the aspects that are related to speech perception.
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are connected by excitatory links. Input to the system takes the form of stimulation of
feature-level nodes by a speech wave, and activation of these units then spreads, according
to the connection characteristics, to other nodes at all three levels. Nodes at other levels
then, in their turn, excite or inhibit connected units, and information is thus fed back and forth
between levels. As more of the speech signal is input, different patterns of activation
emerge. Whereas at first, probably several units at word level were activated, as more
information becomes available, some of these will receive more and some less activation.
When one set of nodes remains clearly more active than any others, the word they represent
is recognised, and its meaning can be accessed.
The advantage of such a system over the modular one, it is claimed, is that perception can
be seen as a process of simultaneous constraint satisfaction, rather than as a series of
discrete decisions. Speech perception can therefore be a highly interactive process39, with
information from different levels all being relevant at once40. Such models therefore
demonstrate a mechanism for integrating bottom-up and top-down processing, and allowing
both right and left context effects to be relevant to any percept.
"Feedback allows higher level considerations to influence the outcome of processing at
lower levels in just the same way that lower level considerations influence the outcome of
processing at higher levels. The influences of lexical and other constraints on phoneme
identification need not be pushed out of the theory of speech perception itself into decision
processes, but are integrated directly into the perceptual process in a unified way ... no
special provision needs to be made for combining lexical and phonetic outputs in the
decision mechanism." (McClelland and Elman 1986:74)
Since all information is represented uniformly, explicit propositional knowledge is not
needed. Rather the knowledge of the system is implicitly embodied in the strengths of the
an4 pfocrzf/nq
connections between its nodes. In fact the whole distinction between representation^is
blurred, with the emphasis taken away from explicit knowledge and rules. Learning becomes
not the addition of, or change to, rules, but depends on the changing weights of connections
between nodes. In fact, such a system learns associations or regularities not explicitly given
in the design. Similarly, the kinds of degradation such a system suffers on damage or error
in nodes and links, or with poor quality input, is much more like that observed in human
performance: compensations can be made rather gracefully and large degree of
degradation can be tolerated without breakdown.
An important advantage claimed for such a model in comparison with IP models is that the
system does not require, or even lead one to expect, invariant features of the speech signal.
Rather than being a hindrance to perception, as it is in almost all IP formulations, the
contextual variability of segments in the speech wave can be seen as a source of
information for the hearer.
"We maintain that the difficulty that speech perception presents is not how to reconstruct an
39Models based on this approach are often called "interactive activation models; the best-known speech
perception model so far is called TRACE.
40These systems can thus be seen as an extension of the thinking of Morton and Marslen-Wilson, or of the
architecture of the HEARSAY system in the ARPA project. The PDP team explicitly mention these relationships.
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impoverished signal; it is how to cope with the tremendous amount of information that is, to
use the term proposed by Liberman et al 1976, "highly encoded". (Elman and McClelland
1984:344)
The PDP view, it is claimed, allows a neat account of various well-known phenomena of
human speech perception. For example, "real word effects" and the ability of subjects to use
phonotactic information in constraining perception. Both of these effects simply "fail out" of
the design of the PDP model, without requiring explicit representation of knowledge and
rules for its application. Similarly, the way the links are arranged - inhibitory within levels and
excitatory between levels - means that the system displays a kind of categorical perception,
again without the need to postulate any "special" mechanisms.
At the current stage of development, there are also several problems associated with these
models - though their proponents are confident that these are problems related to particular
implementations, rather than being inherent to interactive activation models as a class. A
great deal of developmental research is currently in progress. Here I will mention a couple
of examples (taken from McClelland and Elman 1986) of the kinds of problems faced.
One is that of word boundaries: a given stretch of speech can contain many words other
than the ones intended, especially long words can be made up of several smaller ones.
Current PDP models of speech perception frequently "recognise" the wrong ones.
Relatedly, it is sometimes necessary for a perceptual system to "recognise" non-words, it
would seem then that some kind of control mechanism would have to be built in,
incorporating decision processes which could use information at word level to locate word-
initial phonemes (McClelland and Elman 1986:76). Another area of difficulty is that the
overall pattern of activation can be quite different for different occurrences of the same word.
These systems therefore do not mimic the well-known human speech perception
phenomenon of "priming" - in which a second occurrence of the same or a related word is
recognised more easily or quickly than the first. McClelland and Elman therefore suggest
that it might be necessary to "have things both ways", using the TRACE architecture for
recognition but also having a central store with a single representation for each phoneme or
word.
The reaction from the IP community to PDP models is generally favourable, and the idea
behind the architecture seems attractive to IP modellers as a way of achieving the kind of
"parallel processing" widely thought to underlie speech perceptual abilities. However there
is considerable doubt as to whether such non-modular models could ever be constrained
sufficiently to deal with free connected speech. I will say more about this approach, as
already mentioned, in Chapters 4 and 5.
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1.8.2. Ecological Perception
The second rival to IP is an approach to speech deriving from the "Ecological" perceptual
theory of J.J. Gibson (1966, 1979), a psychologist who developed a framework for studying
perception based on what he called a Direct Realist philosophy. I will delay discussion of the
more philosophical background till a more appropriate place, and concentrate here on how it
has been used in speech perception research. Currently, the development of an ecological
theory of speech perception is mostly associated with the name of Carol Fowier (eg 1986).
Previously,Gibson's approach has also been adopted and adapted (though to a lesser
extent) by, for example, Neisser (1976), Sanders(1977).
As in PDP, the major objection Direct Perception (DP) raises against IP is the amount of
processing that it requires to be performed on the input to achieve a matchable form that can
be used to access the meaning. The solution in this case however is not to propose a
different mechanism but to question the underlying conception of human speech perception
from which the processing view arises. It is seen to be related to a larger issue in perceptual
theory: the postulation of intermediate representations between the stimulus and the
percept, and it is the need for this postulation that DP theorists question.
They believe it is possible to avoid these intermediate representations and thus have a
theory of direct (as opposed to mediated or indirect) perception. The key to this lies in the
description of the stimulus. According to DP, IP's reliance on intermediate representations is
necessitated by the fact that the description of the stimulus is described in the language of
physics, and, further, that it is described as if it occurred in discrete time slices. DP prefers a
more "ecological" principle for stimulus description: it should be relative not to scientific
knowledge, but to the perceiving organism and its needs. Thus for an animal in a particular
environmental niche, the stimulus must be described according to the ecological significance
it affords - ie as food, shelter, danger and so on. As well, it is not the case that animals
receive information from the environment in short static individual time segments. Rather a
stimulus is spread out over time - it is an event - and its changing characteristics are part of
the information available to the organism.
Adapting this approach to speech perception, DP's first step is to determine what is the
object of perception from the point of view of the perceiver. This is taken to be not, as in IP,
the acoustic waveform, but rather the articulatory origin of that waveform41. The acoustic
wave, on this view, is simply the medium by which information about articulation is received.
The next step is the claim that the hearer can directly pick up information specifying the
original articulatory gestures, and thus retrieve the speaker's meaning. There is no need for
41 DP thus bears some resemblance to Motor Theory in its focus on the articulatory origin of the speech wave as
opposed to its acoustic nature. In fact, some of the original proponents of Motor Theory seem attracted to the DP
perspective (Studdert-Kennedy 1985, Liberman and Mattingly 1985).
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processing, computation, knowledge application, and so on. This is to make the claim, then,
that there is some direct relationship between articulatory gesture and linguistic unit: that it
is possible to specify unique, invariant, lawful relations between articulatory gestures and
linguistic units. As Gibson himself said42 (1966:94) "Phonemes are in the air". The failure of
the past thirty years' research to identify invariant relationships between acoustic and
linguistic units is not felt to counter this claim; in fact, from the perspective of DP, it is not
surprising that the search has been unsuccessful, since it has been seeking the wrong goal -
segmentation of an acoustic, rather than articulatory, representation.
Even so, this DP claim is a fairly substantial and controversial one. Proponents of the theory
believe it can be fulfilled by attention to speech production theory. They favour the view
embodied in Action Theory {cf Fowler et al 1980), which stresses that production should be
thought of not as "translation" of phonemes or other units into deformed images of
themselves contaminated by the influence of adjacent sounds. Rather it should be seen as
a series of skilfully controlled and coordinated gestures, emphasising that these are events
taking place in time. Coarticulatory effects, then, are not a hindrance to perception, but a rich
source of information about the exact nature of the gestures that were performed. Speech is
thus a sequence of overlapping gestures of the vocal tract, not a series of mutilated phonetic
segments. The DP view also encourages conception of speech perception as an integrated
process involving the entire perceptual system, not one isolated mechanism among others.
Researchers prefer to focus on the perceiving subject as actively integrating and seeking
information from a variety of sources (eg Byrnes 1982).
This view of speech perception has attracted a considerable amount of interest, and is
supported by a number of experiments and reinterpretations. It is clearly in early
developmental stages however, and there is still a good deal of debate at the level of
theoretical possibilities. In general the IP community welcomes43 the attempt to do some
metatheoretical sorting out, and accepts some of the criticisms brought against it, especially
those to do with the standard descriptions of the speechwave as "impoverished", and the
implausibility of "translation" theories in their most blatant forms. The term "ecological" has
entered the IP vocabulary, especially with respect to the kinds of experimental investigations
that should be used in studying speech perception. However there are also some strong
reservations about the plausibility of the alternative. It is especially doubted whether there
really are invariant relations between articulation and linguistic units. Perhaps the major
concern of IP theorists is over the lack of any top-down processes, which IP sees as
necessary to overcome poor signal information and account for the many context effects and
ambiguity resolution in speech perception; and as being evidenced by the occurrence of
errors of perception.
42Cf Fowler (1986:13): "The perceived parsing must be in the signal; the special role of the preceptual system is
not to create it but only to select it."
43See responses to Fowler (1986).
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1.9. Conclusion
Now that I have reviewed the IP approach to speech perception, and given, I hope, a fair
appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses in the eyes of its practitioners, I can step back a
little to state my own opinion of it, which is in fact the motivation for the research undertaken
in this thesis.
I am struck particularly by two general features of IP research as reviewed above. The first
is that in taking a fairly broad survey of the field, it turns out that almost every aspect of the
basic IP model is criticised or doubted by some subsection of the community. This was seen
above, where the diversity of opinion on several key topics was pointed out: the relationship
between active and passive processing, the existence and relevance of invariant cues, the
number and interactiveness of modules, the question of units of processing, and so on.
Many sections included mention of some more radical suggestion of a need for reformulation
of the basic questions to which answers have traditionally been sought: maybe we should
not think in terms of concatenated units, or acoustic cues, or stages of processing. This
continual requestioning of basic principles seems to me to be a significant hindrance to
progress in speech perception research. The solution is certainly not to discourage such
questioning; but rather to undertake a thorough analysis of the issues and the general
criteria according to which the various positions are held and defended. If so much is being
questioned, it must surely be relevant to ask what exactly it is about the IP model that is
being retained, and why.
My second observation is that, while it is surely true that the research reviewed above
constitutes a large body of knowledge about various phenomena of human speech
perception, it is not clear that what is being offered is an account of speech perception in
general. Certainly IP has been successful in providing a theory to relate signal
characteristics and percept in a range of cases. But the attempt to extend this account to
cover more general kinds of cases, notably everyday perception of speech in conversational
situations, runs into severe problems. If an account of some human activity has difficulty with
notions of control, context, meaning, individual differences, integration, and so on, it must be
legitimate to wonder just what about that human activity it is explaining. What is wrong here
is not the account that IP gives, but the fact that there is an inadequate appreciation of the
scope and range of that account, and the principles according to which it can be generalised.
Here again, then, the need is raised for consideration of criteria and presuppositions.
I have already shown that there is in fact a good deal of metatheoretical research being
carried out within IP. My belief however is that there remains scope for considerably wider
and deeper analysis than is currently being undertaken. Current discussions usually start
from a statement of the basic IP assumptions, in conjunction with some well-accepted
observation, and derive some conclusion according to which further practical work should be
carried out. This is a well known and often successful procedure. It has the disadvantage in
this case however that the basic IP assumptions as a whole are relatively little questioned
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and justified. If it were aspects of the foundations of the model that were causing the
problems being addressed, this approach would not uncover them. It would be rather a form
of symptom treatment. If different researchers focussed on different symptoms, it would lead
to a wide range of different solutions, and a generally ununified field of research - which is in
fact precisely the status of IP at the moment, in not only my view, but that of many IP
researchers.
In my opinion, the current state of IP is a result of the pattern of its development:
progressively extending an account of some observed relationships between acoustic
features and perception of phonemes, syllables, or other speech sounds, into a theory of
speech perception in general has meant that little attention has been paid to the question of
how or whether the account relates to what human beings are like (as opposed to what an
acoustic representation of speech sounds is like). In fact, to foreshadow my conclusion, I
believe that the IP model is inadequate precisely because it presupposes a processing
system which is not a possible description of a human being as a perceiver of speech.
There is, I suggest, an alternative approach - of starting with an understanding of the nature
of human beings and human cognition in general, and then narrowing the focus to account
for speech perception in terms of the more general principles. This, in the most general
terms, is the kind of approach I will recommend in the last chapter of this thesis.
To be able to do that requires an analysis, not, in the first instance, of the IP theory, but of
the framework of assumptions according to which it is defined. The following chapter, then,
sets out the main features of the philosophical background of IP, which will be analysed in
Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, I will bring the discussion back to the level of speech perception
theory in Chapter 5. The result of the analysis I am conducting will not be solutions to the
problems of IP as posed within IP, but rather, I hope, some insight into particular ways in
which the questions IP seeks to answer are ill-formulated, and increased understanding of





Having given a review of IP research on human speech perception, and stated a need for
consideration of the philosophical or metatheoretical framework within which this work is
carried out, I would like next to set out exactly what that framework is, as a basis for
discussion of the issues I believe to be significant. This unfortunately is not a straightforward
task. The framework is not predefined, and as has already been seen, there is considerable
diversity in the metatheoretical approaches taken by IP researchers.
However, it is not entirely a matter of piecing together the metatheoretical orientation from
clues in the theory. As already mentioned, IP emerged as part of the development of
cognitive science. Cognitive science also includes another branch specifically concerned
with matters of philosophy related to its overall enterprise. Much of the metatheoretical
framework of individual fields in cognitive science is set out explicitly by philosophers in this
branch, sometimes called "cognitivist philosophy", or "cognitivism" (cf Costall and Still 1987).
It is not quite acceptable, though, simply to use cognitivist philosophy as a statement of IP's
metatheoretical commitments. For one thing its scope is too wide, since it interacts to a great
extent with other Anglo-American philosophies, and is rather difficult to separate distinctly
from them. Many of these concerns are not at all relevant to the argument of this thesis. As
well, cognitive science is a large field, rapidly expanding in both size and complexity. Not
only would it be impossible to do justice to the range, diversity and sophistication of all its
philosophical issues and arguments in single chapter, it would be too general for present
purposes, which require discussion of only a subset of these issues. Finally, the metatheory
of speech perception research is not identical with that of other branches of cognitive
science. It has been seen already that many psycholinguists (and other psychologists) have
been doing metatheoretical analyses of their discipline. In some cases (eg the issue of the
relationship of psychology to Al or linguistics) there can be divergence between
philosophical analyses by cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists.
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Despite these problems of definition, however, I believe it is possible, by judiciously drawing
on work in cognitivist philosophy and cognitive psychology metatheory, to identify a
philosophical position1 which is used as an explicit statement and justification of the IP
framework. The present chapter will be devoted to the description and criticism of that
philosophical position. When I use the terms "cognitivist" or "cognitivism" therefore I shall be
using them in this slightly restricted sense.
As in Chapter 1, my aim is to set out the central well-agreed tenets of the approach, and give
an overall impression of the flavour or style of the arguments that go on around them, so I
make no claims to exhaustive coverage of all the details. It will be seen in following chapters
that the level at which I wish to disagree with cognitivist philosophy is one at which details of
differences between researchers are often not so relevant as their similarities.
The structure of the chapter is also similar to that of Chapter 1: it sets out first the central
tenets of cognitivist philosophy; then some aspects of the framework that is elaborated
around these tenets; and then some of the empirical and conceptual issues and debates that
arise within cognitive philosophy. Finally, in a discussion section, it points to the factors,
inherent in the framework, which I believe are at the root of my dissatisfaction with IP as an
approach to speech perception research. Chief among these, as already foreshadowed, is
the nature of the Subject2 presupposed by the theory. I will be arguing that a Subject
performing only the kinds of processes described by IP could not be a language-user in the
full human sense of the word.
2.2. Central Tenets of Cognitivist Philosophy
2.2.1. Monism
Perhaps the most important criterion that any philosophy of the twentieth century has to fulfil
is that of having a monist ontology: it should postulate only material entities, and not rely on
any non-material elements in its explanations and descriptions. One of the great advantages
that cognitive science claims for itself is that it fulfils this criterion, while avoiding the opposite
trap of reductionism, and consequent inability to account for complex or intelligent behaviour.
Cognitivist philosophy thus defines itself as steering a middle course between unscientific
dualism and mechanistic behaviourism, seen as two equally undesirable extreme
philosophical possibilities. Its ability to provide this way out between the horns of a dilemma
1Crsimilar conclusions reached by Mandler (1985:11), Kintsch et al (1984), Eysenck (1984:1 ff). Some discussion
of the status of cognitive science as a unified discipline will be given in Sec. 2.5 below.
2Until now I have been using the word "subject" in the usual psychological sense of the subject in an experiment,
about whom theoretical claims are being made. It will be convenient from now on to broaden the sense of the word
to incorporate the characteristics of any perceiving or cognising agent. (Much more will be made of this in Chapters
3, 4 and 5.) When I intend the word in this sense, I will capitalise it.
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is felt to be an important achievement, and at the heart of cognitivist philosophy's
self-definition3.
The breakthrough that allowed cognitive science to achieve this middle course was the
analogy it drew between mental processes and computation {eg Newell and Simon 1963).
There are commonly4 said to be three major components to this analogy, which I
recapitulate briefly here.
2.2.2. Symbolic Representation
The power of the computer, in this context, comes from the fact that its operations can be
seen as being performed on symbols, which can represent something other than
themselves. Whatever computation is required, the elements of the situation are first
symbolised, in a form the computer can use; then the symbols are processed according to
some program, for which it is irrelevant whether the symbols represent milkbottles, middle-
class families, or whatever; and the output symbols are interpreted in relation to the
particular context in which the computation is being carried out.
Cognitive science suggests that human cognition works in a similar way, ie that minds are
"physical symbol systems".
"At the root of intelligence are symbols, with their denotative power and susceptibility to
manipulation." (Simon 1981:14)
This suggestion has some important advantages in explaining human cognition. Since the
symbols are material entities, monism is maintained - they and the processes that are
performed on them obey the well-known laws of physics, logic and mathematics, even
though the symbols can represent anything at all, even non-material entities.
"... formal tokens can lead two lives: syntactic (formal) lives, in which they are meaningless
markers, moved according to the rules of some self-contained game; and (if the system is
interpreted) semantic lives, in which they have meanings and significant relationships to the
outside world. The story of how these two lives get together is the foundation of modern
mathematics and logic; and it is also the philosophical inspiration of cognitive science."
(Haugeland 1981:22 his emphasis)
It is important to emphasise the feature of this computational analogy that gives it its great
power. The notion that human cognition involves the ability to represent objects of the world
is hardly new to philosophy. Cognitivist philosophy differs from previous versions in the
nature of the things it claims can be represented by physical symbols. These can include not
just features of the world, but knowledge, propositions, goals, desires, and many other things
3lndeed, it is common in debates among cognitive scientists for the opponents to accuse each other of regressing
towards one or other of those endpoints. A good example is Dennett and Searle's (1982) debate.
4ln much of the following account, I will be putting forward well-accepted and frequently rehearsed views.
General accounts similar to the one given here, though often differing in emphasis or selection, can be found for
example in Stillings et al (1987); Anderson (1985); Sanford (1987); Eysenck (1984); Lachman, Lachman and
Butterfield (1979).
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that need to be taken into account in intelligent behaviour. All of these can be represented in
the same kinds of symbols, which can then all interact in the computational processing.
Thus, all that is being postulated ontologically are material entities (and monism is
maintained);but, since the symbols can represent beliefs, meanings, goals and so on, the
system can show highly intelligent, knowledge-based behaviour (and reductionism is
avoided).
In effect what is being claimed is that there is a "level of description" - the symbolic -
between the two observable levels of a person - the behavioural and the physical (or
neurological) (eg Gardner 1985:383); and that understanding of this third level is necessary
to understanding of the functioning of the cognitive system (at least until we have a far better
understanding of neurology than we do now). The analogy is sometimes drawn between
this situation and that of computer descriptions: explanation of the computer's behaviour in
terms of its low level descriptions - flow of current through switches, or machine languages -
is not always the most appropriate. For many purposes, it is more useful to give
explanations on another level, such as the level of programs and programming languages.
Moving between the levels is justified, in the case of the computer, by the fact that the
relationship of the levels is known: translation from one description to another is possible in
principle. In the case of human descriptions, we are not yet sure in detail of how the levels
relate to one another; but the example of the computer showed how the (unobservable)
mental could be included in a scientific, ie monist, psychology.
2.2.3. Processing by Rules
Cognition, in cognitivism, is not about static representations. Another key concept of
cognitivist philosophy is that the mental symbols can be transformed before being
interpreted. Repesentations are processed according to computational rules which can act
automatically on specifiable features of the symbolic representation - the specification of
these features might be very complex, and require reference to knowledge represented
elsewhere in the system, but it can be done relative to features of the representation, rather
than features of whatever it represents. In other words, the operations are formal5. But,
since the symbols are in themselves not tied to a particular meaning, the processes they
undergo can be very general, or abstract; thus of general purpose, but unmysterious.
"Computation is the only worked-out view of process that is both compatible with a
materialist view of how a process is realised and that attributes the behaviour of the process
to the operation of rules upon representations." (Pylyshyn 1980:113)
Again, it was the advent of the programmable computer which demonstrated that highly
complex and flexible behaviour can be achieved by a system using only formal rules: though
each individual step of a process might be maximally simple, a large number of such steps
acting together, and able to make use of knowledge, plans, etc, symbolised in the system,
5Some difficulties with this view will be discussed below.
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can create extremely complex effects. The Turing machine was the theoretical
demonstration of this point.
Intelligent processes could thus be thought of as the operation of a formal system: a set of
tokens and the rules for their manipulation or transformation.
2.2.4. Functionalism
An important, though somehow ironic, consequence of the fact that the physical symbol
system need not have any necessary relationship to the meaningful interpretation of the
symbols, is that the actual physical material the representation is made of is irrelevant.
Whatever the symbols are made of, so long as the functional relations between them are
maintained, and the appropriate computation is performed, the output can be interpreted as
the appropriate result of the computation. Thus, the functional relations between the
representations are more important than their physical properties. Everything is defined by
its function in the system rather than by its physical properties. This fact lifts the whole
discussion into the realm of the abstract: what matters are abstract functional relations,
rather than whatever particular physical material might instantiate those relations.
This perspective allows an account of why it is that things which share no physical properties
can still be in a sense "the same". The classic example is the sameness of a wind-up clock,
a digital watch and a sundial all registering the time "10am": though there is nothing physical
about them that is the same, they are all in the same "functional state".
"Mental things, like beliefs, images and thoughts, are what they are because of what they
represent. They represent what they represent because of how they behave in the mind. The
point is that very different kinds of things ... could all represent the same thing." (Stillings et
al 1987:306)
On this analogy, the human cognitive system is simply one among many possible
instantiations of intelligent processes; biological systems (such as human beings) are just
one class of intelligent machines. This is the reason that neurology is6 of secondary interest
to cognitive science.
This feature of cognitive philosophy is extremely important for practical work in cognitive
science. Its task can now be seen as that of determining the abstract program(s) that any
human cognitive process instantiates - ie the interest is in the software more than the
hardware. Since it is the functional, and not the physical, properties of the program that are
relevant7, it is legitimate to study cognition using models whose physical and computational
properties are understood far better than the brain's. Thus, Artificial Intelligence (Al) is a
central area of cognitive science; and computational modelling of (subsets of) human
cognitive abilities one of the main avenues of theory development.
6Or "has been" - see below.
7Physical properties are of course relevant in the sense that whatever program is postulated must be able to run




Around these three basic tenets (representations, processing and functionalism) is
elaborated a philosophical framework within which cognitivist answers to various
philosophical questions can be given. In this section, as in the analogous section of Chapter
1, I present what might be thought of as a "core", or unembellished account of this
framework. Not all cognitive scientists would unqualifiedly accept all of them. The issues and
debates which occur within cognitivist philosophy around these points will be brought out in
the next section. This is approximately the way cognitive philosophy has developed
historically - the earlier a theory is, the more likely it is to fit the description in the first section.
Most of the issues raised in the second section arise in response to specific failings of the
"core" account, and are therefore easier to expound with respect to it.
I mention firstly some aspects of cognitivist philosophy's framework relevant to the
characterisation of the human being (Subject); secondly, aspects relevant to the
characterisation of science and scientific method. Most of this is rather familiar material, and
this section is intended more to make explicit the starting point for further discussion, than as
an exhaustive treatment8.
2.3.2. Characterisation of Cognition
2.3.2.1. Knowledge
Cognitivist philosophy, as has been noted several times, is keen to stress the degree to
which human mental processes depend on knowledge, in contrast to behaviourism, which
tried to do without any such concepts in its account of human action. Given the view of
cognition I have just outlined it is natural9 to assume that everything a person knows that will
be relevant in any cognitive process is represented symbolically, and stored so as to be
available to interact with other symbolic representations. The form of such representations -
eg whether they are images or propositions - and their nature - eg what terms and syntax
they are in - are then topics of research in cognitive science.
The amounts of knowledge typically stored by a person are of course enormous, and issues
of the organisation and retrieval of particular items from vast databases are also key areas of
empirical research. Human memory is generally assumed to be divided into three stores of
varying durations; long term memory, working memory and very brief sensory registers of
8Again, similar accounts can be found in many textbooks and reviews, eg Anderson (1985) Eysenck (1984)
Stillings et al (1987)
9Problems with this view will be brought out below.
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various kinds10. The storage capacities of each of these, and aspects of forgetting and
access are important areas of investigation. Memory is often thought to be organised
according to "schema" or "script", with slots for particular items to be filled in, which allows
the concept of "default" entries to be used in accounting for the way people can infer
information not explicitly given in a text.
2.3.2.2. Thinking and Intelligence
The paradigm of intelligent thinking has been considered by cognitivist philosophy to be
"problem-solving". This involves definition of a problem state and a goal state. Intelligent
problem-solving is considered to involve setting of sub-goals, and decision as to the most
efficient logical path between them. (cP'Towers of Hanoi" and other such puzzles). Learning
and reasoning are thus at the heart of cognition - in contrast with a behaviourist account,
which allows only trial and error and reinforcement to affect the organism's response to
problems. This kind of human intelligence or rationality is often said to have evolved as an
aid to survival.
An early difficulty with this view was that of the "combinatorial explosion" that occurred with
complex problems if every logically possible route had to be tested. Also, in real-life
problems it is not always possible to specify the goal in advance, so routes cannot be
enumerated and compared. Considerations such as these led to the development of
concepts like "heuristic"11 and "strategy" - procedures based on "educated guesses" which,
though not infallible, work in the normal case to reduce the amount of time and effort
expended in a search.
2.3.2.3. Perception
A good example of the role of knowledge and reasoning in cognitive theory is given by the
treatment of perception. Perception is seen12 as the extraction of information from a
stimulus, usually described in physical terms, which impinges on the sense organs. It is often
explained that the simplest or most obvious account of perception would be as template-
matching - as in behaviourism - but that this could not work because of the degree of
contextual variability in the stimulus. A better account therefore is to think of perception as
pattern-recognition, involving knowledge-based transformation through stages, of the kind
discussed in Chapter 1 for speech perception.
The first stage of pattern-recognition is feature-extraction and -representation. Once the
10CrSection 1.3.2 above.
11As opposed to algorithm.
12The example of speech perception was of course treated in detail in Chapter 1, but very similar considerations
apply in, say, visual perception: "The central theoretical problem in object-recognition ... is to explain how abstract
representations of visual categories in long term memory (LTM) can be rapidly retrieved ... by the information
present in low- or intermediate-level representations of visual input." (Stillings et al 1987:492)
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information-bearing features have been extracted from the stimulus, they must be organised,
and combined, through several stages of processing, with information from knowledge
representations stored in memory. Thus perception involves both top-down and bottom-up
processing, as evidenced by the occurrence of errors, illusions and ambiguities. For
recognition to occur, the outcome of all the processing must be a form, or abstract pattern,
which can be matched with a semantic representation stored in long term memory13.
2.3.2.4. Language
Language is one of cognitive science's most important areas of study, since its use gives a
window onto the structures and processes of the mind: given the structure of language and
the fact that it is understood, we can see the kinds of inferences and knowledge application
which form the core of the cognitive system. Also, language is involved in many high-level
cognitive processes using categorisation or conceptualisation. Lastly, language has been a
key topic of Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century, and there has been
considerable cross-fertilisation between cognitive science and philosophy since the
beginning of cognitive science.
Chomskyan linguistics was very important in the development of cognitivist philosophy,
especially his arguments against structuralist/behaviourist accounts of language and
language use (Chomsky 1959). Chomsky's transformational-generative view of language as
a rule-governed system, rather than a set of static structures: his focus on sentences and
their relationships (especially their ambiguities) rather than phonemes and theirs: and his
demand for a new standard of "explanatory adequacy" were influential to the degree of being
revolutionary. It was partly through his work that the common concerns of linguistics,
psychology and computer science were highlighted. Compared to the early days, however,
"the honeymoon is over" (Lachman, Lachman and Butterfield 1979): the relationship
between linguistics and psycholinguistics has become much more contentious since the
1960s. Nevertheless, many aspects of the Chomskyan conception of language and
language use remain14, at least in core areas of cognitive science. The separation of
competence and performance clearly fits in very well with cognitivist philosophy, as does the
focus on formal structures and rules. Also Chomsky's observations about the ambiguities
and other relationships of linguistic structures have posed some of the defining problems for
cognitive science.
"For the most part ... Chomsky has been more influential in psycholinguistics because of
the kinds of questions to which he has drawn attention than because of any direct utility of
his theory for experimentation." (Gardner 1985:215)
Language is seen by cognitivists as a system of relationships between physical forms and
13A very similar account to this one is given by Eysenck (1984:38).
14The idea of the relationship between language, psychology and philosophy in itself, of course, shows the
influence of Chomsky's thought.
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meanings15. In general the meaning of a word or sentence is thought of as a semantic
representation associated with it. Both the formal and the semantic properties of language
are important areas of study. The formal representations are studied for the rules of their
relationships (syntax). The semantic representations can be studied in their own right, and
decomposed into their elements to find the relations they have with each other - often
thought to be in the form of systems or networks. They can also be studied for their
relationship to thought itself. In general, thought is not considered to be identical with the use
of language. Rather, linguistic forms cause or affect thought processes that take place in
some other, perhaps language-like (Fodor 1975), system of conceptual-representation.
"Words manipulate mechanisms of thought and thought processes select the words we
utter but words themselves are only sounds or shapes which interact with mental
procedures." (Sanford 1987:18)
This view is motivated, for example, by the observation that people's memory of something
they have learned through language is usually in terms of its semantic interpretation, rather
than the linguistic structures which actually encoded the information.
The relation of linguistic structures to facts about the world is another topic of interest to
cognitivist philosophy. A particular focus is on how to characterise the truth values of
statements in terms of their relationship to the truth or falsity of the facts they represent.
2.3.3. Characterisation of Science
2.3.3.1. Relationship of Science to Philosophy
One of the hallmarks of cognitive science is its interdisciplinary nature. From the beginning it
has been felt that the new conception of cognition allows many questions that previously
were open only to philosophical speculation to be given a scientific or empirical cast: the
framework constrains speculation; and experimental tests can provide answers to the
(reformulated) questions. This has been seen as very much a parallel of the historical
development of the special sciences from a general, speculative philosophy (Miller and
Gazzaniga 1984:4).
However, in the last decade, especially, the relevance of philosophical thought to empirical
issues, rather than vice versa, has been given increasing emphasis. The failure of the early
Al models and theories of cognition is often blamed on conceptual confusions caused by an
overly cavalier attitude to philosophical issues. One outcome of this has been that many
cognitive scientists have taken an interest in philosophy themselves rather than leaving it all
to the professionals (which is of course why much of the work I refer to in this chapter is by
people who are primarily psychologists or computer scientists). It is increasingly common,
for example, for cognitive psychologists and others to situate their work in a context of the
history of philosophy.
15"Language relates sound to meaning via syntactic structures." (Stillings ef al 1987:389)
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2.3.3.2. Truth and Explanation
In the early days of cognitive science, there was confidence in the cumulative nature of
science and the attainability (by "convergence") of (closer and closer approximation to) the
truth. Nowadays it is much more common to accept a Kuhnian view of scientific paradigms,
consensual beliefs and pretheoretical assumptions, with "truth" being seen as relative to an
agreed framework, rather than defined absolutely. Cognitivism thus provides the framework
of assumptions within which empirical work can be carried out. Many cognitive scientists say
that the cognitivist view is only one of many possible views, but that for the time being it is
the most generally accepted and fruitful16. It is thus thought of as a "working hypothesis": it
may turn out to be wrong, but in the meantime, much will have been learned. Given this
view of science, the ability of cognitive science to make explicit its pretheoretical
assumptions, and work rigorously from them, is often claimed as one of its advantages. As
was seen in Chapter 1, the computational metaphor is often said to be an important aid in
maintaining rigour and explicitness.
One of the prominent issues in the change from behaviourism to cognitivism was that of
explanation, with the move from inductive to deductive demonstration, and from verification
to falsification of hypotheses 17[?or an exposition of the older view of science and scientific —i
methodj, bringing about an emphasis on bold conjectures and fruitful hypotheses. Provision
of a working model or program is considered the best possible kind of explanatory
demonstration: the potential of cognitive science to produce such real demonstrations of the
validity of its theories is considered one of its major advantages.
"...if computational concepts can be embodied in a functioning computer program that can
be run on a machine, then one knows that the programmed theory in question is sufficiently
powerful to generate the performance evinced by the machine" whereas "The explanatory
power of verbally expressed theories is ... intuitively sensed rather than rigorously
articulated..." (Boden 1979:115, her emphasis)
This goal however, is a very advanced one, and not always practicable18. For many
purposes a more informal view of explanation is usually accepted. A model is deemed
"explanatory" if it allows control or at least prediction of the phenomenon under
consideration, and especially if it can account for more observations than it was originally
devised for; or if it relates something we do not understand (in the case of cognitive
philosophy, for example, human intelligence) to something we do (for cognitive philosophy,
this means for example, computers, biology, or physics).
16Several modern textbooks actually introduce cognitive science in this way. One example is Lachman, Lachman
and Butterfield (1979).
17See Cohen and Nagel (1934) ^ —
18ln any case, some cognitive psychologists now question the validity of such demonstration - see below.
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2.3.3.3. Scientific Method
The topic of method was discussed with respect to psycholinguistics in some depth in
Chapter 1. It is also a topic of concern in cognitive psychology more generally (viz. Kintsch et
al 1984). Very much the same kinds of issues are raised, especially the difficulties of
designing and interpreting experiments about unobservable mental processes.
It is generally accepted that the basic sequence of formulation and experimental testing of
hypotheses arising from theories is the right one, but many problems with it are discussed.
For example, it has often been the case that the more obviously programmable aspects of
cognition have been tackled first, leaving more difficult ones aside. While this procedure is
agreed to make sense in general it is sometimes criticised on the grounds that the tasks that
are "simple" computationally are not always those that are "simple" for humans. Jenkins
(1974) wonders if it might not be like thinking it is "simpler" to ride a monocycle than a
bicycle, and a bicycle than a cart. This is part of a general difficulty of defining sub-goals for
research which make sense in relation to the more distant major goals (Miller and Gazzaniga
1984:9).
It is also usually agreed that development of well-specified, general theories is desirable; but
this criterion also has its problems. Aiming for increasingly well-specified models and
theories can encourage the kind of "paradigm-driven experiments" described in Chapter 1.
Aiming for very general models can mean that sources of variability are eliminated, by
careful selection of subjects, absolutely uniform conditions, etc, when the variability might
itself be significant (Cohen 1977 discusses these points in some depth).
A major point often claimed in the favour of the cognitivist enterprise, as has been seen, is
that it compels researchers to be explicit, and therefore more rigorous, in their thinking,
especially by imposing the need for computational modeling. Again, there are some doubts
as to how good a test a computer implementation is - in other words, the fact that a
computer can "do it" cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that humans "do it" in the
same way. (This point, as well as some of the others raised here will be taken up again
below in Sec. 2.4.)
In general cognitive scientists are very aware - as was seen to be true of speech perception
researchers specifically in Sec. 1.4.2 - of methodological problems, and currently there is
increasing interest in designing experiments with "ecological validity" (the term taken from
Gibsonian theory already mentioned and discussed again below), as well as increasing
concern with the need to be explicit about presuppositions, control of variables etc.
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2.4. Issues Within Cognitivist Philosophy
2.4.1. Introduction
There are, naturally, many areas of debate within cognitivist philosophy. I will focus here on
a few central ones that have particular relevance to the present thesis.
2.4.2. Consciousness
One of the biggest philosophical problems facing cognitivism is how to account for
consciousness and conscious experience. Given the monist postulation that there is only
one kind of entity, it is necessary to explain the fact that some entities of that kind have
consciousness, while others, by hypothesis of the same kind, do not. This raises questions
like: What is it about a thing that makes it conscious? How can we differentiate between the
two theoretically? Is it possible to give consciousness to a non-conscious entity? Why are
some human cognitive processes conscious while others are not? What function does
consciousness serve?
"The problem of consciousness lurks always in the background. The phenomenon of
immediate awareness is a collection of unanswered questions. What does it mean for
attention to be conscious? What limits unconscious information-processing? What is
consciousness good for? Could computers be conscious? The questions go on and on."
(Miller and Gazzaniga 1984:9)
The view that emerges from the standard cognitivist tenets outlined above is that
consciousness, like other properties of systems, is a consequence of the functional
relationships of representations and processes. On such a view, it is theoretically possible
for a non-human, non-living19 entity - a machine - to have consciousness. For some aspects
of consciousness - like knowledge, beliefs, even hopes, desires or self-awareness - this is
relatively uncontroversial. However, when it comes to the subjective, conscious experience,
the "feel", of some states, the classic example being pain, it is admittedly harder to be
convinced that a machine made of metal and wires could have "consciousness" in the same
sense as we humans do.
There are various ways of treating this issue, of which I will mention only a couple. One is to
insist that "pain", and other cognitive states, are a matter of the instantiation of a particular
computational process or functional relationship. In humans, for example, this process is
instantiated when particular nerve fibres are stimulated. Part of the process is the holding, by
the system, of the belief that it is in pain. This view suggests that our unwillingness to
attribute pain to a machine is mere prejudice on our part. If a machine instantiates the
functional relations of pain, including having the belief that it is in pain, and asserts that it is
in pain, who are we to deny it? Surely that would be the worst kind of inhumane prejudice?
19Perhaps "non-carbon-based" is a less prejudiced term.
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This view is backed up by various thought experiments involving the gradual replacement of
a person's entire nervous system with an artificial substance that instantiated all the same
functional relationships and carried out the same computational processes as the original. At
what point could we say that the person no longer "really" felt pain? Or was no longer "really"
conscious? (This line of thought is pursued to great effect in Hofstadter and Dennett 1981)
Others take less hard-line approaches that involve weakening the force of some of
cognitivism's basic tenets. One such approach is to concede that there are aspects of
human nature - pain, and perhaps other aspects of human experience, such as emotions -
which are simply outside the scope of computational explanation. This would seem to be
Boden's view - she makes the analogy between cognitive science and other scientific
explanations:
"One might well doubt whether biochemistry will ever be able to explain all the metabolic
processes occurring within the human body - but it does not follow that biochemistry has
nothing to say about these processes." (Boden 1979:113, her emphasis)
After all, she says (p.130), we do not expect chemical theories to fizz if we put them in a test
tube.
"Every metaphor or analogy has its limits, and the scientist should ideally know what these
are. But it is not always possible to predict - or even sensible to ask - what these limits are at
the early stages of employment of a theoretical metaphor in science." (Boden 1979:113)
Another response is to suggest that the tenet of functionalism has its limits. Consciousness
can then be explained as a property of the particular (biological) matter that some intelligent
systems are made of, and thus not transferrable to a machine made of metal and wires.
Searle {eg 1981, 1984) is a particularly well-known holder of this view.
Another way that is hoped to afford insight into the problem of consciousness is to look at it
from a philosophical or conceptual perspective, suggesting that it is the formulation of the
problem itself that causes the trouble, and that it is therefore necessary to define more
carefully exactly what is meant by the word "consciousness", which has many connotations,
some rather emotional. One possibility is to speak not of conciousness but rather of
attention. On this view, the difference between conscious processes and unconscious ones
is that the former are attended to, while others are not. This is related to the observation that
human cognitive systems have limitations on the capacities of their memory stores, which
must therefore be used as efficiently as possible. "Consciousness" thus has, on this view, an
adaptive function, both in allowing the system to reflect upon its own thought processes, and
in limiting the amount of information that has to be dealt with at one time:
"If one were aware (conscious) of everything one knows, or even of everything that is
relevant (closely related to) some current experience, one would be swamped with
information and unable to act." (Mandler 1985:82, his emphasis)
This gives a useful insight into the relation of the conscious to the sub- or unconscious as
seen in cognitivism. Processes of which we are not conscious, or aware, are like conscious
cognitive processes in kind; the difference is that they are either unattended (because the
attention is focussed elsewhere) or not available to awareness (because they happen "below
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the level of consciousness")20.
A concept that has become increasingly important in this regard is that of "intentionality". It is
a concept with quite a long and confused history, and will receive further discussion in
chapters 3 and 4. In current cognitivist use it seems to have several possible definitions and
uses. According to one of these, intentionality is "a philosophers' term for aboutness"
(Stillings et al 1987:317) - ie the property of something that makes it possible for that thing to
be about something else. An intentional state, for example, is one which has content as well
as formal features and relationships. Key examples are beliefs, desires, fears, etc, which are
all, necessarily, of or about some object ("object" being meant in a grammatical, rather than
physical, sense).
Intentionality can also be defined as a property of systems or devices: an intentional system
is one which operates on the basis of beliefs, goals, fears, desires, etc. As we have seen,
operation which takes into account such factors is an important feature of intelligence in the
cognitivist view. An intentional system is, thus, in a sense an "intelligent" system.
Consciousness, intentionality and intelligence are thus all closely bound up together: the
question of how if at all they differ is one of the currently focal issues in cognitivist
philosophy.
The questions about consciousness are sometimes rephrased, then, in a more precise or
scientific way, ("more neutrally" - Dennett 1978), in terms of intentionality, in the hope of
avoiding some of the problematic connotations of the word "consciousness". The debate
then concerns whether a machine could in fact have or be given this property, leaving out of
consideration our more emotional feelings about souls and human dignity21.
A problem remains however: that of defining when a system should be deemed to be
intentional. One response to this, given for example by Pylyshyn, is that if the behaviour of
the system can be altered in a general way by change of a specific intentional state, then it is
intentional. In such cases, an explanation of the process needs to be in terms of the
"functional architecture" of the system, rather than its electronic or physiological events. For
instance, in humans, a change in one belief state can cause radical differences in behaviour.
The fact that human behaviour is so well explained in everyday life by "folk psychological"
descriptions22, which are essentially intentional, argues, in his opinion, for the importance of
intentional states in human behaviour.
use the fact that we are not aware of this kind of processing going on inside our skulls as a counter¬
argument to cognitivist philosophy's claims is considered to be regressing to the old introspectionism. Observable
and verifiable evidence is felt to be more reliable, and all the evidence shows that some such processing must be
going on. "The processes are the same whether consciousness enters into it or not" (Sanford 1987).
21 It has to be said that this has sometimes led the word "intentionality" to be used very loosely, as a convenient
catch-all phrase, meaning something like "whatever it is about ourselves and our human consciousness that we are
inclined to think could not be attributed to an artificially intelligent device".
^Everyday explanations such as "He went to town because he wanted to buy shoes"; "She left because she
knew that the bus had come", and so on.
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A more radical proposal, from Dennett (eg 1978), is that the "fact of the matter" as to
whether or not a system operates with propositional attitudes is not relevant, even if it is
ascertainable. He takes the instrumentalist position that if it is useful for explanatory
purposes to ascribe beliefs to the system, then we should do so. This he calls taking the
"intentional stance" towards a system. Searle, on the other hand, disagrees strongly with
Dennett's position. He believes not only that there is a fact of the matter, but that it is a
crucial matter. The fact that humans really have intentionality, whereas machines do not (at
least so far), is what makes ail the difference between them. His famous and much debated
illustration of this point is another thought experiment called the Chinese Room argument
(Searle 1980).
2.4.3. Achievability of Artificial Intelligence
A closely related and hotly debated issue is whether it is possible in principle or practice to
build a system which has consciousness, intentionality or intelligence. Emotions run high on
both sides of this argument, and opinions run the whole gamut from the assertion that even
the early Al systems like the General Problem Solver should legitimately be said to be
intelligent and to have a mind; through a series of stages of belief that though Al has not
been achieved yet, it is possible in principle or practice; to the belief that only living, perhaps
human, beings have true intelligence and mental states.
This issue is closely tied to opinion about how seriously the computational metaphor should
be taken as a description of human cognition, ie on its scope and its status. If, for example,
one believes that mental processing literally is, at the deepest level, computation, then there
is no reason to doubt the possibility in principle of an artificially intelligent machine, though
one may well doubt the capability of current technology to produce such a machine. On the
other hand, if one believes that computation is a fruitful metaphor for studying (some aspects
of) cognition, true Al might not seem to be achievable, although computer models could be
considered as throwing light on human cognitive abilities23. Searle has made a well-known
classification of opinions on this matter into "Strong Al" - the view that in modelling intelligent
processes with a computer system, one is actually creating an intelligent device; and "Weak
Al" - the view that the discipline Al provides useful insight into human intelligence and
cognition, but does not create "minds".
Stillings et al (1987:331) suggest that only a minority of cognitive scientists take computation
merely as a convenient descriptive metaphor for human cognition. Pylyshyn takes an
especially strong stand on this issue, suggesting that it is actually failure to take the
computational analogy literally enough that causes a considerable amount of confusion in
cognitive science. His own approach starts from the assumption that cognition literally is
23"Computers will be pivotal in helping us determine how computer-like we are, but the ultimate answer might be
'not very much'." (Gardner 1985:387)
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computation, and explores the implications thoroughly. Searle himself takes the rather
unusual view that, while human beings literally are information-processers, machines are
only metaphorically described as if they were (1985:35). The difference between them, in his
opinion, is that humans have intentionality, while machines do not.
A further issue is that of how to decide when, or whether, Al has been achieved in practice.
The most famous proposal for such a test is the Turing test, suggested by Turing (1950).
Briefly, it says that if it is not possible to tell from the answers given to a series of questions
whether the answerer is a machine or a person, and it is a machine, then that machine
should be deemed intelligent. Though many problems with this idea have been pointed out
since it was proposed, it is still considered a useful theoretical definition. However, since the
development of even a candidate for such a test is still a long way off, there is a need for a
working definition. The most popular is that a machine's behaviour should be called
"intelligent" if it does something that would be described as requiring intelligence if a human
did it (Gardner 1985:140).
2.4.4. Mind and Brain
One of the traditional philosophical problems that cognitive science claims to throw new light
on is that of the relationship of the mind to the body - of mental events to physical events.
Specifically the issue has been to explain how mental events can (seem to) have causal
powers over physical ones, eg how a decision (mental) can cause an act (physical). This
area is notorious for the concept of dualism, the doctrine that the mind is "made of" some
immaterial substance, or "soul-stuff", which can somehow - magically - interact causally with
physical or physiological "stuff". Such a doctrine would of course be anathema to cognitivist
philosophy, but the cognitivist tenets allow a neat solution to the mind-body problem:
"From the philosophical point of view, computational insights enable us to understand how
it is possible for the immaterial mind and the material body to be closely related, and in
particular how it is possible for the mind to act on the body during purposive action and
voluntary choice." (Boden 1979:111-112)
In fact, however, the statement of the problem has changed somewhat in the course of
translation into cognitivist terms. Specifically, it has become the mind-brain problem -
cognitive science tends to ignore the rest of the body - and has been recast as the problem
of how mental states relate to brain states. The solution, simply put, is that the two are the
same: a mental event simply is a (kind of) physical (material) event, described in a certain
way. In human beings, specifically, a mental event is a kind of neural event. This however
does not put an end to the debate. There is still the important issue of deciding how the two
kinds of description - mental and neural - relate to one another24. The crux of the matter is
whether mental terms can in fact be reduced to neural ones, or whether there is a need in
different contexts for both kinds of description.
24A review of this debate is provided by Mackay (1984).
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The reductionist view is that the two are identical. In principle, anything that can be said in
mental terms can be said equally well, or better, in neurological terms. The reason mental
terms are used in everyday language is simply to do with habit and tradition. The reason
they have to be used in psychology and cognitive science is that we do not yet know enough
neuroscience to do without them. On this view it seems likely that one day it will be possible
to dispense with the mental vocabulary altogether. This position - sometimes called
"eliminative materialism" - was once considered overly simplistic, and "reductionist" was
used as a derogatory epithet. Recently though it has been elaborated by some highly
sophisticated thinkers, who argue that "reductionism" is not the bogey it has sometimes
been thought, but an important tool for understanding cognition {eg Churchland 1986; Rorty
1980; Stich 1983).
Others prefer the view that the descriptions at the two levels - mental and physical - are
significantly different (though descriptions of "the same things"), and reduction is not
possible. One such view is dubbed "anomalous materialism", and states that there is no
lawlike relationship between the levels of description - terms from each are needed in
different circumstances. For example, Davidson (1981) argues that while individual mental
events are identical with individual physical events, classes of psychological events are not
coterminous with, or their descriptions interchangeable with, classes of physical events.
Mental events are sometimes said to be "supervenient upon" physical ones: different from,
but in a sense dependent on, them.
Mandler exemplifies the view that the problem should be dissolved, rather than argued over:
the ability of mental events to cause physical ones is not real, but only apparent. In fact,
"both mental and physical events are products of underlying representations and processes"
(Mandler 1985:30).
2.4.5. Knowledge
A very straightforward interpretation of the implications of the central tenets of cognitivist
philosophy for human cognition might seem to imply that all knowledge is represented
explicitly in memory. It has become clear however that there are some major problems with
this view. It seems unlikely, for example, that everything we know can be individually
represented in the "knowledge base" of the mind: though someone might "know" that 247 +
1 = 248, it seems extremely implausible to suggest that every such piece of knowledge is
individually represented in their memory.
Numbers are a rather simple case. It is easy to see how they might be dealt with
straightforwardly by generative rules of inference and deduction. Consider the analogous
problem for more semantic kinds of knowledge:
"Suppose that the way we understand [that the pronoun in 'I left my raincoat in the bath
because it was wet'] is by retrieving the fact that putting a raincoat in a bathtub makes sense
if the raincoat is wet, but not if the bathtub is. This would be a pretty strange piece of
knowledge to have floating around in our heads. Think of how many others we would have
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to have if this is really how we worked: that grizzly bears don't like champagne, that there is
no major league baseball on Uranus, and so on ad infinitum. Probably then this is not the
right account." (Stillings et al 1987:351, their emphasis)
It might seem then that knowledge must be organised in some way whcih would allow
specific facts to be inferred from representations of more general ones. There have been
some attempts to develop models of language understanding based on such inferences
(notably Schank's, described eg in Gardner 1985). However, these raise many questions of
detail: How to characterise the atomic facts? Which beliefs are explicitly represented, and
which are inferred? How is the knowledge organised, and how are such inferences made?
Such accounts are thus believed by some to be implausible.
Much of the knowledge we use in everyday life is not specialised information, but practical,
mundane facts, barely worthy of the term "knowledge". Accounts which attempt to represent
all of it explicitly are sometimes said to lead to an infinite regress: how is the knowledge of
how to apply the representations represented? Some see the solution to the problem as
requiring a distinction between two different kinds of knowledge. Not all our knowledge is
"declarative", and explicitly representable at all. Some, and often the most basic, is
"procedural" knowledge - ie to do with knowing how, rather than knowing thai?5. A classic
example is knowledge of how to ride a bicycle. It is not possible to teach someone how to do
such things simply by telling them facts about the operation - it is not even easy to work out
what would be the facts they should be told. Knowledge like this requires physical
experience and practical learning: it seems to be somehow "wired in"26. This creates a
difficulty for the purely abstract, functional approach to Al, since procedural knowledge
seems to implicate the body in various ways. One avenue of exploration of these issues in
cognitive science is the development of robotics.
Mandler (1985:31) thinks that some of these difficulties with the cognitivist view of
knowledge are caused by overly rigid categorisation into "representation" and "process",
which are not in reality as clearly separable in cognition as the standard tenets might imply.
2.4.6. Meaning and Language
The treatment of meaning is an area most cognitivist philosophers would identify as
problematic for their position. Defining what exactly "meaning" means is a big part of the
problem. In general, as seen above, it is seen as something associated with a linguistic
structure or other representation, as its interpretation. Cognitivist philosophy thus
distinguishes between the form and the content of a representation and stresses the
separation of the two.
25A similar kind of distinction is sometimes drawn between episodic and semantic memory.
^McDermott (1981) on the other hand expresses impatience with the whole topic of declarative vs. procedural,
clearly considering it to be a dead-end distinction.
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This separation of form and content is the source of some contentious issues. As we have
seen, in cognitivist philosophy what matters about mental representations is the functional
relationships of their forms, rather than their actual content, or their relation to things outside
the system itself. This view is held by many cognitivist philosopers, most notably by Fodor,
who advocates "methodological solipsism"27 as the best approach to studying the cognitive
system, on the grounds that symbols in a computational system can relate only to each
other, not to things outside the system. However, it is disputed by others. Pylyshyn (1984)
for example argues that it is not possible to account for the many different kinds of behaviour
a person who hears the cry "Fire! Fire!" can evince (running from the building, dialling a
telephone, packing belongings, etc) without reference to the meaning of fire in the external
world, for that person, ie the relation of their internal representation to fire in the external
world. Others counter the form/content distinction with the example of everyday reasoning,
which often, in real life, is influenced not only by the form of the logical problem, but also by
its content, ie the things referred to. (Many examples in Cohen 1977). It also seems clear to
some (eg Jenkins 1974) that memory is organised according to meanings, as well as formal
properties.
A related problem is that the simplest, most serial type of symbolic processing, in which all
the processing is completed before the interpretation of the output is accessed, seems
inadequate to account for most cognition. (This issue as it relates to speech perception
models was discussed in detail in Chapter 1). It is frequently the case that even quite early
stages of processing require some interpretation, or access to the content of the symbols.
The most common way of dealing with this is to propose that modules at different levels can
interact, or have access to each other's output and perhaps even each other's processing. It
is sometimes accounted for (eg Sanford 1987) by suggesting that some kind of "primary
processing" is performed on the input, to access at least the general semantic area involved
before detailed processing begins. Another frequently mentioned way of accounting for this
is that some kind of parallel processing is in operation, so that the various stages can
interact. There is also some interest in the possibilities of content-addressable technology.
As for meaning in language, it has been stated already that the cognitivist view sees the
meaning of a word as something associated with its form (sound or shape). Minsky puts this
idea especially boldly, but not uncharacteristically:
"It is the underlying emptiness of words that gives them their versatility. The less there is in
a treasure trove, the more you'll be able to put into it." (Minsky 1987:196)
Similarly, the meaning of a sentence, is seen traditionally as a semantic representation
associated with its syntactic form. The same kinds of problems have arisen over this
separation of form and content as those just mentioned. The battle over the relationship
between syntax and semantics has raged since the early days of transformational generative
27"... the doctrine that in explaining cognitive states we do not need to bother about the way the world outside the
mind is, only about the way the mind represents it." (Macnamara 1988)
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grammar (eg Fodor and Katz 1964, Steinberg and Jakobovits 1971, Seuren 1974). The
comment is often made that meaning has traditionally been given too peripheral a place
relative to formal or structural aspects of both language and cognition generally - ie that
syntax has been given too much priority over semantics (eg Oettinger 1972).
Another important class of problems concerns the view of language as a rule-governed
formal system. An increasing interest in pragmatics and language use (partly stimulated by
the need to incorporate this kind of knowledge into Al systems) has led many to question the
regularity of the rules (see Baker and Hacker 1984 for Wittgensteinian arguments on this
topic; also Harris 1980, 1981). The separation of competence and performance has also
come under considerable attack, especially in relation to child language acquisition.
Recently there has been considerable interest in the relationship of the literal to the
metaphorical, and in general the problem of providing a cognitivist account of what
metaphors are, how they arise, how they are used. This issue is explored very effectively in
Ortony (1979); see also Lakoff and Johnson (1981), Lakoff (1987). Some attempts have
been made to account for these kinds of relationships within an orthodox cognitivist
framework (eg Minsky 1987).
2.4.7. Interpretation
It will be recalled that the point of postulating that cognition is a symbolic process is that the
symbols need not be attached to particular meanings during the computation, and the
process can be applied in many different situations. At some stage, then, the symbols must
be interpreted, ie - associated with the relevant semantic representation so that their
meanings or contents can be accessed. The question of how this accessing is accomplished
is the problem of interpretation. In general, this is assumed to be a fairly simple and
unproblematic process of matching the form of the input (suitably processed) against a form
stored in memory. Some cognitive philosophers however address the "homunculus
problem".
A philosophical account of some aspect of human ability is said to invoke a homunculus
("little man") if it seems to presuppose the very quality it purports to explain. For example a
theory of vision which suggested that the way vision works is that an image of the scene
seen is projected onto the retina could be accused of invoking a homunculus: the question
can be asked "who sees the image on the retina? And how is their vision explained? As an
image on the retina?" In other words, it presupposes visual abilities in its explanation of
vision. The problem is often phrased in terms of an explanation leading to an "infinite
regress".
In relation to cognitivist philosophy the question is about whether, in explaining intelligence in
the way it does, it is merely postulating a lot of sub-systems which would have to have as
much intelligence as the total system for the explanation to work. This would be the case, for
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example, if interpreting the symbols manipulated by the system required as much
intelligence as is being explained by mechanism of symbol-manipulation. There are various
ways of dealing with this. Dennett provides an account of symbol manipulation which he
claims obviates the need for a homunculus in the bad sense. His solution uses the notion of
"discharging homunculi":
"One starts ... with a specification of ... an intentional system, and then breaks that largest
system down into an organisation of subsystems, each of which could itself be viewed as an
intentional system (with its own specialised beliefs and desires) and so formally a
homunculus....Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung
in to explain...If one can get a team or committee of relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind
homunculi to produce the intelligent behaviour of the whole, this is progress...Eventually this
nesting of boxes within boxes lands you with homunculi so stupid (all they have to do is
remember whether to say yes or no when asked) that they can be, as one says, 'replaced by
a machine'. One discharges fancy homunculi by organising armies of such idiots to do the
work." (Dennett 1978:123-4; his emphases)
Thus he argues that data-structures are examples of representations that can be said to
understand themselves (1978:102), and there is no "homunculus problem".
Minsky's (1987) view that minds are "societies" of "agents" is a similar solution. In fact it is
quite a popular view, put forward in some textbooks:
"As we descend through the levels of decomposition in the explanation, the spark of
intelligence required for the processes at each level gradually dims, until we reach the
machine language instructions, which are easy to implement mechanically. The ghost [in the
machine] is exorcised by gradually reducing it to simple formal operations as we elaborate
the explanation." (Stillings et al 1987:313, their emphasis)
Pylyshyn's solution is different. He believes that if the view that cognition literally is
computation is taken seriously and strictly the problem does not arise, because the symbols
of a computational system are essentially different from the more familiar symbols of
semiotics, which he calls "secondary symbols":
"The symbols of the semiotician have no meanings and exhibit no behaviour unless there is
an intelligent, knowing agent to interpret them. These secondary symbols get all their
meaning from their social and conventional (and sometimes personal) use... By contrast,
mental symbols of the sort that concern cognitive science ... have intrinsic meaning
(semantics) by virtue of being instantiated in a physical mechanism in such a way that they
interact causally with each other and the world outside (through transducers)." (Pylyshyn
1984:118)
Here too, the solution is seen in terms of a theory with a special kind of symbol, which does
not need interpretation in the same way as the familiar kinds of symbols do.
Most cognitive philosophers, as mentioned above, do not consider this a serious problem for
their view. Some in fact see it as an another traditional philosophical conundrum that the
computational analogy overcomes:
"The existence of the computer provides concrete proof that the commonsense notion of
representation is indeed viable." (Baars 1986:149-150)
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2.5. Status of Cognitivist Philosophy
In this section, as in the analogous section of Chapter 1,1 would like to consider the status of
cognitivism in the eyes of its own practitioners. This topic could actually have been included
with those of the previous section, since, as seen briefly in the Introduction above, its own
status is a debated issue in cognitive science28. Some (eg Lachman Lachman and
Butterfield 1979) believe cognitivism is (perhaps gradually) achieving that of a (Kuhnian)
"normal science", while others (eg Gardner 1985:384) see it as still in the early stages of his
cycle, lacking consensus with respect to basic assumptions and unity in terms of research
programme. This heterogeneity is commented on by Mehler and Franck in their editorial
comment introducing the tenth anniversary volume of Cognition:
"There are those who are convinced that information processing and artificial intelligence
hold the keys to the future; those who believe that there is no future for the field as a whole
and those who believe that cognitive science will only come of age when it has developed a
more descriptive approach displaying greater concern for ecological parameters. Finally,
there are those who have refused to engage in any speculation whatsoever, and have opted
to remain close to the data they have gathered within the paradigm they have developed. But
... one feeling pervades our reading of all the articles, and that is that the field is in rapid
expansion without any homogeny of approach." (Mehler and Franck 1981:4)
Most would agree that the straightforward view of cognition arising from the basic cognitivist
tenets is overly simplistic - ie almost all would accept at least some of the problems
mentioned in the review above as real ones. The difference of opinion is over whether or not
the problems can be satisfactorily solved within the basic tenets of cognitivism, ie whether
"more of the same" research will suffice, or whether something different is needed as well29
is probably the most famous discussion of this issue - see Cohen (1977), Leahey (1980) for
summaries and commentJ I will mention in this section what seem to be the major issues in
the discussion.
One is the ability of cognitivism to provide an account of what have till now often been taken
to be peripheral topics: emotion, motivation, consciousness, attention, subjective experience,
language use and cognition in the context of everyday life, informal reasoning, and so on30,
Machlup and Mansfield (1983), Cohen (1977), to name just a few of those who consider
these problems; Smyth et al (1987) have developed their approach with specific focus on_
^cognition in action.J Many comments centre around the problems cognitivism has in
accounting for meaning and "ecological validity" mentioned above, and the difficulties of
theory, method and interpretation.
Doubts and criticisms of cognitivism for its lack of attention to these kinds of issues have of
course been around for a long time, offered by those both within and outwith cognitive
science:
28This is clearly related to the status of IP, as a theory within its philosophical framework, which was discussed at




"... it almost seems as if the perception of meaning were primary and everything else a
consequence of understanding meaning. If this were true, linguistics would have to be built
anew." (Oettinger 1968:296)
"The gambit disclosed ... is the following: If man doesn't know the underlying physiology of
his actions, maybe it's all right to suppose these actions resemble the actions of a computer.
Such an argument makes as much sense as supposing that if man understands bicycles and
doesn't understand airplanes, he can assert that 'airplanes are bicycles'." (Taube 1961:50)
"First it is asserted that except for trivial engineering details, a program for a machine is
equivalent to a machine. The flow chart for the program is equated to the program. And
finally, the statement that a flow chart could be written for the non-existent program for a
non-existent machine established the existence of the machine." (Taube 1961:59)
Probably most famous, and most scathing, was Dreyfus:
"Obviously [Al researchers] think that analogies are solved by human beings by applying
transformation rules because the prospects for Al are only encouraging if this is how humans
proceed. But it is clearly circular to base one's optimism on a hypothesis which, in turn, is
only justified by the fact that if the hypothesis were true, one's optimism would be justified."
(Dreyfus 1972:142)
Little notice was taken of these comments at the time they were made, however, partly
because, however justified a scathing tone might have been, it was not conducive to
effective communication: partly because the cognitive science community in those days was
really too confident and too busy getting on with their own exciting projects to spend much
energy analysing exactly what was being said. But perhaps mostly because no viable
alternative was being proposed.
"[The suggestion that meaning is central] does seem to have been lost from sight, and
perhaps deservedly so, because ... it doesn't tell one what to do next." (Oettinger 1968)
Fault-finding has often been seen as churlish, in the absence of something better to replace
what was being criticised31. Practical advances have been seen as the main requirement.
Increasingly however these kinds of issues are taken seriously by those within the cognitivist
community, as some of the discussion above has shown {cf Norman 1981, Neisser 1976,
Stillings et al 1987). There have been several famous apostates: Weizenbaum (1976/1984);
Winograd (1981; Winograd and Flores 1986) has taken Dreyfus' phenomenogical comments
very seriously, and worked them into a new approach to expert systems design.
As well, there are various breakaway groups attempting to establish new approaches to the
study of cognition on different conceptual bases. Two of the most successful in terms of
attracting interest (though neither has so far achieved a position of dominance) are actually
revivals of previously neglected approaches. Gibson's Ecological Perception is receiving an
increasing amount of attention (Costall and Still 1987; Neisser 1976); Rosenblatt's
"perceptron" idea has been taken up and expanded considerably by the PDP group (1986),
and is currently very popular and influential. Both of these were mentioned briefly in
connection with speech perception research in Chapter 1; I will talk about their philosophical
frameworks in Chapter 4.
31 Eg Loftus on Jenkins (1974); Newell/(1983) on Hofstadter.
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Many cognitivists however, while agreeing that there are some conceptual problems in
cognitive science (perhaps amounting to "turmoil" or even a "crisis"32 and that the
alternatives have something of truth about them, nevertheless believe that the basic tenets
of cognitivism are the best ones, and that their limits have not yet been sufficiently explored
(Boden 1981, Miller and Gazzaniga 1984). The alternatives are welcomed for their opening
up of issues for debate, but many consider their drawbacks to be considerable (see for
example Fodor and Pylyshyn 198133, 1988; and the responses to Fowler 1986.
The key factor here seems to be distrust of subjective or "introspectionist" methods, and the
need to constrain and control the variables being studied in any particular case. The
cognitivist tenets are felt to be the only foundation which can allow both the necessary
constraints on research and theory, and the necessary flexibility of behaviour in the systems
developed.
"...the only psychology that could possibly succeed in explaining the complexities of human
activity must posit internal representations. This premise has been deemed obvious by all
but radical behaviorists..." (Dennett 1978:119)
"Being governed by representations is not the same as being formal and computational.
Nonetheless, computation is the only model we have of how a physical system can be
governed by representations." (Pylyshyn 1984:117, his emphasis)
"At present ... any theory of mind should certainly be restricted to an effective procedure.
To abandon this criterion is to allow that theories can be vague, confused and ... only
properly understood by their proponents." (Johnson-Laird 1981:142)
"Whoever wishes to banish the representational level from scientific discourse would be
compelled to explain language, problem-solving, classification and the like strictly in terms of
neurological and cultural analysis. The discoveries of the last thirty years make such an
alternative most unpalatable." (Gardner 1985:383)
2.6. Discussion
2.6.1. The Subject in Cognitivist Philosophy
Thus far, I have been concerned to present a balanced overview of the cognitivist foundation
of the IP model of speech perception, as seen by cognitive scientists themselves. I would
like now to step back, as I did at the end of Chapter 1, and consider this foundation from a
different perspective. I have foreshadowed already my view that cognitive philosophy suffers
from some problems which can be seen as underlying, and in a sense causing, difficulties in
the IP model of speech perception. In a nutshell, the remainder of this thesis argues that
cognitivism, and thus the IP model based on it, has severe problems, centred around the
fact that it has an inappropriate conception of what a human being - the Subject of speech
perception - is like. I will begin that argument in this last section of Chapter 2. Its completion
will have to wait until Chapter 4, as it requires the background I will provide in Chapter 3.
32Mandler (1985:35); Leahey (1980:392); Eysenck (1984); Cohen (1977); Pylyshyn (1980), Macnamara (1988).
33Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981:154), discussing the non-computational Gibsonian account, describe the proposal to
do without representation and process as not "radical" but "suicidal".
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It is necessary then to consider what kind of Subject cognitivism does postulate. In fact,
cognitivism does not generally discuss the nature of the Subject as such. It is more usual to
talk about the nature of intelligence, or of intelligent processes like perception, than about
the nature of the being that carries out the processes. It is clear though that if one makes a
claim about the nature of a process, one is ipso facto making a claim about the nature of the
processor as well. In the case of cognitivism, then, the fundamental tenet, discussed in
detail above, that cognition is, essentially, symbol-manipulation or information-processing,
implies that the Subject is, essentially, a symbol manipulator or information processor. This
is not to say that cognitive science does not allow the Subject ever to be anything other than
a symbol manipulator; it is to say that cognitive science claims that as far as cognitive
processes are concerned, the essential nature of the Subject - the quality that makes for
intelligent action - is to be a manipulator of symbols. My argument here is that a Subject
which is essentially a symbol-manipulator could not perform all the cognitive tasks that
cognitive science tries to explain in this way - in particular, it could not understand speech.
2.6.1.1. Symbol Interpretation
I would like to start by picking up again the topic of the interpretation of the symbols
manipulated in cognitive processing (Sec. 2.4.7 above). This is the point at which the
(necessarily) non-meaningful physical symbols which have been manipulated and
transformed are made meaningful - "mapped onto meaning"; "translated into meaning" -
resulting in understanding.
It will be recalled that for cognitive science, this interpretation is a process of matching forms
and thus accessing a stored semantic representation. The well-known philosophical problem
for such an account, discussed above, is that of the "homunculus": an unadmitted theoretical
entity invoked by an account which postulates as an explanation of interpretation something
which is just as difficult to interpret as the original. It will be recalled that those cognitive
philosophers who consider the problem reject the suggestion that cognitivist theories of
perception invoke a homunculus - for example, Dennett's account (that any homunculi are
"discharged") was seen above to be quite well-accepted. My claim here however will be that
the cognitivist account of interpretation really does suffer from the problem of the
homunculus34, the explanations quoted earlier notwithstanding.
In fact, the problem of the homunculus is surprisingly undisturbing for many cognitive
scientists. The reason, I surmise, is that the symbols we see as output from the programs
run as simulations of mental processes seem to us unquestionably and inherently
meaningful, especially when they are simple symbols like numbers, as opposed to texts,
whose interpretation might be more debatable. But of course no matter how "simple" their
interpretation is to us, all such symbols (better called "characters") are meaningless in
^As Crick (1979:134) remarks wryly, "Unfortunately, it is easier to state the fallacy [of the homunculus] than to
avoid falling into it".
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themselves. The basis of the generality of computational processes after all, as seen above,
is that the symbols should be meaningless, and transformed according to purely physical
laws. They therefore need somehow to be "given meaning" at some stage, to relate them to
the actual situation in which the computation is being carried out. Cognitivism, and IP, as
has been seen several times above, see this as being accomplished by the matching of a
formal representation with a stored meaning.
As I see it, this account faces a problem with two parts. Firstly, to account for the
interpretation of symbols by saying that they are matched with a semantic representation
does not actually explain understanding and meaningfulness - it simply replaces one
representation with another, and begs the question of how the semantic representation itself
is to be interpreted. Merely calling it a "semantic" representation does not make it
meaningful.
A solution like Dennett's is a response not to this objection but to another one: it counters the
anti-intellectualist, behaviourist position which prefers not to invoke knowledge and
intelligence at all - whether or not it is in the form of mental representations and processing -
by justifying the tactic Dennett calls "putting a little man in there to do the job". What it does
not address is the question of "who" is putting the little man in; and "who" tells him what the
symbols he is manipulating actually mean. In the case of the computer program, this kind of
interpreting is done by the programmer, who has a human understanding of the whole
situation in which the program is being run. This kind of understanding is not available within
the program itself; or to a symbol-manipulating Subject such as cognitivist philosophy
postulates human beings are. All the "knowledge" and "rules" that cognitivist philosophy can
give its Subject ultimately do not help overcome this problem: they are all given
(necessarily) in the same kind of uninterpreted formal structures.
So in the computational terminology of cognitivist philosophy, which sees cognition as being
very like the running of a complex computer program35, the homunculus problem cognitive
science faces can be stated as; "Who takes the role of the programmer, and interprets the
symbols produced as output from the program which has been run? Who reads the
printout?"36.
The second part of the problem with the cognitivist account of interpretation is somewhat
different. This account relies heavily, as has been seen, on the notion of matching of two
formally defined tokens - the output of the processing37 and the representation used to
35"...a symbolic process that transforms formal expressions that are in turn interpreted in terms of some domain
of representation." (Pylyshyn 1980:115)
^Similar observations about the programmer implicitly assumed in symbol manipulation accounts are made by
Carello et al (1984), though the direction their argument takes from that point (towards a Gibsonian "Direct
Perception" account) is very different from mine. I will discuss the differences in Chapter 4.
37The need to achieve a matching like this is after all the motivation for postulating the processing of the input.
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access the stored meaning. Matching, like interpretation, is a process which seems very
straightforward when we do it in everyday settings - but it cannot be done according to
purely formal criteria. It is an instance of the more general problem of stating when two
things are "the same". Stating two things to be "the same", formally or otherwise, requires
decisions as to which features should be compared; which features are relevant and which
irrelevant; the degree of difference to be tolerated as a "threshold"; and so on. These
decisions require an understanding of the context in which the matching is to be carried out.
Indeed, it requires exactly the kind of decision-making, and exactly the kind of
understanding, that cognitivism is trying to explain with the symbol-manipulating account -
and yet here is the same problem turning up as part of the proffered explanation.
2.6.1.2. Symbol Designation
If cognitivism pays little attention to the problems surrounding the interpretation of symbols -
their "conversion into meanings" - it pays far less to the problems of the initial designation of
those symbols as representative of features of the world. The reason, again, I believe, is
that it seems to be such a straightforward operation of association or matching: if we decide
to symbolise one thing with another, it seems like a very simple matter of choosing an
appropriate representation, and instituting a convention that from now on it will stand for the
thing we want to symbolise.
This seeming simplicity however, is due to familiarity, not ease of explanation by cognitivist
philosophy. Again there are two kinds of problem. The first is another instance of the
difficulty just discussed of deciding that two things are "the same". Knowing which symbol to
associate with which feature of the world is far from straightforward - it involves all the
well-known difficulties of categorisation and classification. In short, it requires an
understanding of the whole context in which the association is being carried out.
Secondly, more important, and perhaps more difficult to grasp - taking "symbolisation" as the
first step of cognitive processes presupposes that the objects or features being symbolised
exist in the world already constituted as what they are. The processing system has only to
recognise them and associate appropriate symbols with them (in itself, not unproblematic, as
already discussed). But of course, "reality" does not come neatly packaged and labelled,
ready to have symbols attached to its objects, features and facts - as is well known to
cognitivism. A large part of the motivation of cognitive science, after all, was disagreement
with the behaviourist notion that recognition is simple matching. Cognitivism saw recognition
as problematic and devised the symbol-manipulation account as an explanation, a
mechanism whereby it could be achieved.
However, in explaining the recognition of largish, meaningful objects in the world, cognitivism
relies on the recognition of small, meaningless ones - apparently assuming that where
recognition of objects like chairs and people and words is a problem, recognition of their
features is not. This is absolutely erroneous. Cognitive science depends on the belief that
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small sets of features can be found and given formal definitions to make the formal symbol
systems go. Repeated failure to achieve this goal gives weight to my argument that the
"constitution" of small features in regular, formally defined sets is no easier to account for
with cognitivist explanations than the constitution of larger objects with context-dependent
definitions is for behaviourism.
I have talked here about problems with the tenet of representation for cognitive science. It
will be seen that the same kinds of problems arise with respect to the central cognitivist tenet
of processing by rules. Specification of what rules to apply requires abstraction of the form
of the rules from observation of many instances; knowledge of which rules to apply in any
particular circumstance requires background understanding of the situation in which they are
to be applied.
It would appear then that cognitivist philosophy's "symbol manipulation" can account for at
most a part of human cognition: the middle phase, between symbol designation and rule
specification at one end, and rule application and symbol interpretation at the other. Their
account thus starts after the beginning and stops before the end of all that needs to be
explained about cognition. That would not be a major problem - assuming cognitivist
explanations recognised, and remained within, the boundaries of their explanatory power - if
this middle phase was sensibly separable, and the division into symbolisation, processing
and interpretation was a reasonable way of breaking down cognitive tasks.
In fact, I do not believe this is the case. Each of the "stages" in cognitivism's account of
perception requires a certain kind of understanding for its functioning. In particular, each
requires the same kind of background understanding of the meanings and significances in
the situation as is being "explained" by the processing model as a whole. My claim is that
this understanding is necessarily non-formal. Understanding depends on meaningfulness.
Meaning and significance are not already in situations, merely to be apprehended by the
Subject. They arise through the interaction of the "reality" and the Subject's purposes,
values, interpretations, understanding, and so on. The understanding a Subject has of a
situation is thus part of what constitutes the meanings according to which the Subject can
make apparently simple and obvious judgments like "same" or "different". This kind of
understanding cannot be achieved by a formal, symbol-manipulating system38. Thus
"subjective experience" is not something extra a good theory of cognition has to explain, on
top of what cognitivism sees as central abilities (logical problem solving, etc). Subjective
experience is the condition of meaningfulness. If cognition involves symbol manipulation at
all (and indeed some "high-level" kinds of cognition do seem well-explained by such a
description) it must involve other processes as well; it cannot be symbol manipulation "all the
way down". Furthermore, if my position is right, the symbolic processes depend upon these
Ml am not yet in a position to elaborate and defend these claims in detail here; I will do that in Chapter 4.
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other, non-formal processes39.
This allows me to explain my disagreement with even those cognitivists who do
acknowledge these problems of definition and application of symbols and rules, but believe
that they are solvable within the cognitivist framework, for example:
"To study representations ... is to concern oneself with intentional matters, with the way in
which meanings are constructed, organized, transformed and utilized by the system in
question." (Boden 1979:119)
"...theorising in a programming mode forces the theorist to specify, not merely that a
particular cue-schema pair is activated in a given psychological context, but how the cue is
identified as such..." (Boden 1979:121)
Boden is concerned to show that cognitivism can (or should be able to) account for the fact
that a system recognises features of the world in ways that are relevant to its own concerns
in the context, rather than according to some "objectively true" definition. For example,
whether a particular thing in the world is called the morning star or the evening star depends
on who is looking at it and in which context. Similarly, whether a particular combination of
lines is seen as the corner of a cube or as random lines depends on more than just its
"objective" features. This is an important kind of insight, and it is possible that a symbol
manipulating system could make these distinctions. It is not the point I am making here
though. A cognitivist account might show how a particular object is represented in one way
rather than another. The problem I am raising is that of how object comes to be anything at
alitor the system, to be meaningful in any way at all to it. This part of the account cannot be
covered by a symbol manipulation device. Again, I will come back to these points in much
greater detail in the course of the following chapters.
2.6.2. Monism
Having seen how cognitivism's postulation of a symbol-manipulating Subject implies some
presupposition about the nature of the world (ie that (some of) its objects are already
constituted as what they are), it is relevant now to consider cognitivism's understanding of
the nature of the world. The fundamental fact about the world as far as cognitivist
philosophy is concerned, is, as has been seen, that it consists of only material entities. This
is the central doctrine of monism. It will be recalled that the "breakthrough" achieved by
cognitive science was its ability, with the description of cognition as symbol-manipulation, to
postulate a Subject which could carry out intelligent cognitive processes without recourse to
non-material entities in the explanation.
39This would seem to be a situation analogous to that described by Godel's theorem: that a complete description
of a formal system requires necessary reference to terms outside those of the formal system itself, so no formal
system can ever describe itself. A rather similar argument to the one I am making here is put forward by Carello et
al 1984 (though as already mentioned they are arguing against IP from a Gibsonian perspective) when they claim
that a system operating only in discrete [ie symbolic) mode can never achieve self-complexing and generation of
new primitives, and therefore no symbolic account could cover all the behaviour of natural systems.
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However, in applying the monist principle, cognitivism confuses the existence of an entity
with its existence-as (some description or interpretation). An existent material entity can exist
as any number of different descriptions or interpretations, depending on the context and the
observer, as has just been discussed. In itself, however, it merely exists; there is nothing it
exists as. To say that something exists is one thing; to say what it is another. Cognitivism
does not take sufficient account of this distinction.
This confusion has some extremely significant effects on cognitivist theory. For one thing it is
made blind to some crucial ontological distinctions - most notably, the differences between
object, symbol and symbol-user. If these are all material entities, for cognitive science that is
all that needs to be said about them. Stopping at the assertion that they are material entities
it is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. It fails to mention the most important characteristics of
the entity described. One example of an important question in this context is "What does it
take for something to exist as a symbol?" It seems clear that it involves more than mere
material existence. Crucially, it involves the existence of a Subject of a kind which can use it
as a symbol. Another question is "What does it take for something to exist as a symbol-user,
or interpreter?" Certainly physical symbols and physical interpreters can be material things of
the same kind. But they are not only material things: in their existence as symbols or as
interpreters they differ crucially. Cognitivist philosophy in its eagerness to be monist is
insensitive to the kinds of differences there can be in things' existence as. One important
example of this failing has already been mentioned. Cognitivism fails to provide any account
of the Subject of cognition as a being to whom (or to which) objects can be meaningful,
informative, symbolic, etc. Indeed, it cannot account for the Subject as a being for whom or
which objects can arise in the world at all - it must simply presuppose the "prepackaged"
existence of some atomic elements out of which objects can be constructed, as explained
above.
Certainly it is true that cognitivism is not naive about this. As shown above, it is at pains to
explain that "higher level" objects have to be built up out of small "low level" ones (as
opposed to behaviourism, which assumed Subects could simply read off what something is),
and that this requires intelligence. The question it does not answer, or even raise, is how
these "low-level" objects (features, cues, information-bearing units) come to exist as what
they are. In fact it is no simpler to explain recognition of something simple than of something
complex in the absence of consideration of who or what is doing the recognising.
Cognitivism is simply ignoring the contribution of Subjects in the shape of its researchers
who are both constituting these objects and designating them as "basic" or "low level".
The second point to make about the tenet of monism is that in cognitivist practice, monism
means more than it states: it means that physical descriptions of entities are preferred to
other descriptions. Cognitive science behaves as though mere existence were equivalent to
existence-as (physical description) - ie as if a description in physical terms were a neutral
description. Since material existence is seen as the ultimate, unchallengeable kind of
existence, and material things are seen as best described in the language of physics, a
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confusion arises between material existence and existence as say, atoms, light rays or
speech waves. This allows cognitivism an acceptance of entities with a physical description
as neutral, "merely existent" material entities. Thus it comes to seem that the level of
description that uses terms like atoms, etc, is more concrete, self-existent or "real", than
others. Explanations for the existence of other levels of description are to be in terms of
these "concrete", "material" entities, and to show how "higher level" entities could be derived
from them.
Actually, the picture is yet further complicated by the fact that cognitivism's monism does not
in fact live up to its own principles at all. Cognitivism is far from operating only with
observable material entities. It depends crucially on abstract, formal and functional entities,
which it treats "as if they were material. Thus cognitivist philosophy can claim to have a
monist ontology while still allowing central status to abstract rules, functional descriptions
etc.
There is a strong relationship between the foundational tenet of monism and the nature of
the Subject that cognitivism can postulate. If it can be assumed, albeit tacitly, that there is a
neutral or self-existent description of the world, then it can be assumed that the Subject can
take as "input" already constituted Objects, and need only transform them into other Objects.
The same tenet of monism however also severely constrains the ways that this
transformation of Objects can be achieved. In the development of cognitive science, it
seemed obvious that the Subject must be constrained to operate on formal features of
representations, rather than with meanings or interpretations. Where context and knowledge
have to be taken into account, as cognitivist philosophy argues they must be, against
behaviourism, they need first to be formalised in some way. A crucial hidden assumption
here, I believe, is that the Subject not only can but must, or can only, operate only with
formal features and rules. I have started an argument, above, to show that human Subjects
could not operate wholly according to principles of "monism" (assuming cognitivism's
idiosyncratic definition of this term). In the course of the following chapters I will show in
addition that the human Subject need not operate according to any such constraints.
2.7. Conclusion
Though, as was seen above, so much is doubted about the cognitivist framework, some
aspects of it are never questioned. The three central tenets (to do with representations, rules
and functions), and their foundation, monism, are the "givens" with which cognitivist
philosophy works, and, importantly in the present context the basis of the "givens" of the IP
model of speech perception. But, if my argument above is valid, these tenets have serious
limitations if considered as the basis of a general account of human cognition. It should be
asked then, finally, why cognitivist philosophy adheres to them so firmly; how are they
justified in relation to the objections I have just raised?
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The answer is that they are not. Monism is asserted, and the other three tenets derived from
it, by reference to behaviourism and dualism, as explained at the beginning of this chapter,
and the discussion moves quickly on to other, internal topics. Cognitivism considers its ability
to glide between the horns of these two unpalatable positions to be all the justification it
needs. But surely this two-dimensional continuum of philosophies with the caricatured
endpoints is not a realistic picture of the options? There must be other philosophical
positions. There are certainly other possible positions40. Surely pointing out that there is an
ontological difference between a symbol and a symbol-user, or between an abstract
"program" and the "hardware" it runs on, does not imply an accusation of a virulent
"dualism". Cognitivist philosophy's arguments against behaviourism, however valid, do not in
themselves constitute an argument for a computational view of mind.
My argument in this chapter then is that it is essential to question and rethink some of the
deepest and most fundamental tenets of cognitive philosophy in order to understand the
roots of the problems that it faces. It is not that these tenets are "wrong" and need to be
thrown out; but they do need to be seen in a wider perspective, and there is a need for
greater clarity with respect to their scope and their effects. The situation here, I believe, is
very similar to that of IP as discussed at the end of Chapter 1. There seems to be a feeling
among both communities that to start tinkering with the foundational assumptions risks a
regression to the bad old days and a loss of all the ground that has been gained since
behaviourism was overcome. I think this is clearly counterproductive, and has the effect that
much sophisticated thinking is expended on treating symptoms, rather than causes (I will
show in some detail how this is what is happening in Chapter 5). It can seem like a loss of
ground to start a journey by moving in a direction opposite to that of the destination, but
there are many instances in which it is necessary to do just that.
Such a radical rethinking as I recommend, though no doubt mind-expanding, would be rather
unmotivated without some constraints and principles directing it along the most profitable
lines. What should these be? I have already pinpointed the key problem of cognitivism as its
understanding of the nature of human Subjects. Mentioning "subjectivity" in the context of
philosophy immediately brings to mind the "subjective philosophy" of phenomenology, noted
for its treatment of this topic. Chapter 3 is devoted to an exposition, and analysis of
phenomenology, and an appraisal of its relevance to the issues at hand.
40Some cognitivists do indeed claim to consider other philosphical positions before rejecting them. I think the





In this chapter I will provide a brief account of the phenomenological tradition of philosophy,
as a basis for further discussion of some of the issues raised at the end of Chapter 2. Doing
so will I hope have two effects. First, looking at a philosophical framework that is very
different in many respects from the familiar one outlined in the last chapter will highlight, by
contrast, some features of the latter which are hidden by their very familiarity. Secondly,
since phenomenology is specifically concerned with Subjectivity, it might give us some
insight into the treatment of the Subject in cognitivist philosophy, the inadequacy of which, I
have argued, is a cause of some of its problems. Unfortunately, as will become evident, it
will not provide a simple answer to the problems raised in Chapter 2. But the recent history
of continental philosophy shows a kind of development which I believe is importantly relevant
to cognitivist philosophy.
Because part of what can be learned from phenomenology is contained in the development
from one philosopher to the next, and also because it is a rather self-contained and self-
referential tradition, so that later texts are hard to understand without knowledge of earlier
ones, I will give brief surveys of the work of several central figures of this century, rather than
distilling a set of concepts that might characterise the tradition as a whole.
These surveys must inevitably be very limited, if they are to fit within the scope of this thesis,
and certainly cannot do full justice to the work of the philosophers they describe. Each of
them wrote prolifically, over many years, on complex and interlinked themes, developing an
idiosyncratic style and vocabulary suited to his own treatment of the topics. As well, there
exists a large body of critical and interpretive work. Here, therefore, I have aimed only to give
a general overview, with attention to topics of relevance to present concerns, rather than an
exhaustive or detailed description. I have given a higher priority to making the account
comprehensible to those familiar with cognitive science, than to detailing all the nuances of
thought and terminology of each philosopher. My account is greatly indebted to the following
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works, though I have referred to others, which are mentioned at relevant points: Husserl
(1900/70, 1913/31), Heidegger (1927/62), Merleau-Ponty (1945/62), Spiegelberg (1982),
Schmidt (1985), Schmitt (1969), Spurling (1977), Roche (1973), King (1964), Llewelyn
(1985,1986).
The plan I have adopted as an organisation of the chapter is to treat each philosopher in
turn, giving first a general outline of the philosopher's work, and then a brief account of his
approach to perception and to language. All this is done as far as possible from that
philosopher's own perspective. - After each such exposition, there is a discussion section,
which relates back to the themes of this thesis.
3.2. Husserl
3.2.1. General Philosophy
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is known as the Father of Phenomenology, and, although his
followers rejected many of his ideas, it is from his work that the central concepts of
phenomenological philosophy have developed. He was German1, and started his career as
a mathematician and physicist, studying in Leipzig, Berlin and Vienna. It was during a trip to
Vienna (1884-86) that he heard lectures from Brentano.
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was also German, but had been lecturing in Vienna since 1874.
He had been a Catholic priest and theologian, but had left the church and turned to more
secular philosophy. His particular interest was in the relationship of philosophy to
psychology. His mission - and he did have a strong sense of mission - was to provide a
rigorous foundation for psychology and philosophy. He seems to have been a man of
extremely firm convictions, and strong personality (see eg Husserl's biographical sketch in
McAlister 1976).
He believed that contemporary psychological research suffered from severe problems, and
that these could be traced to incoherences in the general foundational assumptions
underlying the theories. It was necessary, he believed, to undertake a revision and
regrounding at this level if these problems were to be solved. His diagnosis was that, in the
quest for a "scientific" account, insufficient attention was paid to mental facts. To Brentano,
mental phenomena were just as real as physical ones, and ignoring them, or explaining
them away, had been to the detriment of both philosophy and psychology. On the other
hand, however, he was equally strenuously opposed to postulation of "fictitious entities",
such as relations, ideals, values, universals and norms. The world, according to Brentano,
consisted only of real things, and real thinkers, and a valid foundation for psychology and
philosophy should incorporate only these entities. In his own work Brentano gave a high
1That is, German-speaking; he was born in Prossnitz, then part of the Austrian Empire.
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priority to the study of mental phenomena and consciousness, previously neglected. He
recommended that the best way to carry out such a study was by "inner perception" - which
he was at pains to distinguish from "introspection". In introspection, one claims to look into
the mind, as if it were a vessel, and describe its contents - a process fraught with
possibilities for error or self-deception. Brentano preferred to think of consciousness as an
activity, rather than as a container. In inner perception, one simply allows one's awareness
to focus on one's present mental activity. At the very moment of inner perception, he
claimed, one can in principle claim infallibility. By this means, Brentano divided mental
events into three "natural classifications": the activities of representation (primary),
judgment, and affective valuation.
Brentano's most famous concept however is that of intentionality. He intended it originally
as a "mark of the mental" - a way of distinguishing theoretically between mental (psychical)
and physical events:
"Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by ... the intentional ... inexistence of an
object, and ... the reference to a content, the directedness toward an object (which in this
context is not to be understood as something real)... Each contains something as its object,
though not each in the same manner. In the representation, something is represented, in the
judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This
intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon
shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are
such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention." (Brentano, quoted in
Spiegelberg 1982:36-7).
This is the origin of cognitive philosophy's concept of intentionality discussed in chapter 2.
As I mentioned there it is a term which engenders a good deal of confusion, and is used in a
variety of different senses. During the course of the present chapter I will call attention to the
development the term has undergone in the phenomenological tradition. In chapter 4 I will
discuss the whole topic more fully, and will in fact suggest that the confusion is sufficient to
make the concept more trouble than it is worth for cognitive science. For the present, I would
like to underline the fact that intentionaiity as described here originally by Brentano refers
simultaneously to two aspects of mental events - the "intentionality" of the act itself, ie its
directedness upon an object2, or its having of a content3; and the "intentional inexistence" of
its objects, by which he means that the object of a psychical act need not "exist" in the sense
that the object of a physical event must. Brentano's concept is a revival from medieval
scholastic philosophy, and the word itself incorporates the medieval sense of "intend" as
"stretch toward".
Husserl was impressed by Brentano. He had been concerned already for some time with
problems of inconsistency in the foundations of logic, mathematics and science, and thought
that Brentano's approach, of defining a more satisfactory ontology by taking greater account
2"Object" here is meant in the sense of any "accusative" of an act of consciousness, not necessarily a material
entity.
3This relates to what was called in Chapter 2 the "aboutness" of intentional states
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of the contribution of consciousness to the constitution of objects, might help to overcome
them. Gradually though he came to see that the problems were more general and required
more radical rethinking than Brentano allowed for. He changed to philosophy, and devoted
the rest of his career, in Gottingen and later Freiburg Universities, to this task of rethinking.
His major goal thereafter was the establishment of an absolutely reliable foundation, free
from any unjustified presuppositions, from which consistent and reliable philosophical and
scientific concepts could be built up.
Husserl was very dissatisfied with any philosophy based on the concepts or facts of natural
science, since these are products of what he called the "Natural Attitude", a kind of everyday
realism in which objects stand out as simply "there", as what they appear to be, and no
questions arise about their origin or validity. This of course is a handy attitude for many
everyday purposes, but it ignores the fact that seeing "things" requires the operation of acts
of judgment and interpretation, and that such interpretation is based on assumptions and
presuppositions which have not themselves been justified, and thus amount to nothing more
than naive prejudice. In particular, they can give no account of the origin of the meaning of
anything perceived.
The natural sciences have been content to ground their concepts in this attitude of naive
realism:
"...Natural science has grown to greatness by pushing ruthlessly aside the rank growth of
ancient scepticism and renouncing the attempt to conquer it." (Husserl 1913/31:95, his
emphasis)
This lack of attention to its philosophical underpinnings had actually brought European
science to a crisis, according to Husserl, and it certainly is a disastrous start for philosophy
itself. A philosophy based, as traditional philosophy is, on the concepts and terms of natural
science simply inherits the contradictions, inconsistencies and paradoxes of the natural
attitude.
"A philosophy with problematic foundations, with paradoxes which arise from the obscurity
of the fundamental concepts, is no philosophy, it contradicts its very meaning as philosophy.
Philosophy can take root only in radical reflexion upon the meaning and possibility of its own
scheme." (Husserl 1913/31:27, his emphasis)
So Husserl opposed naive realism - though his philosophy is realist in the sense that he
believes perception is of real things themselves, rather than representations, signs or
images of the things (eg (Husserl 1913/31:135-7). On the other hand, he was equally
disgusted with the fashionable contemporary movement towards "psychologism" according
to which "truths" (of logic and mathematics, for example) boil down to mere facts of
psychology - ie are grounded in (feelings of) belief or certainty. To Husserl, this view implies
relativism, and thus destroys the meaning of truth and falsity (Spiegelberg 1982:87), and this
he could never allow. He was a very firm believer in the real and certain existence of pure or
ideal truths of logic, and valued deductive truths far above mere inductive generalisations.
Psychologism can also be seen as a brand of naive idealism, a philosophical stance which
minimises the role the real world plays in perception and cognition, and this also counted
against it in Husserl's eyes:
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"...now as ever I hold every form of current philosophical realism to be in principle absurd,
as no less every idealism ... "(Husserl 1913/31:19)
The important thing, he believed, was to transcend this dichotomy of realism and idealism
that had bedevilled philosophy for so long. For Husserl, as for Brentano, neither objects in
the world, nor psychological states of consciousness could be studied in abstraction from the
other. We can know a thing only as it appears to us in our experience; and equally we can
never conceive of consciousness itself, without some Object4 of which it is conscious.
"In the very essence of an experience lies determined not only that, but also whereof it is a
consciousness..." (Husserl 1913/31:120, his emphasis)
Thus Brentano's intentionality thesis was adopted and adapted by Husserl. Husserl was not
so interested in using the intentional inexistence of an object in the theoretical distinction
between mental and physical events that Brentano had used it for. For Husserl, intentionality
is the characteristic of consciousness that brings about Objects, or "constitutes" them as
what they are. Most importantly, it is the source of meanings, indeed of the meaningfulness
of the world, that there is this relationship between Subject and Object.
"For Husserl no "object" is conceivable except as the correlate of an act of consciousness.
An "object" is thus never a thing-in-the-world, but is rather something apprehended about a
thing; objects are things as intended, as meant, as taken by a subject." (Edie 1976:5, his
emphasis)
The world and consciousness are thus correlates of each other: "...consciousness and
thinghood form a connected whole." (Husserl 1913/31:126)
A brief pause for clarification is perhaps in order here. In this opposition to the Natural
Attitude, Husserl is distinguishing between a thing as it exists independently of any
consciousness: and the same thing as it exists in its essence, as what it is for
consciousness. No thing can have an essence or meaning in itself; these it gains only in
relation to a consciousness. I will distinguish in my description, though this is not Husserl's
own usage, between the word "Thing", which I will use for the former case, a merely existing
entity; and the word "Object" which exists as something, for some Subject. To describe
Husserl's philosophy, a further subdivision is required. He distinguishes between an Object
of the intentionality of pure consciousness, in its pure meaning - the "phenomenon" - and an
Object of the natural attitude, which is the phenomenon as seen after acts of interpretation,
judgment, etc. For Husserl, Things in themselves cannot be known; they have no meaning
except insofar as they exist as Objects for a Subject. The World that we know is thus not the
world in itself, but the "Life-world", the world as lived in and experienced. On the other hand,
the Objects of the Natural Attitude, as has been explained, are distorted from their true
essence by unconsidered acts of judgment, etc.
4I will use the term 'Object' in this sense of anything that has being for a Subject. It need not of course be a
material object in the everyday sense; it is closer to a grammatical object of any verb of perception, cognition, etc.
Thus an Object is a correlate of a Subject, as I use that term.
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So Husserl concluded that the reliable starting point for the foundations he was building was
with phenomena - that is, with the appearances of things to consciousness before they are
distorted or glossed over by the presuppositions and prejudices of the Natural Attitude, as
we rush through our lives. If we could come to see and study the pure, unadulterated
phenomena, as they are constituted by consciousness, we would have reached a
satisfactory level of reliability from which to begin to build philosophy and science with
"autonomous self-responsibility" (Husserl 1913/31:29), which could account for every
assumption and every inference.
The method by which such a grounding was to be established from phenomena was a key
aspect of Husserl's philosophy. He called it the method of reduction. His explication of the
reduction actually changed considerably over the course of his philosophical career. I will
attempt here only a very general characterisation, smoothing out the details which changed.
It can be seen in relation to Husserl's understanding, outlined above, of perception in the
Natural Attitude, in which an original phenomenon is acted upon in some way to give the
objects of perception. Normally we are quite unaware of the fact that in perceiving we are
making judgments and inferences, accepting presuppositions and so on, and they are
therefore not checked for validity or accuracy, or scrutinised for possibility of error. There is
thus "a sort of blindness in the very heart of seeing" (Ricoeur, 1967:20).
The aim of the reduction is precisely to uncover these normally hidden acts, and thus
recover the pure phenomenon as it given to consciousness before we rush in with our
interpretations: The watchword of this kind of phenomenological reduction is "zu den Sachen
selbst!"5. Husserl believed that if this reduction was performed, it would then be possible to
uncover the ideal or essential meanings of both the phenomena and the acts or structures of
consciousness, and these could be used to provide a foundation for philosophy that was not
affected by mere contingent and conditional facts, but was reliably true in principle.
The method itself involves a change of viewpoint, through several stages, from that of the
natural attitude to a phenomenological attitude. This is an attitude of reflection, in which one
takes, as the Object of consciousness, consciousness itself, attempting to bring into view its
hidden acts and structures. This requires that one simply ignore everything one normally
knows, believes or assumes, as to matters of fact about the Object in the Natural Attitude,
and all the purposes or contexts of the perception, focussing on whatever is occurring in or
to consciousness at the time. This ignoring is called by Husserl "suspending" or "bracketting"
of everything known (which after all is always prone to error), and doing it allows one to look
at the Object ohne mitzumacherP. It is not the same as disbelief, or doubt: it simply means
that knowledge of facts is no longer relevant, and is put out of play. After all, all facts are




merely contingent, and as such are not relevant to the uncovering of the essential meaning
of the phenomenon. One should simply notice that a judgment has been made, neither
adhering to it or di^jreeing with it.
"This reduction...is not intended to restrict reality, but precisely to unfold its structure." (van
Peursen 1959/60:181)
So the aim of the first stage of the reduction is simply to accept, notice and describe in a
detached way whatever presents itself to consciousness: these are the phenomena, the
reliable "things themselves".
Thus his famous "Principle of principles":
"No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the principle of all principles: that
every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority for knowledge, that whatever presents
itself in "intuition" in primordial form ... is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be,
though only within the limits within which it then presents itself." (Husserl 1913/31:92, his
emphasis).
The next stage of the reduction involves scrutiny of the phenomenon and the acts of
judgment, etc, observed in the first stage. Their details can be varied in the imagination in an
attempt to gain insight into what is essential to them.
"Whatever facts present themselves serve only as examples similar in their most general
aspect to the empirical illustrations used by mathematicians...", much as the examples of
beads on an abacus can help us "to grasp with insight, and in their pure generality the series
2,3,4...as such, pure numbers as such, and the propositions of pure mathematics relative to
them, the essential generalities of a mathematical kind." (Husserl 1913/31:11)
This stage involves a discipline of doubting reminiscent of Descartes' project. Husserl sees
his reduction as a radicalisation and extension of the Cartesian doubt. Descartes set out to
discover what could not be doubted, and must therefore be indubitably real, or true. He
stopped when he reached the Cogito, the indubitable non-physical thinking self linked to the
physical body. Husserl agrees that consciousness is the "fundamental indubitable", but finds
it necessary to go further, to analyse the structures and acts of consciousness itself, and
come to an understanding of its essential nature, rather than stop with the fact of its
existence.
As part of the reduction, therefore, the philosopher must learn to suspend all the merely
contingent facts of his own consciousness, not so much by doubting, as by putting out of
play those aspects of consciousness that belong to him as himself - his particular
personality, psychology and situation. In this way he can come to understanding of pure
consciousness, gradually elucidating the essential structures of consciousness as such.
This is the reason that Husserl's philosophy is often called "pure" or "transcendental
phenomenology". He believes in pure or ideal essences which transcend any and all actual
instances of existence. He believes then, that it is possible for a philosopher to achieve
intuition of universals, from examples, though clearly from the description just given, it has to
be done according to a rigorous method if it is to be successful.
Husserl gives rather few satisfying examples of exactly how the reduction should be carried
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out - though he often refers to the fact that it is strenuous and difficult, and requires great
mental discipline and rigour. He himself seems to have been quite astonishingly rigorous in
pursuing this course of philosophical thinking, though his results could hardly be counted as
successful in terms of their original stated goal. The ultimate aim of all the work, it will be
remembered, was the building up of a reliable philosophical structure. Husserl, however,
never finished digging the foundations. His 50-year career was a continual process of
revising and re-questioning, a deeper and deeper archaeology (a term he would in fact have
liked to use for his philosophy, if it had not already been appropriated by another discipline
(Spiegelberg 1982:76). At the end of his life he claimed only to be a "true beginner",
expressing confidence in his achievement only to the extent of claiming that, were
Methuselah's span of days allotted to him, he might attain his goal from the starting point he
had reached (1913/31). He certainly hoped that his work would be carried on after his death
by his followers - especially Heidegger - but as will be seen below, this was not to be.
My focus here on the reduction should not suggest that this kind of analysis was all that
Husserl did. The method of reduction only makes sense within a philosophical framework
which supports and interprets it. Much of Husserl's work had to do with the elaboration of
such a framework. The style of Husserl's thinking meant that this framework underwent
considerable change through his career, as he struggled with problems of consistency and
strove to correct the misunderstandings to which his work was prone. This, together with the
fact that by his own admission his language is "so difficult, even for Germans" (Husserl
1913/31:30), giving rise to numerous issues of interpretation, makes his philosophy
extremely difficult to summarise in any way that does justice to the intricacy of his thought.
Below I will attempt a very general characterisation of some aspects of his philosophy that
are particularly relevant to the present discussion.
Before doing so however, it might be useful to dispel some possible misunderstandings.
Each has an element of justice as a criticism of Husserl's philosophy, and they have in fact
been important in the development of phenomenology, as will become evident later in this
discussion. But a proper understanding of Husserl's philosophy requires that these criticisms
should not be made lightly or simplistically.
First, though Husserl's philosophy is in some ways idealist, it is not a caricature idealism in
which all that exist are ideas, and the external world is a mere fiction, or creation by the
mind. He believed, as explained above, that it is impossible to separate conceptually the
world and the consciousness that knows the world: the unities of perception are thus partly
conditioned by the unity of the world. Neither is the ideal for Husserl something that literally
exists separately or distinctly from the real or actual, as in Plato. The real and the ideal are
inseparable in Husserl's philosophy: the real becomes understandable according to its (own)
ideal meaning.
"According to Husserl, fact and 'essence' are inseparable in experience. Every fact, in




Secondly, it is quite unjust to dismiss Husserl's phenomenlogy as mere subjective
description and introspection in the derogatory sense that it is just a matter of looking around
and describing what appears in the first words that spring to mind. Husserl's quest was for
essential universal and transcendent truths. His reasons for starting with phenomena and his
method of using them were rigorously worked out. "Subjective" as he used it never meant
"relating to a particular personality" but rather "relating intrinsically to (pure) consciousness
as such".
Finally the problem of solipsism in Husserl's thought should be raised. His philosophy of
pure consciousnesses constituting their own realities has often been criticised as being
incapable of explaining any intersubjectivity or communication, or even true knowledge of
the existence of others. This caused Husserl a good deal of exasperation during his lifetime,
since he felt that it hinged on a misunderstanding of his work. For one thing, part of what is
revealed in the reduction is the existence of co-transcendental fellow-subjects, a
"transcendental society of 'Ourselves'" (Husserl 1913/31:21-22). Each consciousness is
aware of the existence of others which are assumed to be similar to itself.
"Whatever holds good for me personally, also holds good, as I know, for all other men
whom I find present in my world-about-me. Experiencing them as men, I understand and
take them as Ego-subjects, units like myself ... in such a wise that I apprehend the world-
about-them and the world-about-me objectively as one and the same world ..." (Husserl
1913/31:105)
The constitution of the world by consciousness did not mean that each consciousness has
its own reality. The point of the reduction was to uncover the essential meanings that
something must have in order to be perceived as what it is. The system of meanings was
ideal and objective, in the sense that it did not relate to a particular instance of use.
"The world has this meaning whether we are aware of it or not." (Husserl 1913/31:22)
For another, the personality of the Subject was only suspended in the reduction, not doubted
or denied. Again the point was to find out the essential characteristics that any
consciousness must have, not to say that those were its only characteristics, or that all
consciousnesses were identical.
Now I would like to look in a little more detail at two aspects of Husserl's philosophy which
are particularly relevant to present concerns: perception and language.
3.2.2. Perception in Husserl's Philosophy
Husserl's philosophy implies and incorporates a certain kind of attitude to perception, and an
account of perception was an integral part of his work. It is however an attitude which is
prone to various traditional philosophical problems, and the details of his account changed
considerably through the phases of his career, in response to these. So, once more, this
section aims only to present the overall style of his approach.
Actually, Husserl's account of the perception of Objects has already been prefigured to some
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extent: the explanation above of the method of reduction can be seen as an undoing or
working backwards of the acts of perception which give the Objects of the Natural Attitude.
Everyday perception can thus be seen as the result of acts or processes carried out on a
phenomenon. In this respect Husserl's understanding is somewhat similar to that of
cognitivism. The similarity should not be overstated, however. We might note first the
central role of Subjective consciousness in constitution of the phenomenon. The
phenomenon is in no way like the "sense data" or "cues" of traditional accounts of perception
(of which cognitivist philosophy's is a development). The Subject's experience is necessary
as the source of the meaning of the phenomenon. Objects thus are meaningful from the
"lowest level", which is not true of accounts in which Objects are built up from meaningless
"sense data" which must at some stage be given meaning, or converted into meaning.
A problem of course is how to characterise, or even account for the constitution of the
"original" phenomenon. This Husserl does by proposing intentional acts, sometimes taking
several steps, which occur "below" the level of the phenomenon. Thus intentionality
objectifies, unifies and relates "hyletic data" (Spiegelberg 1982), which are in some respects
similar to sense data, although more like "stuff" than atomic facts or features. Husserl is not
entirely happy with this solution, and the details change, but the general picture of acts of
consciousness constituting objects through a series of stages, some relatively passive and
some relatively active, is characteristic of his approach (Spiegelberg 1982). Here perhaps
there is the possibility of greater similarity with cognitive science - I discuss this further
below.
So things experienced are brought under concepts, to be perceived as what they are, ie
according to their essential meaning. These concepts are part of the essential structure of
pure consciousness-as-such, inherent in every Subject. The view that consciousness and
Object are correlates means that perception can be seen either as classification of things
according to their essence; or as realisation of concepts by actual things (cf Sajama and
Kamppinen 1987). In this respect, too, Husserl's view comes close to cognitivist philosophy's
account of recognition as resulting from both top-down and bottom-up processes - the
"incoming" features determine which stored representation will be accessed, and the stored
representations determine how the sensation will be perceived, which meaning it will be
given.
Another problem for an account like Husserl's is that of how to explain the fact that in
perception we always seem to go beyond the immediately given. In only a minority of cases
is the Object perceived as self-evidently given in its essence - in fact, this really only
happens for certain kinds of reflective perception. In the usual case, for example in seeing a
three-dimensional Object like a cube, house or tree, we can only see one side at a time, and
yet it is part of the essential meaning of the Object that it has other sides. This Husserl deals
with using the notion of horizon and co-presentation. Generally, things are not perceived
alone and in isolation from other things. There is always a horizon of less reliably given
objects, or aspects of the same Object, present at the same time. Our awareness of these
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helps us to anticipate the next perceptual events, so that we never come to them completely
cold: they are adumbrated to some extent. Here again, then, it is possible to see some
similarity between Husserl's view and that of cognitivism.
3.2.3. Language in Husseri's Philosophy
Language as such is not a central interest of Husserl's, though naturally it does come up as
a topic of discussion. We have just seen how he stresses the role of Subjective experience
in making perception meaningful; the same is true in Husserl's account of language. He is
interested in
"the queer manner in which words ... bow themselves off the stage ..., and merely serve to
introduce ... objects and connections other than themselves ... and to what extent knowing
or cognizing an Object consists in putting the right name to it, seeing it as called this or that.
All this has many points of affinity with recent linguistic philosophy, but it is also profoundly
different. For recent linguistic philosophy ... sees meaning only in the varied use made of
words and combinations of words in many natural and social situations. This ... is of course
both valuable and necessary, for... a life of meaningful references that had no 'fulfilment' in
responsiveness to what environs the person, would be ... impossible. But ... [for Husserl] a
personal appropriation of meaning, a lived-through understanding of what it is that words are
naming or communicating, is a central feature of the meaningfulness of words, and ... in
default of it, there could be no more genuine semiosis than there is in the case of a computer
or taperecorder." (Findlay Introduction to Husserl 1900/1970:4)
So, as well as the important difference that all meaningfulness is grounded in experience of
the Life-world, there are some significant points of similarity between Husserl's and
cognitivism's understanding of language7. There is a definite, essential meaning associated
with, but separate from, each word-form. This meaning is objective, in that it does not vary
according to the particular person using it, or situation in which it is used. These meaningful
words are related in a logical system somewhat like de Saussure's langue, with a distinction
between "expression" and "indication", rather analogous to that between sense and
reference.
As for sentences, statements have logical relationships to aspects of the world that make
them true, false or meaningless (anomalous). Husserl shows less interest in other sentence
types, or in communication and language in use.
"Husserl's interest in language was primarily that of a logician interested in the
omnitemporal and objective laws which are necessarily presupposed in any act of linguistic
expression." (Edie 1976:xi)
7This similarity is rather evident in Verhaar (1970, orig. 1966), in which disagreements between Husserlian
phenomenology and structuralist linguistics are discussed. Many of the points raised are similar to Chomsky's.
3.2.4. Discussion
At this stage, a brief pause is in order, for some preliminary comparisons between the
cognitivist and phenomenological philosophies. The vast differences of style and problematic
between cognitivist philosophy and Husserl's "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology -
even in the heavily watered down version I have been able to give here - must make it seem
unlikely that they are even commensurable, let alone that there are any similarities.
However, I hope in the course of this discussion to show first that the major insight of
Husserl's philosophy is of crucial importance to cognitivism; and second, that one of the
reasons that Husserl failed in the end to provide a satisfactory philosophical framework is
that his position is too similar to, rather than too different from, the traditional philosophical
view he argued against, and of which cognitivism is an extension.
It will be recalled that I ended Chapter 2 with two kinds of criticism of cognitivist philosophy.
On the one hand the nature of the Subject postulated was inadequate: the symbol-
manipulator could not perform the tasks required of it without the aid of a homunculus, since
there was no way for the symbols to be meaningful to the manipulator. On the other hand,
relatedly, there was insufficient consideration of the distinction between existence and
existence-as. This was not a naive equation of the two: cognitivism recognises that large
objects do not simply exist as what they are without a Subject to interpret them as such; but
it does assume that small objects or features must be available as "raw data" for the Subject
to construct the larger objects from.
The second point of this criticism can now be phrased in Husserl's terms, by saying that
cognitivist philosophy is a philosophy of the Natural Attitude: it accepts (some) Objects of
perception - including those of scientific perception - as if they were given, without enquiring
sufficiently into their provenance. Husserl's insight about the role of consciousness in the
constitution of things as what they are is thus a very important one for cognitive science. His
distinction between existence (of a thing) and essence (of an Object) is precisely the
distinction between existence and existence-as that came up in the discussion of Chapter 2.
Husserl's argument that the role of Subjective consciousness in existence-as is unavoidable
is thus relevant to cognitivism. Objects are what they are only in relation to a Subject, as
they are meaningful in the Subject's Life-world, not in relation to some pre-defined "sense
data".
This view thus also overcomes the problem I posed for cognitivism of accounting for the
meaningfulness of the Objects its Subject constitutes from meaningless "cues". For Husserl,
Objects must always already be meaningful in order to be Objects for a Subject. The
"lowest" level of perception is the phenomenon, to which both Thing and Subject contribute.
The World the Subject experiences is the Life-world, not the world of science - atoms, light
rays, sound waves and so on.
Husserl's and cognitivist philosophy's perspectives can perhaps be compared by looking at
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their attitude to the choice between realism and idealism. It will be recalled that cognitivist
philosophy's breakthrough in finding a way out of the dilemma posed by behaviourism and
introspectionism (the manifestations of the realist/idealist poles most relevant in their history)
was their version of monism. They felt it very important to choose the realist pole, in the
hope of avoiding a dualist ontology. They were able to do so without losing the ability to
account for complex, creative behaviour, by virtue of the additional power they could give it
with the computational analogy.
Husserl's reaction to the dilemma was very different. He sees both poles as equally
objectionable in resting upon an assumption of independence of Subject and Object.
Cognitivist philosophy's variation on the theme of realism would not impress him. He sought not
to settle the problem one way or the other, but to overcome it by understanding its cause.
The reason it is difficult to choose between them is that both poles have something of truth
about them: the Subject and the World are both implicated in the constitution of a meaningful
Life-world.
In this insight, I believe, Husserl's philosophy is of crucial importance to cognitivism: it is the
key to undestanding and solving the major problems I raised at the end of the previous
chapter. However, the results Husserl attained with his insight are in some respects not very
encouraging. As we have seen, his quest became a never-ending "archaeology". The
reliable foundation he required was never attained.
It might seem natural then to doubt the wisdom of this inclusion of the Subjective in a
philosophy. Whatever the side-benefits of Husserl's quest in philosophical insights (which I
have not brought out at all in my summary, but which are widely acknowledged), so far as
his central, motivating quest is concerned, his focus on Subjectivity led to failure. Certainly
so far as cognitivist philosophy is concerned, his work must seem, in comparison with their
own, hopelessly lost in unverifiable speculation, and totally unworkable: hardly an attractive
alternative, no matter what the gains to philosophical truth of abandoning the Natural
Attitude.
However, I believe such a response is overly hasty, in leaping to the conclusion that it is
concern for the Subjective that is the cause of Husserl's problems. Husserl's apparent failure
should not lead us to abandon any consideration of the Subjective. Far better to try to
uncover what are the real causes of the difficulties.
One way of looking at this situation is to consider the reason that Husserl wanted to include
the Subject in the first place. His motivation, as has been stressed, is a quest for increased
certainty - the reliable, necessarily true foundation from which he could build in a principled
way an edifice of guaranteed truth. He looks for a reliable method for discovering real,
definite, enduring essences, such as those of mathematics, where, in Husserl's estimation,
the essential nature of numbers and their relations is definite, discoverable and indubitable.
His task as philosopher then is to specify what the essential meanings of the world are.
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Clearly, any essential meanings of perceived objects are not obvious from their surface
characteristics, which vary so greatly. Therefore, Husserl concentrates on abstract or formal
characteristics - of the kind which remain the same despite surface differences. His work as
a philosopher involves specifying what are the abstract formal essences of the things he
encounters in the world8.
This amounts to a prejudice which values the abstract, ideal essence as more "real" than the
actual characteristics of existence. So despite his insistence that the ideal realm of concepts
and the real world of things are inseparable correlates, Husserl works almost as if the ideal
were more real: the domain of greater truth and reliability, to which appeal can be made in
explanations, proofs, etc; and from which extrapolations are made about the world. Thus he
can be seen, perhaps, as a "methodological", though not an "ontological" idealist (Sajama
and Kamppinen 1987). Non-essential features, actual characteristics in space and time, are
to be ignored as irrelevancies or even hindrances to understanding of essential truth - the
true is timeless, unambiguous and definite.
This focus on abstract, formal characteristics of Objects is closely linked to the kind of
Subject that Husserl postulates. The pure transcendental essence of the Subject's
consciousness has definite and enduring structures. Only if that is the case can a focus on
the phenomenon as the foundational level of truth be justified. Since it is the case, as far as
Husserl is concerned, an important criterion of "truth" is immediate "presence" to
consciousness of something, in its essence. If something is immediately present, there, to be
observed - whether an external Object of perception or an internal act of perception - and
apprehended fully in its essence, then it must be accepted as true.
These remarks might strike a chord of recognition from the discussion of Chapter 2, where
cognitivism was characterised by its ability to account for intelligence as the formal
processing of formal features. Despite the many differences between Husserl and cognitivist
philosophy, I was able, in setting out Husserl's treatment of perception and language, above,
to remark on several points of similarity between the two philosophies. These similarities
might have suggested that there are similarities at a deeper level as well, and that, I believe,
is the case.
Certainly cognitivist philosophy does not search for an absolute foundation: as was seen in
Chapter 2, it incorporates the Kuhnian view that truth is relative to pretheoretical
assumptions, and sees its own foundation as a kind of "working hypothesis". But I showed at
the end of Chapter 2 how the version of monism espoused by cognitivism operates to
impose a kind of notional foundation around the descriptions of the natural sciences. This, I
8We saw above that Brentano's move had been very similar, in his insistence that mental events are as real and
important as physical ones. His next step was to establish a definite ontology (real things and real thinkers, but
nothing else); theoretical distinction between types of entity (intentionality); criteria for a method of investigation
(infallibility of inner perception); classification of mental events, and so on. He however did not have Husserl's
degree of self-questioning.
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argued there, affects the cognitivist understanding of Subjectivity: there was an implicit
assumption that a physical or formal description was somehow neutral, so that at the
"lowest" levels of perception, Objects ascribed to the Subject were those of the physical
description; and the rules according to which representations were transformed were those
of logic and mathematics.
Though Husserl's philosophy is importantly different from cognitivist philosophy in
acknowledging the crucial role of the Subject in the constitution of Objects as what they are,
looking more closely at the nature of the Subject he postulates suggests that it is not in the
end so very different from the one I have argued is implied, or presupposed, in cognitive
science.
Husserl's Subject too lives in a world whose essential meanings are already definite;
whereas in cognitivism they are given by science, in transcendental phenomenology they
are given by a postulated pure consciousness. Other meanings, like those of everyday life
are derivative, obtained by transforming the pure essential meanings into something else. In
both cases, the same kinds of questions are begged as to where these essences come
from; how the definite, systematic structures come to be there in the world - how the
philosopher's own work can be explained in terms of the Subject he postulates in his theory.
There is thus a belief - or hope - in the reality of some "foundational" level of description
which I am now arguing lies behind decisions as to the nature of the Subject each
philosophy postulates, and thus influences its account of perception, language, and the rest.
The fact that cognitivist philosophy and Husserl share this belief accounts for other
similarities. The two philosophies discussed here share some deep commitments that give
them a similarity of structure and emphasis despite their very different surface appearances.
In both, the paradigmatic case of perception is that of the Subject standing back and
observing a thing from one angle and then another; consideration of language in use for
communication is secondary to study of language in its essential nature as a logical system
of meanings. It seems in fact rather likely that if the transcendental framework were pressed
into an experimental programme with the same criteria as cognitive science's, it would soon
be pushed into statement of "acts of consciousness" in explicit rules, representations at
different levels between "phenomenon" and "object of perception", and "horizons" consisting
of atomic facts and propositional knowledge arranged in some systematic structure. The
similarities then would be more striking.
The fact that Husserl maintains this belief in the possibility of a reliable foundation while
giving a role in constitution of Objects to the Subject is, I believe, a reason (combined with
his extraordinary rigour and self-critical faculties) for the bottomless archaeology that his
philosophy became. Giving the role of constitution of Objects to the Subject does mean
losing that kind of reliable certainty and controllability.
So the present analysis has shown that bringing in Subjectivity of a kind that allows the
89
possibility of a reliable objective foundation to be retained does not sufficiently address the
problems I raised at the end of Chapter 2. It does not change the deep features of the
philosophy that underlie, and in a sense, cause the problems. These are reasons then for
not responding to the criticisms of Chapter 2 by incorporating Subjectivity like Husserl's into
cognitivist philosophy. They are not, however, reasons to reject the argument that
Subjectivity should be considered at all. An explicit, defensible account of Subjectivity is
necessary to a science of cognition - all that has been shown here is that it should be
Subjectivity of a different kind from Husserl's.
Fortunately, Husserl's successor, Heidegger, addressed very fruitfully precisely this issue of
the nature of Subjectivity, and came to a very different philosophical framework, which
overcomes these problems I have discussed. It is his work that I will discuss next.
3.3. Heidegger
3.3.1. General Philosophy
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), also German, began as a student of Catholic theology in
Freiburg, before changing in the later part of his studies to secular philosophy. He was
apparently impressed by his first acquaintance with Husserl's work, which was through his
writings. By the time they met personally, though, years later, Heidegger had come to some
fundamental disagreements with Husserl's approach to philosophy, and was developing his
own ideas along very different lines. However, they worked together for some time, and
Heidegger's major work, Being and Time (1927), was dedicated to Husserl.9. Husserl's view
was thus very influential to Heidgger's philosophy, even if only in the negative sense that it
was in part as a reaction against Husserl's philosophy that Heidegger's was worked out.
Perhaps the major point of Heidegger's disagreement with Husserl was over the nature of
the Subject in his philosophy. Where Husserl postulated that the world could be known only
in relation to a transcendental consciousness, Heidegger argued that to know, a Subject
must first be, and be the kind of being that can know. It is therefore necessary to ask "What
kinds of beings can know? What different kinds of beings are there? What characteristics
must a being have to have the possibility of knowing?"
So Heidegger believed that the starting point of philosophy should be the addressing of the
question of the meaning of being. Not just Husserl, but all of traditional philosophy, he
argued, had missed the point by not asking this question. Of course, he acknowledged that
there had always been a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of being - ontology -
but the problem addressed had been to do with what exists, rather than how (whatever
^ere is some controversy regarding whether Husserl was fully aware of the extent of Heidegger's disaffection,
since he nominated him as his successor to his position in Freiburg, apparently in the hope that his project of
transcendental phenomenology would be continued.
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exists) exists. This is because philosophy has always been more concerned with knowing
than with being; with questions like "What (kinds of things) can we know about?"; "How can
we know things?"; "How can we be certain about what we know?". The study of being has
therefore been very limited. Insofar as it has been studied at all, for example, it has been as
an extension of the verb "is", with no attention paid to the first person "am".
From this starting point, Heidegger elaborated a rich and profound philosophy, which, once
more I will sketch in the most general terms. Heidegger was actually interested in the nature
of Being in general and many different modes of being; however in the course of achieving
this he undertook a detailed analysis of human being. It is on that analysis that I will
concentrate here.
As in Husserl's philosophy, the method was an integral part of the study. The problem for
Heidegger's approach, of course, is: if being is prior to knowing, how can it ever be known
about or investigated? It is not possible to use any of the usual ways of knowing or being
certain - since it is no longer clear what their foundation is. Clearly it would be
counterproductive to start from some apodictic truth and build up by means of rational
inference and deduction. To do so would be to use criteria of truth which presuppose facts
about or attitudes to being - which is what is being investigated.
Heidegger's method is called the hermeneutic method. Hermeneutics is a branch of study
with a long history of its own (see, eg Nicholson 1984, Mueller-Vollmer 1986, Radnitzky
1970). It can be summarised as the study of interpretation, especially the interpretation of
texts, and has its origins in the exegesis of works of scripture, and the study of judicial
decision-making. Interpretation is meant here in the sense of making explicit or articulating
an understanding that is already there, though in a dimmer or vaguer form. The most
famous aspect is the concept of the hermeneutic circle as a model of the process of
interpretation: one starts first with a global, though vague understanding of the text to be
read, and its context, and some implicit expectation as to what it will be about. Within the
context of this initial understanding, certain details stand out as salient or especially
meaningful, and attention is directed towards some particular parts of the text. As these
become more clearly understood, one's understanding of the whole shifts somewhat, and
needs to be reconsidered. With the new attitude to the whole, the significance of some of the
parts changes or becomes clearer... and so on in a circle or spiral of indefinite duration and
ever-increasing understanding.
The keyword in this method, then, is explication, rather than explanation:
"...basic assumptions [are] not so much built on and away from...[as] filled in in more detail,
and interpreted to a higher level of explicitness." (Bateman 1983:37)
Importantly, the vague, non-explicit understanding that a person has of a situation can never
be made fully explicit. With work, aspects of it can be brought to awareness, and spoken
about in propositional form. But complete explicitness is unattainable, since the whole can
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never be completely seen from any one perspective. Thus, most importantly, such
understanding does not, and could not, exist originally or primarily as explicitly formulated
knowledge. Making explicit requires acting upon the inexplicit or vague understanding; it
necessarily involves losing something, or abstracting away from the real situation. The
decision as to which aspects to leave out and which to retain requires the understanding of
the whole.
Far from being therefore a poorer or weaker method than one which relies on external
criteria, or a fixed background understanding, its strength lies in the very fact that it accepts
that no individual fact can be guaranteed in a universal or external way, but only in relation to
a particular understanding. According to this method, we increase our understanding of
something by looking at it from various different angles to see how it appears according to a
range of different background assumptions.
"The circularity of its problem is not a secret weakness at the heart of philosophy, but is its
distinction. The task is not to avoid or repress the circle, but to find the right way into it."
(King 1964:32-33)
"We can never make all the assumptions explicit, but something is won if we are aware that
there must be such assumptions." (Radnitzky 1968:25)
This then is the kind of approach Heidegger takes to his questions about human being. He
reasons that human beings clearly have some understanding, however dim, of the various
modes of being - as evidenced, for example, by their ability to differentiate them, and treat
them appropriately - and that this dim understanding can be explicated. His analysis aims to
articulate and explicate this vague understanding.
Our experience of our own being shows it to be embodied, mobile, experiencing,
communicating, situated, engaged, and so on - anything but the detached observer of
Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger's analysis shows that far from being founded in, or
superimposed upon, rational, explicit, "knowing" of essential meanings, these characteristics
of being are the condition that allows us to have any knowledge of essences at all. Indeed, it
is the condition of there being any essential meanings. To make the world of Things into a
world of Objects requires a Subjectivity of Heidegger's kind, rather than of Husserl's kind.
From this perspective, to suggest that the actual existence of the Subject is in some way
irrelevant, or a hindrance, as Husserl's reduction does, is absurd. Husserl's idea of a
transcendental consciousness constituting objects thus makes no sense; it would be nearer
the truth to say that such a consciousness is itself constituted, an abstraction (cf Spiegelberg
1982). Husserl's reaction to this argument was that in taking this approach, Heidegger
remained stuck in the natural attitude, and his philosophy was in danger of being confused
with anthropology. This dispute between them was never resolved. The two approaches are
incompatible.
Heidegger's interpretive analysis is thus concerned (in part) to point to the characteristics of
human being which are its necessary qualities, not simply in cognising essential meanings of
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the world, but in creating or bringing into being those essential meanings. Some aspects of
his analysis, in outline, are the following.
Human being is being-in-the-world. This is a similar point to Husserl's one that Subject and
Object are inseparable. Neither the being nor the world is separately describable or
definable, or even possible to speak about in abstraction from the other. Hence Heidegger's
use of the hyphenated phrase. But for Heidegger, we are in the world in a special sense -
not as a pea is in a pod, or a cube is in a box, but fundamentally involved.
The most fundamental characteristic of human being, he finds, is that it is interested: it has
an attitude of care towards its own being, and indeed other kinds of being. It engages in
projects which arise out of this attitude - though it is important to emphasise that not all such
projects are voluntarily and rationally chosen. There is a sense in which we are "thrown" into
situations in which we must act, and in which projects take form. It is against the
background of this engagement that things in the world emerge as meaningful - in relation to
the role they can play in our projects. Things are thus known primarily not in a detached way,
to be rationally observed and described, but rather as tools or equipment to be used ("to-
hand"). Only secondarily, in the event of a breakdown or other kind of problem, do we
encounter them in their other mode of being - as objects of contemplation and analysis
("at-hand"). Objects thus get their being (not necessarily their existence) in relation to the
Subject. In their original to-hand being, tools are not even encountered as so many separate
bits and pieces, but rather as parts of an interconnected whole.
Another fundamental characteristic of human being is that it is being-with other people. The
world that we are in is an intersubjective one from the start, and communication with others
is basic to our own being. Communication here means "discourse" in the most general
sense; verbal exchange of information is far from the only or even the central kind of
communication. It can only occur at all on the basis of a more general kind of understanding
or empathy such as one human being has for another's being.
One of Heidegger's major preoccupations is the explication of human being's attitude to
time. Time is one of the things that has been most thoroughly objectified and rationalised in
the tradition of philosophy, so that we tend to think of it as occurring in an even flow, from a
past gone behind, through an instantaneous present, and into a future still to come ahead.
Time as actually experienced by human being however has a very different structure. Our
being is fundamentally oriented towards the future, and the past remains with us in the
present. Thus historicity and contingency are not additional to, or flaws in, a timeless ideal
nature, but rather necessary conditions of the Life-world. It is our orientation towards the
future gives us a sense of our possibilities which in turn gives us the ground out of which the
projects we undertake grow - and it is these projects with respect to which the meanings of
the world emerge.
One of the things that faces us most starkly out of the future, according to Heidegger, is the
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possibility of our own death. This makes a sense of dread a deep characteristic of human
being. Since dread is an uncomfortable feeling, we tend to suppress or disguise it in various
ways. This has the important result that such attitudes or feelings, which might previously
have been brushed aside as an irrelevant factor to do with individual personalities, and thus
the domain of psychology, or even psychiatry, are for Heidegger integral to our being as
humans, and thus to our very ability to know anything at all.
This tendency of ours to ignore or suppress knowledge of our own death and finitude has,
Heidegger claims, some important consequences. Forgetting these facts allows us to ignore
our own being, and our role in the constitution of the meanings of the world. The easiest
way to live is to accept the "ground" of appearances given to us by our society and
language. This might mean for example accepting as "real" or "true" the "essential"
meanings we perceive in Objects; or the categories defined by our language. To do this
however, Heidegger claims, is to be in a sense "inauthentic". If one were living in an
authentic way, one would be aware always of the provisional and contingent nature of the
"real" and the "true"; its dependence, in a sense, on oneself.
Clearly, there is a major change here from Husserl's "phenomenology". The phenomenon
being studied is not the pure essence of things as they appear to transcendental
consciousness. In fact, for Heidegger, Husserl's "essences" are derivations or products; the
interest is not in the products but in the process whereby they come to be. Similarly,
Husserl's method of reflection is for Heidegger a deficient mode of being. Heidegger's
phenomenology is not a forcing, but a letting - letting things reveal themselves as they are, in
their own being. Where Husserl believed that formalisation and specification of essence
were necessary to philosophical clarity, Heidegger believes that these are impossible to
achieve with any completeness, and in any case remove one from the scene of interest, to
focus on the abstract, partial and derived. Even regarding a tool, as an at-hand object, for
example if it has broken, is a secondary and deficient mode of contemplation for him.
Knowledge, for Heidegger, is not primarily detached, factual or eternal; nor is truth a matter
of logical implications, ahistorical and non-contingent. These kinds of systematic knowledge
are useful, but always necessarily derived as an abstraction from a kind of knowledge better
thought of as know-how, wisdom, understanding or insight. Thus the role of the philosopher
is not to give "knowledge", but to cultivate insight and understanding.
In the middle part of his career Heidegger's philosophy underwent a "turn". There are
various interpretations of the exact nature of this Kehre, but it seems that he became less
interested in analysing human being in the manner discussed here. He became dissatisfied
with his own earlier work, seeing it as still too stuck in the traditional mode of philosophy, and
in fact never completed the concluding part of his main work Being and Time. His later works
were mainly shorter pieces, often using various poets' work as topics, and much more
difficult to understand. Fortunately this later work is not relevant to the concerns of this
thesis, so I can safely leave it aside.
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3.3.2. Language in Heidegger's Philosophy
Language obviously occupies a completely different place in a philosophy like Heidegger's
from the one it has in a philosophy like Husserl's. It is not a system that is separate or
abstract in relation to other aspects of human being. It is central to and integrated with them.
Language is fundamentally a characteristic of human being; to see it as an entity in itself is
to make it into an at-hand object.
So language for Heidegger is not a clearly defined, unified system existing separately from
the situations in which actual utterances are made10. In part, it is one kind of tool that is
available for our use. It is also, in part, (only) one of the kinds of discourse that we can enter
into with others. And words are only one of the kinds of things that can be meaningful for us.
Language "works" only within the context in which it is used; and only because it is used
within a context, where the parties share characteristics and understandings.
Language is certainly not primarily an ideal logical or formal system. Meanings are not
"objective" essences attached to linguistic forms. Of course, language as a tool can be
contemplated in an at-hand way, by standing back from it and making it into an Object. But
this can only ever be a secondary and an incompletely achievable step and must rest on the
prior understanding gained within real situations. It is by taking this step that traditional
thought has come to separate the forms and contents of words, or to take the literal
statement as the paradigm of linguistic expression. But these are abstractions, and give a
very limited picture. The phonetic form is only one of the things that makes a word
meaningful. Being literally true or false is only one way for language to relate to the world.
The truth of an utterance, like its meaning, is given to it by the situation in which it is used.
Thus the distinction between a literal and metaphorical use is another that is only available
to an at-hand contemplation of language.
"...such a rendition of meaning places the focal point of meaning not in the words, but in
[human being].
There is a large and impressive tradition, especially in English-speaking countries, that
would take serious issue with this claim of Heidegger's. It is usually thought or argued that
only words or propositions have meaning. In order for an act or occurrence in the world to
have meaning attributed to it, it must first be articulated in some form or other. Heidegger,
however, denies this. His claim is that word-meaning is a derivative form of meaning."
(Gelven 1970:96-7)
It is through expression in language that we articulate our pre-theoretical or inchoate
understanding of the Life-world. Communication is thus a making explicit and refining of a
more general kind of discourse between Subjects who share enough of this kind of
understanding to make such discourse possible. Thus a language actually incorporates a
10"The question of the essence of language has to be consigned to the silence in which new paths in language
are opened up. Hankering after a conceptual grasp of the essence of language as a whole is an aspect of [human
being's] inauthentic yearning for a wholeness that denies his finitude, for a presence to truth that is a truth of
language in general without being a truth in a particular language, for a hermetic closing of the hermeneutic circle of
his existence." (Llewelyn 1985:27)
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community's background understanding within it. In this way it can be a tool for us, saving us
the work of building up concepts from scratch for every project. But it can also be a
hindrance to us, since its existence tempts us to simply make use of it, taking over the
average understanding of our community, rather than articulating our own understanding.
Different communities have different languages, and different understandings of the nature
of the world.
This conception of language is especially important for Heidegger's own work. A project like
his, of uncovering or unconcealing, demands that he somehow escape the average
understanding of the world that his culture has, ossified in its language. His explications
therefore use all kinds of neologisms, hyphenations, revivals of "original" meanings
(sometimes with contrived etymologies), etc, to jolt his readers out of their complacent
attitudes, and allow him to step outside the traditional categories and assumptions. His
philosophy is not concerned to argue against other points of view - to do so is to accept the
terms of the language they are couched in - but rather to replace their vocabularies in ways
that encourage greater openness - though not of course to replace them once and for all. As
was seen above, Heidegger does not want his own vocabulary to come to be used in an
"inauthentic" or derivative way. Understanding his work therefore is not a matter of
translating his philosophy into "ordinary" literal terms, but of learning his language. Any
account except his own is likely to be inadequate as an explanation of his thought.
3.3.3. Perception In Heidegger's Philosophy
Heidegger has reversed the degree of interest in language and perception that Husserl had.
He devotes a great deal of his philosophical energy to language, and relatively little to
"perception" as traditionally understood. He certainly offers nothing that could be called a
"theory" of perception in the usual sense, since he does not accept the traditional
understanding of what is to be "explained" in perception.
Characteristically, he refuses to separate perception off from other human abilities, and
reverses the traditional order of thinking about it. To Heidegger, perception is a ground of
knowledge, not a result of it. Certainly any classification into sensation and perception is a
high-level abstraction from our actual encountering of things in the course of the practical
tasks of our lives. Nor is there a status for anything like Husserl's "phenomenon". Stimulus,
sense datum and phenomenon are all equally "at-hand" abstractions resulting from an
attitude of reflection, necessarily incomplete and provisional. Importantly, they all depend
upon, rather than cause , meaningful perception.
Some of the familiar problems of perception thus do not arise for Heidegger. Perception is
never thought to be basically the detached observation of an Object from a distance, nor to
occur in static, self-contained "acts". The Objects do not have meanings which the Subject
has to discover or distort; rather the Subject constitutes Objects as meaningful in the
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context. Understanding or using something is not dependent on "knowing" it in an objective
way. Thus the problem of how what is "present" can be supplemented or filled out with what
is known or anticipated is also irrelevant.
"Ordinarily, 'what we hear in the first place are never noises or sound patterns, but the
creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the tapping
woodpecker, the crackling fire'. A rather artificial and complex attitude is needed if we are to
hear a 'pure noise'." (Schmitt 1969:76, quoting Heidegger)
Perception is very closely bound up with language and culture. Our most common way of
perceiving is in terms of the categories our language gives us. Part of the process of coming
to live with greater authenticity is learning to see outside or behind these categories, rather
than simply accepting them at face value, as if things in themselves had the essences they
appear to have. It has already been pointed what an important effect this has on the use of
language in philosophy, or meta-theory.
3.3.4. Discussion
Here I would like to continue the discussion from the end of Chapter 2, and Section 3.2i#-
above. So far I have argued that, while Husserl's philosophy is different in many respects
from cognitivism, it has some important similarities, which can be traced to a similarity of
understanding of the nature of the Subject and of the World.
In Heidegger's philosophy, we have a very different kind of approach. Importantly, the
Subject postulated is different from that in either Husserl's phenomenology or cognitivist
philosophy - specifically, the criticisms I raised there do not apply in this case. There are no
problems of explaining how non-meaningful things are converted into meaningful ones; or
how a regular system of essential meanings came to exist prior to its use by the Subject; or
even about how the philosopher's own philosophical activity can be explained in terms of the
abilities attibuted to the Subject.
In the terms I have been using, the key difference between Heidegger's philosophy and the
ones looked at above could be said to be that, while Heidegger has kept the crucial insight of
the distinction between existence and essence, and the role of the Subject in constituting
Objects with essences, he has focussed more on existence than on essence - given greater
priority to the actual than to the ideal. If the real world in itself does not come packaged as
Objects with essences, it is necessary to explain how there come to be such Objects; not to
impose a system of essential meanings, and explain how it comes that they are not always
apparent to Subjects. In Heidegger's view, this involves postulation of Subjects of the kinds
outlined above. So here our existence as human beings with personalities in a community of
others is seen as prior to our essence (as "pure consciousness", for example); and our
understanding of other people and things is seen as prior to explicitly formulated knowledge
of their essential meanings.
So by this move - change of focus and priority (or value) from essence to existence -
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Heidegger has overcome the whole set of problems raised above. The resulting philosophy
is one which allows a different understanding in many areas - language, perception,
communication; insights which are preferable in some ways to the systems required by the
more formal philosophies.
Heidegger's move, though clearly advantageous in these respects, is not without cost,
however. The link between the nature of the Subject postulated in a philosophy, and that
philosophy's assumptions about the nature of "reality" or the world has already been pointed
out several times. Heidegger's "world" is not a "prepackaged and labelled" one, in the bad
sense that the "world" implicitly presupposed by cognitivist philosophy is - which is also to
say that it is one without objective essences or definitions. But to say this is to open the door
to exactly the kind of uncertainty that cognitivist philosophy or Husserl fear: the fear that I
have suggested is part of the reason for continuing to insist on formal, objective, reliable
"symbolic processing" as the paradigmatic example of human cognition.
In short, Heidegger's philosophy takes away the foundations that Husserl (explicitly) and
cognitivism (implicitly) rely on. The essence of a thing is now not something definite and
enduring associated with a form, but rather something constituted in a meaningful situation
by an understanding Subject. If essences and facts are not "there" in the world, merely to be
apprehended by the Subject, but rather are constituted by the Subject, then they are indeed
"subjective". If, in general, a Subject's perception is influenced by the language he uses,
then the philosopher's own perception must be influenced by the language of philosophy. A
philosopher's (or scientist's) view is as much a personal interpretation as is that of the
Subject in the philosophy. All the foundational concepts we are used to relying upon, all the
criteria of truth, proof and explanation, and all the methods of attaining them, become, with
this one move, unreliable. Everything is thrown up for questioning; everything becomes
open-ended, provisional and contingent. The familiar, obvious and taken-for-granted are to
be made problematic. It is true that Heidegger does provide an alternative method for
investigating the Life-world given his understanding of it: the hermeneutic method - but such
a method is likely to be of little comfort to someone used to being able to rely on facts and
proofs.
It would be nice then if the choice between these two kinds of philosophy were a completely
open one. It might then be possible to opt for the one with the reliable foundations, and treat
the insights of the Heideggerian one as relevant to other, perhaps more mystical, purposes.
The problem, however, is that though it is easy to phrase an appraisal of Heidegger's
philosophy in terms of his "taking away" the foundations that are there in Husserl or
cognitivist philosophy, this is actually rather misleading. He is not taking away something
that really exists, but pointing out that something that is sometimes assumed to exist, does
not; or that something that is striven for can never be attained. The foundations and
certainties of Husserl and cognitivist philosophy, far from being reliable, are the cause of
their problems. Heidegger's insights, I believe, should therefore be taken very seriously by
cognitivist philosophy.
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It is now possible then to assess the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy for cognitive
science. Many aspects are clearly desirable as features of a general philosophy of cognition
- it provides a unified and coherent way of incorporating diverse insights about human
nature, and it overcomes the specific problems raised against cognitivist philosophy. On the
/■$
other hand though it^very difficult to see how it could be made workable as the basis of a
scientific endeavour like cognitive science. Clearly it would be impossible to incorporate
(somehow) a Heideggerian Subject into the existing framework of cognitive science, as a
replacement for the symbol manipulator criticised in Chapter 2. Far too much is related to the
Subject, and the repercussions would be highly unsettling.
Another conceivable possibility would be to make a radical change of philosophical
perspective and take on Heidegger's framework as a whole. The problems of "workability"
raised above are one reason not to take this course - but not the most pressing. A far greater
consideration is that to do so would utterly contradict Heidegger's intention, and negate the
thrust of his philosophical argument. We have seen the efforts he went to to avoid letting his
terms and concepts become "foundational", to keep them from being used glibly or without
insight. To take such an avowedly and explicitly antifoundational philosophy and use it as the
foundation of a philosophical or scientific endeavour would be self-contradictory and self-
defeating. Taking seriously Heidegger's philosophical insight, and using it in a science of
cognition, would mean guarding against foundationalism, not instituting his insight as a
foundation.
Again, then, as with Husserl's philosophy, a natural reaction would be to think that cognitivist
philosophy's original doubts about the advisability of allowing subjectivity into the picture
were quite justified; and again, my response is that this reaction is not the best one. For one
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thing, putting what are essentially technical criteria ahead of philosophical soundness seems
a thoroughly wrong-headed way to make such a decision. Better to question the validity of
the criteria themselves in the circumstances. For another, though Heidegger himself took his
philosophical insights in the direction of poetry and perhaps even mysticism, I do not believe
it is necessary to work at that frontier of his thinking. Other, more prosaic, aspects of his
work are also worth working out in detail, and might allow more practical progress in relation
to a science of cognition. A look at the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty will help me to develop
this line of argument.
3.4. Merleau-Ponty
3.4.1. General Philosophy
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is a phenomenologist of a rather different ilk from those
already discussed, although his work was certainly a continuation of their project.
He was a Frenchman, and belonged really to a different cultural era, being part of the
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intellectual and political world of Paris in the years around World War II: he was a close
friend and sparring-partner of Sartre's. His educational background was quite different from
those of the philosophers so far mentioned. He was well-versed in the human sciences -
politics, history, anthropology, sociology, linguistics and language pathology, and especially
psychology - as well as philosophy itself. He also seems to have had a milder, less "driven"
personality:
"There is in him little of that pioneering approach of the early phenomenologists or even of
Sartre who preferred exploring the frontier to cultivating charted territory." (Spiegelberg
1982:572)
He is particularly useful from the point of view of the present thesis for two reasons: first,
because he develops the insights of the first phenomenologists, and explores the
implications of their work for various practical and theoretical problems: second, because he
had far more contact with non-phenomenologists, and explained his work in relation to more
familiar approaches, as well as with reference to phenomenology. In addition, his work is
remarkably readable, comparatively speaking.
One caution that should be borne in mind, is that although he was undoubtedly a brilliant
thinker, he seems sometimes to have been rather unscholarly in his reading of other
people's work, attributing to them ideas they would not have recognised as their own. For
example, he sees Heidegger as basically continuing the same themes as Husserl, who he
also misinterprets as being far more Heideggerian than he really was11. And he seems to
have read de Saussure with a rather congratulatory view of his philosophical sophistication,
as well as coming to something of a misunderstanding of some of his basic concepts, eg
langue/parole, synchronic/diachronic, etc. History however forgives Merleau-Ponty, perhaps
because the quality of his own thinking was such that his misreadings brought about a
productive synthesis of otherwise disparate views: in an important sense, Merleau-Ponty is
thus combining and extending others' work.
A prominent feature of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is his concern to overcome or transcend
traditional dichotomies, most particularly the long-standing opposition between rationalism
and empiricism12. He is at pains to show that holding the members of these pairs up as
opposite poles offers a false choice, since at bottom, they each rest on an identical network
of foundational assumptions. The rationalist pole accepts precisely the same split between
an objective world and a detached Subjective consciousness as the empiricist - it just gives
the Subject more work to do (cfSpurling 1977:25).
Merleau-Ponty presents arguments against the empiricist position, and the behaviourist
11 Merleau-Ponty works mainly from Husserfs writing, claiming to be continuing the train of his thought (if
sometimes "pushing him further than he would wish to go"), though as will become clear, he is also greatly
influenced by Heidegger. In my description of his thought here, I will mainly compare him to Husserl.
12With all their close relatives: intellectualism/sensationalism; materialism/dualism; subjectivism/objectivism;
idealism/realism, and so on. From the perspective of Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, they can all be seen as
variations on the same theme. In the present discussion the terms can therefore be used rather loosely.
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psychology which rests upon it, many of which are very similar in style to cognitive science's
arguments against behaviourism. However the direction he moves in for an alternative is
very different to that of cognitive science. Merleau-Ponty's arguments against theories of
representation, the appeal to memory in the sense of stored knowledge, and the role of
logical inference in cognition are just as forceful as those he brings against theories which
give stimuli from the environment the main causative role in explanation of behaviour.
"He attacks traditional empiricism on the ground that the 'sensations' which according to
empiricists serve as the starting point of all knowledge are scientific abstractions, not objects
of experience. ...'Empiricism' Merleau-Ponty sums up 'fails to see that we need to know
what we are looking for, since otherwise we would not be looking for it; intellectualism fails to
realise that we must be ignorant of what we are looking for, or else, once more, we would not
be searching.'" (Passmore 1968:500)
In this opposition to both philosophical stances, Merleau-Ponty seems close to Husserl, but
although in a surface way he agrees with Husserl's insistence on the interdefinition of
Subject and Object, Merleau-Ponty's position is very different at a deeper level. He is in
sympathy with Heidegger's strong criticisms of Husserlian transcendental consciousness,
which he sees as being far too like the detached intellectual Subject of rationalism.
For Merleau-Ponty, as for Husserl, what is important is the relation of the Subject and the
Object. One common way of studying a relationship is to define each of the elements first in
its own right, and then move on to look at their interaction - but that approach is quite
inappropriate in this case, since the elements of the relationship are involved in each others'
constitution. It is the nature of the relationship itself which must be the primary focus. In
Merleau-Ponty's view, the relationship of the human being to the world is best seen as a kind
of dialogue - or "dialectic" - with both the World and the Subject contributing to a constantly
evolving interpretation.
For Merleau-Ponty, as for Heidegger, however, the Subject's active, embodied, being-in-the-
world of temporality, history and other people, is the ground of the possibility of there being
any Objects, essences or formal descriptions. Thus,
"he was forced to reject the one thing in Husserl's work which gave sense to all [the rest]:
the transcendental ego13. For Merleau-Ponty, the fatal error of the 'intellectualist'
philosophies ... was their failure to see that finitude, temporality, and carnality were not
blemishes detracting from absolute Subjectivity, but were, rather the only terms on which
truth was possible." (Schmidt 1985:42)
As "Subjects", we are not just conscious, but we have, necessarily, a nature, a way of being
that is our own.
Merleau-Ponty's goal is, in general, more down-to-earth than Husserl's or Heidegger's - to
study and describe human being in a way that increases our understanding of ourselves.
The method in his case is close observation and analysis of lived experience and its
meanings. So the definition of "phenomenology" is, again, different from Husserl's (though
not quite the same as Heidegger's either): the phenomena being studied are not the radically
13The "Ego" here is what I have been calling the "Subject".
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"reduced" essences of perceptual objects, but lived experiences of the world; and
phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a withdrawal from the world, but an attitude to
take to the world.
"...the phenomenology which Merleau-Ponty professes ... is very different from what
ordinarily goes under that name. Whereas for ... Husserl 'truth dwells in the inner man',
Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, rejects the concept of an 'inner man'. Man, he argues, is
essentially a being-in-the-world. Phenomenology, on Merleau-Ponty's interpretation, is an
attempt to recapture the lived experience, to go back beyond science, back beyond all forms
of propositional truth, to the world as we actually encounter it in perception." (Passmore
1968:499)
Along with this change, comes a profound change in Husserl's central concept of
intentionality. Of the definition of intentionality really used by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty
complains it is "too often cited as the main discovery of phenomenology" (Merleau-Ponty
1945/62:xvii). He finds the directedness-towards-an-object of consciousness neither a
particularly new nor a particularly interesting suggestion. Instead, he attributes to Husserl a
dual concept of intentionality: first there is the intentionality of acts of consciousness, which
is voluntary and reflective; and secondly there is the more primitive "operative intentionality":
"... that which produces the natural and ante-predicative unity of the world and of our life,
being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and the landscape we see, more clearly that
in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate [ie
interpret] into precise language." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:xviii)
It is due to the action of operative intentionality that the meanings of the Life-world emerge
for a Subject. Its most important characteristic is that it operates before and (logically) prior
to any conscious reflection by the Subject. It produces the "horizons"14 of the always-
already-there situations which are the ground of any self-conscious, reflective thought, and is
the source of the unity and coherence of our lives and actions. Because of this operative
intentionality, there is always already some meaning in every situation we encounter, before
we reflect upon it or attempt to articulate it. Part of being a human Subject is to have this
kind of prereflective intentionality as a source of meaningfulness. In Merleau-Ponty's famous
recasting of Sartre's famous phrase, we are condemned to meaning: even the meaningless
has meaning as "meaningless". Meaning is not something we can choose to avoid: no
matter what we do, we are always already in a meaningful situation. "We never start from
zero" (Spiegelberg 1982:568).
An important consequence of this non-unified intentionality is its implication for the self, or
consciousness. Consciousness cannot now be pure and transparent to itself, and therefore
self-evident. It is in a sense divided, and what we can say about ourselves is influenced by
the limitations of perception and language in the same way as our descriptions of the
external world.
It is most important to stress the role of the (living) body in the operative intentionality of a
Subject. It is the body which projects our situation around us, which gives us space,
14Note the development of meaning from Husserl's 'horizons'.
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distance, perspective and time, and the pre-reflective, ante-predicative, non-explicit
"intentionality" from which perception begins. Thus it is our ability, through our bodies, to
perceive that is the ground of all further reflective, explicit or abstract knowledge. Clearly,
then, one of the dichotomies Merleau-Ponty's philosophy refuses to recognise is that of the
body from the mind. One of Merleau-Ponty's books is called "The Primacy of Perception",
and that is a good summary of his view. We are always already perceiving, before we
"know" anything in terms of essences, facts or propositions; it is on the basis of our
perceptual experience that we can understand anything we know, or judge anything as true.
Perception thus is more important as a condition of knowledge and truth, than knowledge
and truth are of perception.
All this implies a view of the world, which is another integral feature of Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy. So far it might have seemed that the Subject has a great deal of power to create,
or at least interpret, the world according to his own interests and purposes. There are limits
to this though, set by the world itself. There is a way the world is. It has a history and in a
sense an intentionality of its own. There is always an "already there" situation15.
But to the extent that we can "know" the world and its situations at all, we can do so only in
pre-reflective experience. When we speak about it, or describe it or reflect on our knowledge
of it we lose something of it, and distance ourselves from it.
"The world is not what I think, but what I live through." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:xvi-xvii)
As in Heidegger, the intersubjectivity of the world is, for Merleau-Ponty, "given", a
fundamental fact of life, a ground or condition of the possibility of many other facts.
"I would not even talk of solitude, and I could not even pronounce others as inaccessible if I
had not the experience of others." (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Spiegelberg 1982:571)
But while it is true that what we perceive is largely a factor of the way the world is, it is also,
and equally, true that "the world is what I perceive" (Merleau-Ponty l945/62:xvi). This is
certainly not a claim for the veridicality of perception in the traditional sense. Rather it is an
expression of Merleau-Ponty's belief in the inter-definition and inter-dependence of the
Subject and the world. Although the universe might exist in some sense independently of
us, it is given to us in meaningful situations and we know it as our Life-world, because of the
way we are, as well as the way the world is.
The way to learn about the world then is not to be told facts about it, nor to "study" it in as
detached and objective a way as possible, but to experience it. And then, importantly, to
interrogate that experience of the world, not simply to accept it as it at first appears.
"Philosophy, [Merleau-Ponty] says, asks what the world is like before we begin to talk about
it, and addresses that question to the 'mixture of the world and ourselves' which precedes all
15This shows a contrast with Sartre's existentialism which emphasises human freedom, and the constant
necessity for choice. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, human beings have only a conditioned freedom, conditioned
by the intentionality of the world itself (in the widest sense of "world"). Also conditioned by the fact that much of our
choice is made in a pre-reflective, sub-conscious way, and therefore not fully controllable. (Spiegelberg 1982:569,
Passmore 1968:502)
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reflection. Then how, we naturally ask, can the philosopher say what he finds? Whatever he
tells us will inevitably be a description of the world as it is talked about, not of the world
before it is talked about. Merleau-Ponty falls back at this point on his description of the
'ambiguity' of language; through our language, he argues, we can suggest more than we can
explicitly say. But of course what the 'more' is cannot be said." (Passmore 1968:503)
Truth and rationality are therefore conceived of very differently from the traditional view. The
role of the philosopher is not to develop a systematic account of the world, and then teach it
to others, correcting their confused picture of it. Rather it is to show the world in a different
light, or lights, so that others will be led to question their everyday knowledge of it and thus
deepen their own understanding.
The method of "interrogation" Merleau-Ponty recommends has several components. In one
aspect it is a method of phenomenological reflection, in which we turn our attention to our
own experience. In this, Husserl's reduction can be useful, though with an important
qualification;
"The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a
complete reduction." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:xiv)
It can however be used to "slacken the intentional threads which attach us to the world, and
thus bring them to our notice." (Merleau-Ponty Pref. p. xiii)
There is also an important place for empirical research and the knowledge of science. So
Merleau-Ponty did not spend his whole life at pure philosophy, elaborating an abstract
framework. He carried out investigations in many areas, and read widely in the human
sciences, as mentioned above.
Unfortunately, he died very suddenly at a quite early age (53), and left incomplete work
behind. It seems that he had returned to more purely philosophical considerations, and was
reconsidering some fundamental aspects of his phenomenology at the time of his death,
though it is difficult now to interpret exactly what was the direction his thought was taking. (I
will mention this again below.) Now I would like to look at the implications of Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy for an account of perception and language.
3.4.2. Perception in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy
Perception was one of Merleau-Ponty's major areas of study, and a good deal has been said
about it already. We have seen that he opposed classical accounts of perception based on
representation, memory and matching, or sensation, rules and percept, in much the same
way as Heidegger did: use of these terms assumes everything it purports to explain.
Merleau-Ponty certainly does not offer an alternative "theory" to explain the classical
problems - for good theoretical reasons: the classical problems are not good formulations.
Perception is the pre-reflective ground of all reflection, and therefore cannot be theorised
about in a purely reflective mode.
"Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a
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position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them"
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:x-xi).
Perception takes place at a pre-conceptual level of consciousness, though this means
something different from it would in cognitivism: the pre-conceptual is, in Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy, deeply Subjective, and necessarily non-formal. Perception is about the relation
of the Subject to the Life-world, and involves a pre-reflective structuring of the world
according to its meaningfulness for the Subject. Far from being an act of intellect, organising
sense-data and recognising objects on the basis of logical operations, perception is a
"primitive patterning" into figure-ground structures, in which Objects stand out as meaningful
in relation to the background. The way this happens - indeed that it happens - depends as
much on the Subject's interests and motivations as on the characteristics of the Object:
"Perception structures the perceived world; it is not so much the passive recording of
sense-data as an expression of our perceptual intent" (Spurling 1977:26, his emphasis).
Meaning is thus at the centre of Merleau-Ponty's account of perception: Objects emerge for
Subjects according to the situation and projects in which they are involved. So Objects do
not have definite, essential once-and-for-all meanings. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy has been
called a "philosophy of ambiguity", though it was not a term he liked (Spiegelberg 1982:544),
apparently because of its pejorative connotation of equivocation. It also makes the meanings
of the world seem already too definite and pre-determined. Things in Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy are not so much ambiguous as enigmatic (Flew 1979:212).
"Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is not one of twilight, but of chiaroscuro" (Spiegelberg
1982:544).
This is not of course, as has been seen, to say that the World cannot be spoken about at all.
It does mean that no single perspective on it, no one vocabulary of terms, can describe it
adequately. We must seek understanding from several angles simultaneously; many views
can have something of truth to them, but they should not be isolated (Merleau-Ponty
1945/62), since to do so is to lose the truths of other perspectives. Much more will be made
of this idea in the discussion of the rest of this thesis.
3.4.3. Language in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy
Language also was a central concern of Merleau-Ponty's. His account of language and
speech is characterised by the same impatience with traditional dichotomies, and concern to
rise above them, as has been seen repeatedly above.
"Language, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a perfect illustration of the dialectic relation
between ourselves and our world." (Passmore 1968:502)
Behaviourist and intellectualist accounts, he argues, are alike in their drive to objectify,
conceptualise and decompose language, and both rest on the assumption of various
separations that Merleau-Ponty argues cannot be upheld. In each case, the point is not that
no conceptual separation at all can be achieved; more that the separation is partial, and
always grounded in a level where the "two" are one. It is not that at one level the two are
separate while at another they are intertwined, though in a way still distinct. Rather at one level
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there are not two elements at all, but an undifferentiated one. Crucially, the separation only
works because a Subject has an understanding of the whole in which the two parts are not
separate.
Firstly, it is impossible to divorce speech categorically from other human abilities and
behaviours, or to see the linguistic system as abstract or self-existent. Speech and language
are not just related to, but grounded in other human activity. Speech is thus more like an
elaborated kind of gesture, than like a translation of thought into a logical code.
The movement from silence to speech is not the movement from nothing to something,
from non-meaning to meaning." (Spurling 1977:51)
So speech is not separate from thought; it is neither a representation nor a sign of some
thought that has been completed before being "put into words".
The greatest service done by expression is not to commit to writing ideas which might be
lost ... but [to bring] the meaning into existence, it brings it to life in an organism of words."
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:182)
"...speech ... does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it." (Merleau-Ponty
1945/62:178)
"Expressive operations take place between thinking language and speaking thought, not,
as we thoughtlessly say, between thought and language. It is not because they are parallel
that we speak; it is because we speak that they are parallel." (Merleau-Ponty quoted in
Spurling 1977:57)
Speech is grounded in the pre-predicative, pre-conscious operative intentionality described
above, and manifests that intentionality (Spurling 1977:53). As has already been pointed out,
operative intentionality is itself inextricable from human physical embodiment. Therefore, the
psychological and physiological aspects of speech are not separable either (cf cognitive
science's "functionalism").
"It cannot be said of speech either that it is an 'operation of intelligence', or that it is a
'motor phenomenon': it is wholly motility and wholly intelligence." (Merleau-Ponty
1945/62:194)
Following all this, it is clear that a form/content distinction is impossible to uphold, for
Merleau-Ponty. They cannot be seen as two elements held together or associated in an
arbitrary relationship16. A word is precisely a meaningful form. A form without a meaning is
not a word, nor is a content without a form. Philosophies which presuppose the separation of
words into form and content - and cognitivist philosophy is only one of many of which this is
true - are thus grounded in a distinction that cannot be upheld:
"... we refute both intellectualism and empiricism by simply saying that the word has a
meaning." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:177, his emphasis)
To say that 'the word has a meaning' is to say that meaning is embodied in words and in
speech, in the same way as it is embodied in behaviour and perception." (Spurling 1977:50,
his emphasis)
16De Saussure of course speaks often about the inseparability of signified and signifier. I will comment on the
relationship between the two positions in Chapter 4.
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Communication, then, far from being seen as message-transfer accomplished by code-
transmission, is more like an evocation of empathy; and thus necessarily always partial. The
linguistic meaning in the traditional sense of literal message-meaning, is not the only or even
the most basic kind of meaning. It only works because it is based in other kinds of meanings
and discourse. On the other hand, linguistic communication also helps to bring that more
basic discourse more fully into being. Once again, the two cannot be strictly separated
defined. Intersubjectivity and language support each other.
"... communication between consciousnesses is not based on the common meaning of their
respective experiences, for it is equally the basis of that meaning." (Merleau-Ponty
1945/62:185).
Having given so many negatives, how can Merleau-Ponty himself characterise speech and
language? Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between authentic and sedimented speech:
authentic speech is the articulation of new meanings, in which a Subject "gives voice" to an
intention or meaning-for-himself. Once this has been accomplished, though, what has been
said exists as a piece/part of language, to be used again, by that person or another. It has
been constituted, and becomes sedimented in an institutionalised language. Authentic
speech in Merleau-Ponty's sense is rather rare, characteristic of children, poets and lovers.
All sedimented language, however, must once have been an instance of authentic speech.
In order to understand sedimented language it is necessary to understand the way authentic
speech is created: once more, they cannot be divorced from each other.
This has a bearing on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the relationship of language and
reality. Clearly, in neither authentic nor sedimented speech is there any sense in which
language mirrors or reflects or represents reality-as-such. His view is rather close to that of
Whorf (though Merleau-Ponty does not seem to have known Whorf's work): authentic
speech gives voice to a meaning that emerges as part of the relationship between a Subject
and a world. Sedimented speech incorporates a community's understanding of its world.
Different languages and different communities have different views of "reality".
3.4.4. Discussion
Returning now to the train of discussion which has so far compared the philosophies of
cognitivism, Husserl and Heidegger, the first thing to note is Merleau-Ponty's practical
achievements. Though he takes Heidegger's philosophical perspective very seriously, he is
hardly paralysed by its lack of foundations or its inability to provide an externally justified
methodology. Merleau-Ponty manages to retain the richer view of the Subject attained by
Heidegger's focus on existence rather than essence, without finding himself unable to utter a
statement, or make coherent and persuasive arguments. It is important then to discover
what enables him to make this kind of progress, despite the "subjectiveness" of his
philosphical framework.
What he does not do, clearly, is create a system of basic categories, and a methodology,
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and then set about constructing an edifice from that basis, as was the style of Brentano and
Husserl. Rather, Merleau-Ponty's way forward is by breaking down categories that already
exist - transcending them in a very fruitful, "constructive" way. He deliberately looks for ways
in which, and conditions under which, categories or dichotomies fail to account for the reality
they are imposed on, and thus deepens his understanding of the reality behind the
categories. In this way he can use evidence and relevant information from a wide range of
different areas, and can incorporate both empirical and conceptual arguments in his work.
The working of this method of procedure can be illustrated by showing one area where
Merleau-Ponty himself does not follow it, but his analysis can perhaps be improved, with
hindsight, by adopting his own policy of breaking down a dichotomy. My example is his
treatment of "authentic" versus "sedimented" speech. Most modern linguists would now find
fault with such a cut-and-dried dichotomy as Merleau-Ponty seems to make here. Use of
"sedimented" language can be just as creative as "authentic" calling forth of a new word for
a subjective experience or phenomenon. The use of the words "authentic" and "sedimented"
seems to imply a value-judgment, or bias against "everyday" speech. Merleau-Ponty's focus
on language as a set or system of words seems to obscure the creativity of language in use
for him.
This is an instance where Merleau-Ponty has actually set up a dichotomy, which we are left,
later, to transcend. It seems that he was later aware of the tension that this distinction
caused in his work - that in fact it was part of a wider conflict in Merleau-Ponty's thinking
between (Husserlian) phenomenology and structuralism that he was in the process of
working out at the time of his death (Schmidt 1985, Edie 1976, Spiegelberg 1982). The
opposition between the phenomenological and structuralist perspectives was one dichotomy
that Merleau-Ponty was not well able to transcend in his lifetime - perhaps because the
contrast between them was not so clear at that time, both being still in the process of self-
definition. Merleau-Ponty perhaps deserves credit for not letting the dogma of one
perspective blind him to the truths in the other - even though the result was a degree of
inconsistency in some aspects of his work.
So - how should Merleau-Ponty's work be assessed in relation to the problems being
discussed? The obvious question is whether his philosophical framework would do as an
alternative approach to speech perception research to that of cognitive science. This
framework has in fact been used as the basis of quite flourishing new disciplines of
phenomenological psychology and sociology17.
However, in my opinion, it is not the best possible formulation of the question in this
instance. The problem with adopting Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a framework for
research is exactly the same as was raised with respect to Heidegger's: it would go
17Though little attention has been paid to the specific problems of speech perception. I will say more about
phenomenological psychology in Chapter 5.
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completely against the main principles of his philosophy if his own language were to become
sedimented into a static structure of concepts. A better way of phrasing the question about
Merleau-Ponty's work is to ask what its relevance is in a more general way; what do his
insights mean for development of a framework of understanding speech perception?
One thing that emerges strongly from his work is the provisional nature of all dichotomies
and categorisations - but also their importance in understanding. Understanding is increased
by making categorisations and then transcending them, or breaking them down in fruitful
ways. The particular set of categories that might be most useful or relevant in a particular
domain is not decidable in the abstract, but depends on the topic, the purposes, the values,
etc, of that particular domain.
Thus the World itself has no definite categories or essences - though it has a nature or way
of being in a non-formal, non-categorial way. When we describe the World in language,
using the categories and syntax of the language, we give something of ourselves and our
point of view to make the description possible.
This view amounts to an antifoundationalism - in strong contrast to the foundationalism of
Husserl who started the movement which led to this position - which has several extremely
important implications for the nature of the Subject and the conduct of philosophical and
scientific study of the Subject. Some of these relevant to the project of this thesis will be
brought out in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
Bringing out this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is supported, I believe, by recent
developments in continental philosophy, to which I will now turn, very briefly.
3.5. Deconstruction
Deconstruction can be seen as the latest stage in the phenomenological movement,
although it is relevant to, and takes its impetus from, not only phenomenology but also
structuralism and the classical tradition of philosophy.
Its major figure is Jacques Derrida (eg 1967/73,1967/74,1972/82). His central philosophical
preoccupation is with the issue of philosophical foundations, in particular, the demonstration
that there are none. This has certainly been a theme throughout the phenomenological
tradition, as I have tried to point up in my exposition. A difference however is that Derrida
focusses explicitly and pointedly on this issue, rather than attempting to elaborate a
philosophical framework around it. He wants to demonstrate the full implications of the
radical antifoundationalist position. The aim of much of his work is to uncover the
foundational assumptions of various philosophical orientations, and then to undermine them
- not to discredit the philosopher concerned, but to demonstrate the provisional and
conditional nature of any foundations. He especially likes to show the reliance of an
argument against a particular foundational dichotomy on the existence of the very dichotomy
it is trying to refute.
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His method is textual analysis. He works with a text to bring out the author's reliance, in
making his point, on precisely the concepts, categories, or oppositions he is engaged in
arguing against or overcoming. His usual way of doing this is by looking at the metaphors
and other devices used by the author, in contrast to what is explicitly and literally stated.
"We can think of deconstruction in terms of a 'double reading'; a double reading which
reads the author's intended text, and reads also the text in a stricter sense. This double
reading will illuminate where the text 'betrays' the author, where the text (and what it
describes) will be shown to be at variance with the author's intention." (Durie 1987:5)
A good example is his deconstruction of Husserl's texts, to show the continuing reliance on a
dichotomy between Subject and Object, in the very exposition of his view that the two are
inseparable18. Or similarly, that his notion of self-evident presence, the fundamental
demonstration of truth in Husserl's philosophy, incorporated necessarily a notion of absence.
The 'now' cannot but retain traces of a past and future - indeed, they constitute the now, for
it is only in terms of them that a now can be constituted as a source point, a source point for
the spread of memory and expectation. The present is derived from its difference to the
non-present, and so the present is determined by the absent." (Durie 1987:20)
And so it is with all "pure" concepts - they are always "tainted" in some way. In explaining
this, Derrida introduces the word difference. It is extremely difficult to describe what this
means, for reasons that will become obvious. It can perhaps be thought of as a "force" that
underlies all classifications, conceptualisations, definitions, formalisations - and thus,
obviously, all uses of language; a force that infects or taints every attempt to purify or
idealise, and undermines every attempt to define a reliable universal foundation or
framework
"Difference" incorporates a pun on two French words. One of its senses is that of "differing"
or "being different from" and harks back to the structuralist dogma that words, etc, have
meaning not in a positive way, referring only to themselves, but in a negative way, which
requires reference to other related, but not currently present, words. Their meaning thus
refers outside themselves: one source of "impurity". The other sense is that of "deferring" or
"putting off till a later time". This takes account of the observation that the meaning of a piece
of language (for example) is never fulfilled, 'closed' or fully realised, since later
considerations can always expand or even alter the meaning. For example, we might accept
someone's words as meaning one thing, then find out later they were lying, which radically
alters the meaning, then find out later they were not lying but merely ignorant, shifting the
meaning again, and so on. There is no one point at which we can be absolutely certain that
all the relevant data is in.
These two aspects of diffdrance both show the pointing of meaning outside or beyond itself;
together they are responsible for the "remainder" or "surplus" that is always necessarily left
over after any dichotomy or classification, which is the reason that there can never be any
18We have seen the working out of this point in a different (not text-based) way, in comparing Heidegger's or
Merleau-Ponty's view of human being with Husserl's.
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universal, foundational classification, and that any attempt to provide one will always be
deconstructible.
Such a philosophical perspective raises various philosophical and theoretical problems. Not
least of these is the interpretation of Derrida's own texts. Naturally it is very important for
him not to fall into the same kind of easy acceptance of sedimented classifications, etc, that
make writing most deconstructible. In particular, it is crucial that his own coinage "diffdrance"
should not become frozen into a "concept" like any other. Derrida's aim is not to tell us about
diffdrance, but to show us it at work (or play). So his writing is full of convolutions, puns,
allusions, clashing metaphors, changes of person and perspective, and other devices of a
somewhat bewildering nature. He claims that he does not deliberately write in a way more
unclear than necessary, though many would consider this disingenuous.
Given all this it is difficult at this stage to come to a clear understanding of the full
implications of his work. Such questions as the degree to which his philosophy differs
significantly from others' - eg the exact status of the term "diffdrance" with respect to
Heidegger's "Being", or the deconstructibility of Derrida's own texts - must await further
development. In any event, this is not the place to try to come to any kind of conclusion
about Derrida's opinions on these issues. The question here is only about the relevance of
deconstruction, or antifoundationalism more generally, in relation to a philosophical
framework for the study of human cognition. I will make some brief remarks on this
relevance here; fuller discussion is the topic of Chapter 4.
Firstly, Derrida's work cautions us against taking over the perspective of any particular
phenomenologist, expecting it to be reliably "right" in some universal sense. Of course
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty made this point to some extent themselves, in their insistence
that the important thing is not to take over a set of concepts from a philosopher or anyone
else who claims to have worked them out, but to come to a personal understanding of the
pre-predicatively meaningful world, and then develop a vocabulary or system of description
out of that understanding. The problem of justifying the choice of one philosopher, or one
phase of one philosopher's work, or a selection of some aspects of various philosopher's
works, would need to be solved before making a framework for research. For a simple
example, every one of the philosophers we looked at underwent a major change of
philosophical orientation in the middle years of his career. At which phase was he "right"?
How should this be decided? The best way then to provide a framework for research on the
topic of human cognition, is not to take it over from Merleau-Ponty, for example, whose topic,
purposes and values were different, but to construct it ourselves, with criteria that seem
relevant to our own topic, purposes and values.
Importantly, this point is relevant not just to philosophical systems, in the rather remote
domain of abstract philosophy, but to any Objects, concepts and theories. Each of them is
constituted within some philosophical framework, from some point of view or for some
purpose - however vague or poorly articulated that framework might be - and is therefore a
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correlate of that Subjective point of view. None of them can be objectively or universally
valid; each categorisation leaves a "surplus" unaccounted for. However useful they may be
within the perspective from which they were developed, transportation to another domain
requires re-evaluation. No matter how familiar or obvious it is that some Object should have
a particular essence, the Object gets that essence partly from a Subject; not wholly or purely
from itself. That is one reason that phenomenologists like to make the familiar unfamiliar - to
make exactly this point: that we must sometimes distrust and interrogate the familiar;rather
than simply accepting as it seems to be in itself, we must sometimes try to see our own
contribution in making it into what it is.
The thrust of the "antifoundationalism" that has been developed during the course of this
chapter, then, is that there really is'19 no "foundation" to the World in itself. Though we make
and use foundations constantly in our lives, these are foundations that we make and use, not
foundations that we are compelled to acknowledge by the nature of the world itself. The
justification of a perspective or framework can only ever be in terms of criteria that come
down to values, beliefs and assumptions - not goodness of reflection of objective reality.
Derrida's "diffdrance", I believe, can be seen as making precisely this point: the "differance"
that underlies all categorisations, etc can be seen as the fact that a categorisation depends
always on both the "reality" being categorised, and the Subject doing that categorising. Both
of these are complex, and not explicitly definable, and their interaction has the effects
described by Derrida as those of "diffOrance".
These points and their implications will be discussed and clarified in detail in the following
chapter. As a footnote to this chapter, I would like to make some comparisons between the
philosophies discussed here, and one which is more familiar to cognitive science.
3.6. A Note on Wittgenstein
I have refrained so far from making any explicit comment on the relationship between
Wittgenstein's philosophy and those of the phenomenologists, although the question will
certainly have arisen in the reader's mind. The reason is that while there is clearly a strong
similarity of concern, it's not entirely obvious how he fits in, or which of the
phenomenologists he should best be compared with: it depends on how you interpret
Wittgenstein, whose epigrammatic style and concern with question-raising rather than
question-answering make him notoriously open to multiple readings (not to mention the fact
that he too underwent a major change in philosophical orientation in the middle of his
career). His work has, in fact, been likened with some plausibility to that of each of the
philosophers discussed in this chapter (see for example, van Peursen 1959, Staten 1985,
Spurling 1977, Llewelyn 1985, 1986).
19Compare cognitivist antifoundationalism. Some cognitivists acknowledge the rale of a Subjective viewpoint in
determining which of several possible foundations might be relevant in a given context; but not the necessary role of
some Subject in making a Thing into any Object at all.
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Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to the argument of this thesis that a definitive
statement be made on the question. The point here is not what differentiates these
philosophers from one another, but what unites them (and others) against the kind of
philosophy on which the IP approach to speech perception is based. This is part of a larger
dichotomy in philosophy between what might be called "formalisers" and "non-formalisers"20,
discussed very interestingly for example by Rorty (1976, 1980), Taylor (1985) and others.
In terms of such a broad division as this, I think the later Wittgenstein can unhesitatingly be
classed along with Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida21. He too strives to undermine
familiar dichotomies such as those between language and thought, sound and meaning,
mental and behavioural. He continually points up the inadequacy - despite the familiar
appearances given in everyday experience - of the view that words and sentences have
definite or fixed meanings; or the idea that there is some "inner man" or private language of
thought of which public speech is a more or less accurate translation or reflection In fact this
kind of questioning of the familiar is one of the main preoccupations of his philosophy: he
wants to encourage us to doubt our everyday assumptions; to show us differences where we
usually see similarities22.
To Wittgenstein, definitions, descriptions, explanations and so on are forms of language
used in contexts, which work because they let us feel we 'know how to go on'23, not because
there is some objective sense in which they reflect, accurately or otherwise, pre-existing
categories. The "sameness" presupposed by any categorisation is, Wittgenstein says, more
like a 'family resemblance' than an identity. So there is a sense in which any use of language
is a metaphorical use, since it compares things which are not strictly identical.
Thus language and communication, though describable in terms of rules, cannot consist in
rule-bound systems or behaviour. Any of the rules we define could be overridden in the light
of later information (cf Derrida's 'deferral' mentioned above); any use of rules implies an
understanding of the criteria and conditions of their application, which cannot be
exhaustively accounted for in terms of rules - no rule can cover all risks and all eventualities.
All this fits in well, I believe, with the inversion of actual and ideal as the domain of greater
value that has been seen during the course of this chapter. For Wittgenstein, as for
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, ideal or formal descriptions are seen as abstract, provisional
^Or betweem those who believe in the importance of "edifying" as opposed to "systematising" philosophy (Rorty,
1980). Compare Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as "therapy".
21While the earlier Wittgenstein, of the Tractatus, would appear to have strong similarities with Husseri, which
makes the comparison between Heidegger's arguments against Husseri with Wittgenstein's against his own earlier
self an interesting topic.
^In this he is different from much of 'systematising' philosophy, which aims to show similarities where we are
used to seeing differences (McGuinness, 4/5/89).
^Interestingly, Wittgenstein does not seem to dwell much on the unreliability of this most unreliable of feelings,
though he is so concerned that we should in general not accept such appearances at face value.
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and partial. The actual is not derived from the ideal, a deformation of it. Rather the ideal is
derived from the actual. To forget this, says Wittgenstein, is like thinking that smooth ice,
which offers no friction and is thus in a sense ideal, is better for walking than rough ground.
3.7. Conclusion
How then should the relevance of the work described in this chapter be assessed in relation
to the enterprise of cognitive science? It is easy to see the phenomenologists as either too
different in their concerns and style to have much to say to cognitivism, or as too similar, so
that their work can be assimilated to the terms and problematic of cognitivism24. Neither of
these reactions is, in my opinion, adequate. Non-formalist philosophies are significantly
different from cognitivism, in ways that have major implications for the enterprise of studying
human perceptual and cognitive abilities.
Qf course, as has been seen, cognitivist philosophy acknowledges the antifoundationalist
position up to a point, but, I argue, does not follow its implications. I can give one brief
example at this stage, though it is the following chapter that is mainly concerned with setting
out the implications of antifoundationalism, and assessing cognitivist philosophy according to
how it fulfils them. Cognitive science accepts antifoundationalism to the extent that it says
(as was seen in Chapter 2): since it is not possible for a framework to be "right" in the sense
of reflecting accurately the true nature of the world, it is permissible to define a framework to
use as a "working hypothesis". Whatever is learned from research within such a framework
might not be "right" in any strong sense, but it will increase knowledge and perhaps be
fruitful enough to lead to a redefining of key questions. Merleau-Ponty's method, described
above, is very different. He says that no one view can give a complete picture, and so it is
necessary precisely not to stick with one perspective, but to vary the perspectives from
which the world is viewed if we are to increase our knowledge or understanding.
However, I have left the most important implication of antifoundationalism until the last. That
in my opinion is what it says about the nature of the Subject who inhabits the
antifoundationalist World I have described. If the World does not come prepackaged as
Objects with clearly defined essences, the Subject must be of a kind which can constitute
and define Objects out of the inchoate experience of the Life-world.
The following chapter will tie these remarks together with those from Chapter 2, and explore
some of the ramifications of the position I have outlined here.
24Winograd and Flores (1986) and Bateman (1983) are examples of attempts to fuse the phenomenological and
cognitivist enterprises; Flanagan's (1984) seems to simply equate the phenomenologists' arguments with those of a






In Chapter 2, I set out the central tenets and philosophical framework of cognitivism, the
background philosophy within which the information-processing approach to human speech
perception research is situated, and called attention to certain respects in which it could be
considered to have an inappropriate understanding of the nature of the Subject of speech
perception.
These observations motivated a turn to continental phenomenological philosophy, noted for
its interest in Subjects and Subjectivity, and Chapter 3 provided a very brief account of
phenomenology in some summary phases of its historical development. There did emerge,
by the end of the chapter, a conception of the Subject that is quite different from cognitivist
philosophy's, and more satisfactory in relation to some of the points raised against cognitivist
philosophy. However, it was found to be impossible to counter cognitive science's problems
simply by incorporating this new Subject into its existing framework. Too much is related to
the Subject: if it is changed, much else will be thrown out of balance. In particular, it was
found that the very elaborated phenomenological Subject was correlated with a very anti-
foundationalist general philosophy. Taking over that view as well, in cognitivist philosophy,
would be impossible, not only because it would have very unsettling repercussions for the
enterprise as a whole; but also because one of the concomitants of taking a view of reality
and philosophy such as that of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or Derrida is that terms, concepts
and explanations cannot be transported as sedimented units to another domain. Taking over
all or part of such a philosophical framework readymade would thus run exactly counter to its
own intention. Instead, I believe, it is necessary to acquire an understanding of the insights
of the phenomenological movement in such a way as to be able to apply them where
relevant to a particular domain.
It is the task of this present chapter to come to grips with the issues raised, and their
implications for a framework for speech perception. The first sections draw together the
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main insights of phenomenology, as set out in Chapter 3, relevant to the topic of this thesis,
focussing and developing the discussion started there as to its significance for the cognitivist
framework outlined in Chapter 2. It need hardly be said that the view put forward, though in
part derived from and inspired by phenomenological philosophy1 is very much directed by
the needs of the project at hand, and by no means makes claims of being a comprehensive
representation of the work of those philosophers.
The later part of the chapter turns attention back to cognitivist philosophy and assesses its
appropriacy as a background philosophical framework for speech perception research,
viewing it from the perspective developed in the first part. Though I believe my arguments
have relevance to cognitivist philosophy as a whole, I do not develop all the points that
would be needed for a full-scale critique, but focus on cognitivist philosophy in its role as a
framework for understanding speech perception.
Finally, I point out what I consider to be a fruitful direction to explore in developing an
aiternative framework for speech perception research. Outlining what such a framework
could be is the task of Chapter 5.
4.2. Subject and World
4.2.1. Antifoundationalism
In this section, I would like to review one of the main themes of Chapter 3, and distil the
parts that are most relevant to the concerns of this thesis.
A major trend of the argument of Chapter 3 was towards the view I call
antifoundationalism. This view makes very strongly the point that there is no neutral or
objective description of the World or the things that comprise it which can be used as a
universal or objective foundation on which to build theories. It was stressed that this is not to
claim that the World does not exist independently of anyone's description of it, or that it
exists only in the mind of its observer2. There is no reason to doubt the existence of material
things; the claim of antifoundationalism is that their existence as what they are depends on
the participation of a Subject for whom they are what they are, Objects with a particular
nature, essence or description3. Part of what makes an Object what it is is the perspective of
the Subject for whom it is an Object.
1ln fact, as has already been noted, the phenomenologists are not the only philosophers to make arguments of
this kind; their arguments can be seen as part of a larger philosophical debate between "formalists" and "non-
formalists".
2lt is thus necessary to make a "distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that the
truth is out there" (Rorty 1986:3). It is only the second claim that is being opposed here.
3I will continue to capitalise the words "Subject, Object, World" when I mean them in the special senses
developed here. I will also add some new terms in the course of the discussion and capitalise those as well.
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This view of the relationship between Subject and Object has many important implications,
not all of which are straightforwardly evident or easy to follow. For example it was seen in
Chapter 3 how Husserl, who makes a clear explicit statement of the interdependence of the
two the basis of his philosophy, nevertheless develops a philosophical system which is in
crucial ways very "foundational". Nearer to home, it is not uncommon to hear a
philosophical view propounded which sounds very much like the antifoundationalism I am
stating here. In particular, as was seen in Chapter 2, cognitivist philosophy makes various
statements which on the surface are quite similar (eg that "truth" is relative to a framework of
pretheoretical assumptions which must be justified in terms other than those of the theory
they support). This is an important insight. However, I believe the implications of
antifoundationalism run much deeper than cognitivism allows. In fact, I will argue below that,
if followed correctly, they undermine the coherence and validity of (some parts of) the
cognitivist enterprise - IP models of speech perception being the focus of my discussion.
These implications will be easier to draw out using some vocabulary, already introduced in
Chapter 3, which I will rehearse here. The first distinction is between the World (as it exists
in itself) and the Life-world (the World as it exists for human Subjects who inhabit it). Of
course we can only ever know the latter, though several kinds of scientific endeavour are
directed towards discovery of the former, to the extent that this is possible. In this thesis, I
am interested only in the Life-world, and do not observe the distinction as clearly as would
be necessary in some other domains. Of course, it is the focus on the Life-world that leads
phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty to give such high value to experience, as opposed to
knowledge. The second distinction, most important for present purposes, is that between
Thing4 and Object, where the Thing is something that has being for a Subject, has emerged
as a significant feature of the Life-world, but has no essence, no existence-as. The Object is
the Thing as described - given an essence - by a Subject in a domain. This concept of Thing
is difficult to grasp, but even more difficult to use. It is sometimes necessary to speak about
some Thing, but of course, it follows from the distinction I have drawn between existence
and existence-as that an entity, characteristic or feature cannot be verbally pointed at or
mentioned without using some descriptive term, and thus making an Object of the Thing. It is
therefore necessary, in speaking of a Thing, to talk around it, and to beware that use of a
descriptive term for it in this context does not bind one to the connotations and implications it
might have in another context, even if that other context might be seen as in some sense the
proprietary context of the term. This kind of tactic goes very much against the grain of
familiar principles of rational thought, which insist upon strict definition and consistency of
use of defined terms. These principles are of course indispensable in certain kinds of
4lt will be clear almost immediately that the word "Thing" here is highly dangerous - though the use of some term
for what it means is imperative. To say "Thing" suggests a noun-y, self-existent kind of entity, but "Thing" as meant
here should have no such connotations - just as Object should have none. McDonald (1988:248) has faced a
similar problem: "The problems of language here are evident in my use of the word 'thing'. Literally, I risk reification.
I am, however, comforted by my dictionary which gives as its first definitions of 'thing', an assembly, parliament,
court, council." Also, as discussed at the end of the last chapter, Derrida is well-known for the devices by which he
attempts to work round this difficulty in the use of a word for his "difference".
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thinking, where it is possible to remain on the level of already-constituted Objects. They are
not always appropriate in domains where it is necessary to involve pre-Objectified Things. In
fact I suggest it is partly a difficulty in keeping distinct Thing and Object that lies behind the
patent misunderstanding of some phenomenologist thought by some cognitivist thinkers
(Pylyshyn 1981, Searle 1977 can be singled out as examples). I will point out frequently in
the discussion that follows places where these distinctions are most relevant. The term
"Object" has been discussed already at greater length: it is the word used for any described
Thing.
One of the most significant implications of antifoundationalism as far as this thesis is
concerned has to do with the nature of the Subject that a philosophy can postulate
reasonably, given its other commitments. The interdependence of Subject and Object means
that any description of the World, as in a philosophical system, rests upon (perhaps implicit)
assumptions about the Subject: and similarly an understanding of the nature of Subjectivity
is closely connected to a (perhaps implicit) understanding of the nature of the World. These
sets of assumptions should be coherent.
Before continuing, I should mention very briefly an implication that antifoundationaiism does
not have (this point will be discussed in more detail below). It does not mean that there can
be or should be no foundations at all. If that were the case, nothing could ever be said, let
alone be said to be true, or right. Antifoundationalism simply implicates in any foundation the
connivance of a Subject in making it a foundation: and thus makes any foundation a local
rather than a universal one. I criticise cognitivist philosophy not for postulating a local
foundation for its project, nor for failing to acknowledge that it is only a local and not a
universal foundation, but for failing to realise the implications of the fact that their foundation
is local - implications both for the nature of the Subject and for the conduct of their own
enquiry. I will spell this criticism out in detail in the course of the present chapter.
Next, I would like to start by discussing some of the general implications I consider
antifoundationalism has for the nature of the Subject and the World to be postulated by a
philosophy.
4.2.2. The Nature of the Subject
If antifoundationalism means that there can be no neutral or universal descriptions of the
Things in the World, it would certainly be highly contradictory for me now to state an
objective definition of "The Subject". However, I think I can point to some characteristics of
Subjects that would appear to be implied, and, conversely, ruled out, by the position I am
adopting.
Firstly, it is necessary to account for how Objects of the world can arise at all. As we have
seen, the phenomenological position is that Objects are constituted from Things which
emerge as meaningful entities in the Life-world for the Subject from a background or horizon
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of meaning. The Subject must therefore be a being for whom or for which this can happen,
that is, one for whom/which features of the world stand out as significant or meaningful. In
the case of human Subjects this happens naturally because we are alive: things take on
significance according to how they affect our survival, comfort or well-being, and our
purposes in achieving or maintaining these. Our being alive, experiencing, is for us the
ground of meaningfulness.
Just being alive however is not enough to give us full Subjectivity in the required sense. We
also have another characteristic: the ability of self-reflection5. Human Subjects are
self-reflective beings, who can take themselves and their actions as Objects of
contemplation. So we not only react to those aspects of the world that are relevant to our
needs and interests in our lives. We can also be aware of the reactions themselves. Thus for
example, instead of simply reacting in a way an observer might say was analogous to two
different events, we can ourselves observe the analogy, and abstract the characteristics of
similarity. (Interestingly, we seem to ascribe differences in Objects more to differences in the
World than to differences in our Subjective viewpoint.)
In this way, we can make classifications, and abstract the features that make for similarities
and differences. The features abstracted can be reified, named and themselves classified,
and so on, resulting in Objects of many different kinds of ontological status. A crucial point
here, which will be returned to below, is that such a self-reflective description is, like any
other description, a Subject's interpretation, not a neutral or objective representation. (Recall
here the progression from Husseri to Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty on the question of "self-
evidence" or "presence to consciousness". A necessary characteristic of the Subject in
Heidegger's philosophy was the "splitting" of the self into more than one kind of
consciousness, not identical or transparent to each other. One part of the Subject can be
Observer to the other(s).
Perhaps it would prevent misunderstanding if I were to point out briefly a claim my position
emphatically does not bind me to. This is an example of the need to talk about aspects of
the World, Things, without making them into Objects of a theory. I say here that the human
Subject's existence as a living entity is the ground of meaningfulness for us: this is by no
means equivalent to the claim that a biological description of a human being is in some way
basic, neutral or foundational.
To return to the analysis of Subjectivity, the characteristics mentioned so far are presumably
closely intertwined with a third essential aspect of human Subjectivity - which is not really a
single characteristic, but a whole conglomerate of closely interlinked and interdependent
factors, none of which could be fully developed without the others: our development of
5This observation is made in many different ways by many different people: human beings are described as
self-interpreting, self-describing, self-modelling, etc. The difference between these views is in the details of how this
characteristic of human beings is understood (see Taylor 1985, ch.4).
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cultures and language; our intersubjective nature and our life with others in communities. It is
these that allow, and are allowed by, "sedimentation" - an apparent stability of existence-as
that would not be possible otherwise6.
All this is related to our ability to imagine, hypothesise, etc, so important to our reasoning
powers. It also means that we can see ourselves as others see us7 compare ourselves to
others, or measure ourselves against imagined ideals, giving us pride, shame, identity, etc,
etc. So possession of an individual personality is closely bound up with Subjectivity;
individual differences are given extra dimensions, and greatly complicated, by our self-
descriptions. The way we describe ourselves influences what we do, and how we
understand the world (Taylor 1985). So our purposes and projects are not related only to
our survival and physical well-being, but become intervolved with various "psychological"
purposes and needs. Thus the Subject is a "self", a being which can mean "I, me, us".
Our Subjectivity thus can be seen as giving us what amounts to a set of ingrained "biases"
or "prejudices" according to which we see the world - to do with our living nature, our cultural
and linguistic heritage, and our purposes or goals on particular occasions. "Bias" of this sort
is absolutely ineliminable. Using the word "bias" suggests that there is an unbiassed
perspective, but that is not the case: eliminating one bias merely substitutes another.
Mundanity, neutrality, and other ascriptions of ordinariness are not lack of bias in this sense,
but rather, a bias of a different kind, perhaps one more shared with others of our community.
Rather than use the words "bias, prejudice", I prefer to say that we bring values to our view
of the World.
"Nor is it... the essence of the mind to look at things impartially. When we look at the world
... we are always 'in a certain mood'. Men talk of overcoming their moods, but what really
happens in such cases ... is that one mood overcomes another. Even apathy is a mood, not
the absence of a mood." (Passmore 1968:480, explaining Heidegger's view)
All these characteristics and more are involved in giving the Subject what I call a point of
view, which is necessarily far from "neutral". It is necessarily informed with desires, fears,
purposes, needs, values, prejudices, anticipations, interests, and so on. A Subject's point of
view changes constantly, sometimes very rapidly, and usually overlappingly - ie one discrete
"state" does not give way at a certain time to another discrete "state".
So, according to the view I am developing here, the human Subject is a living being, a
6ln this thesis I concentrate mainly on the nature of the individual Subject, rather than on the social context within
which any Subject must be situated to achieve full Subjectivity. This by no means implies that I consider the
individual "more important" than the society. The relationship between these two is very much one of co-constitution
- neither would be what it is without the other. To speak of one or the other is to make exactly the kind of abstraction
from a whole as is the focus of much of the discussion in this chapter. However it is a case where I believe the focus
on one or the other for the purposes of research can be justified - so long as it is not done to the exclusion of
consideration at all of the other.
7No particular accuracy is being claimed for this ability. It does not have to be accurate to have the effect it has
(though of course complete inaccuracy is not the norm either, being associated with madness). This has again to do
with the distinction between an understanding of the pre-reflective Life-world, and any expression of that
understanding.
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member of a culture, with an individual personality, engaged in projects and enterprises with
multifarious motives and purposes, who interprets and describes the world, including
himself, as it appears to him to be. What I am claiming, in keeping with Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, is that these characteristics - ie the having of a point of view in the sense
meant here - are essential factors in perception and cognition. Without these, objectification,
significance and meaning could not arise in the world. Things would exist, but not as
anything; not even as individual "things". A Subject which lacked the qualities I have
mentioned, or something like them, would not be a Subject which could make sense of the
world.
There is a way of reading this which makes everything I have said here rather
uncontroversial, perhaps even obvious. Cognitivist philosophy for example, is also based on
the understanding of cognition as crucially involving knowledge, desires, goals, etc (as set
out in Chapter 2). One difference lies in the extent to which cognitivism accepts the
existence of particular beliefs, desires, etc, as described, in (or rather, "represented in") the
mechanism of cognition. The view I set out here says that any such description, even
self-description, is a Subjective interpretation or articulation of a pre-conscious, pre-
conceptual, pre-reflective, pre-ontological, non-explicit experience of the Life-world, and thus
cannot fully encompass what it describes. I will discuss in detail below this and other ways in
which cognitivism fails to honour the implications of the antifoundationalist Subject, even
when it claims to accept them.
4.2.3. The Nature of the World
All this concentration on the Subjective should not be allowed to blind us to the contribution
made by "reality" itself to the existence of Objects. It is certainly true that the world does not
come "prepackaged and labelled", but that is not the end of what can be said about it. It
does not mean that there is no "way things are". Phenomenology for all its Subjectivity, is not
idealism: the notion of the "given" is an important, though problematic, one in all versions of
phenomenology. There are several kinds of things that can be said about the world that are
relevant in the present context.
For example, the image presented above of a lone Subject interpreting a vast and formless
reality was a "limit" image, evoked for the sake of argument, to show the necessity, in the
limit, that for there to be "Objects", there must be at least a Subject to interpret reality from a
point of view. The world as we encounter it in our lives includes of course, and has included
for a long time, many Subjects for whom it has been meaningful. It has a structure and a
"way of being" (though not a fully articulated one). Attempting to "explain" the Life-world
without taking this into account would be an error. In particular, many of the Objects that we
encounter are presented to us as what they are through a filter of our language and culture,
rather than being constituted anew by each Subject on the basis of individual experience.
Another misleading image that may have arisen is that of a single Subject confronting an
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isolated Object from across a chasm in some primal act of interpretation. Again this is a limit.
In the normal course of our lives, we come across Objects in the course of using them, ie in
a context, which also contributes to our interpretation of what the Object is.
To say we cannot be objectively "right" is not to say we cannot be wrong. We cannot have a
neutral perspective on reality; or say anything that is "objectively true" about it, but we can
certainly have better or worse descriptions, given our values, purposes and background
assumptions.
"For in so far as we can talk about illusion, it is because we have identified illusions, and
done so solely in the light of some perception which at the same time gave assurance of its
own truth." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962:xiv)
After all, this thesis is largely devoted to criticising a certain description of reality as
inappropriate or misleading given certain values and purposes; and I have just made several
statements about the nature of Subjectivity, which I argue to be "true" - or valid in the context
of what is to be accomplished.
The crucial point is that in saying anything about the World, we are putting our
understanding into language, therefore making making explicit and giving essence to that
which in itself is not explicitly categorised. This is the reason behind the effect expressed by
Merleau-Ponty's "chiaroscuro" and Derrida's "surplus" (recall Chapter 3); or, in plainer
language, the fact that the whole is more than the sum of its parts: there is always another
way of looking at it which would make it different, and would include some aspects that the
first has had to leave out.
"I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not
possess it; it is inexhaustible." (Merleau-Ponty 1945/62:xvii)
No one description can give us an understanding of the reality described; understanding
requires varying the point of view, exploring the limitations of categories of description8.
A particular aspect of this point is that it should not be expected of the World in itself that it
should be "consistent" in the sense that it should, of itself, fall into a single, logically related
system of classifications. Consistency in that sense depends on a Subject's contribution as
well as "reality's". Such ideal systems are therefore tied to the context in which they are
developed. Ordering the world into a regular consistent system - valuable as it is to do this -
is something that we want to do, for the sake of our understanding, not something we are
compelled to for the sake of reflecting reality more accurately. In particular, given the
description above of the Subject's activity of reflecting on and comparing the Objects that
arise as meaningful for it, abstracting features and characteristics, reifying, classifying and
idealising, and so on, it follows that any regular, formal, ideal abstract system is the result of
some operation by a Subject with a point of view.
aThis is the reason behind the point made above that it is sometimes necessary to argue for the existence of
some entity or feature of the World, without being committed to all the ramifications of its existence as a particular
description. The word "is" cannot now be taken as indicating an enduring and objective essence. At most it gives a
provisional interpretation, rather than a universal definition.
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A most important ramification of this understanding of the nature of the world in the present
context has to do with how a formal description should be viewed. The giving of a formal
description can be seen as a special kind of essence-ascription. As such it is a product of a
point of view and an aspect of the world in a context or situation. The formalisation depends
upon the point of view and the situation. It is thus derivative, not basic. There is much that is
"left out" in any formal description, which cannot be reconstituted from the formal description
itself9. This is one of the major reasons against the symbol-manipulation view of human
cognition, as I started to argue at the end of Chapter 210. A formal system can exist only for
a Subject; never as a Subject.
4.2.4. The Role of Language
In the picture I painted above, language is an integral part of Subjectivity, a part of what we
are as human beings, and closely bound up with our other most fundamental human
characteristics. Clearly, then, it is impossible to define, any more than it would be possible to
give a sensible definition of what a human being is, and expect it to last beyond the
immediate context of the epigram.
However, our use of language has various effects that can be mentioned in the present
context. Perhaps one of the most interesting features of language is the way it is ambivalent
between being part of the Subject and part of the World. "The language" a person speaks
(however defined) must exist in some sense separate from any particular individual user of
the language. And yet for each individual it must be individually "theirs".
It is through language that we can articulate our understanding and thus (partly) bring into
being our world as it is for us. As was seen in the discussion of language in the philosophies
of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, the ability to name aspects of our experience is considered
the "authentic" use of language. To give such an experience a name is to give it its being as
an Object.
"It is the office of language to cause essences to exist in a state of separation which is in
fact merely apparent, since through language they still rest upon the ante-predicative life of
consciousness." (Merleau-Ponty 1949.62:xv)
Even in this brief description however, I have already swung too far towards a very
individualistic pole of language-description. Not every use of language is an originary calling
forth of a new linguistic entity. Language is also social as well as individual, and there is a
sense in which it exists (perhaps, seems to exist) as a separate system for its users. In its
'This fact is significant not so much because of the aspects of reality that are left out in making a formalisation
(they are presumably deemed for the time being relatively unimportant anyway); as for the fact thai anything has
been left out; for the fact that a decision has been made as to what to leave out and what to consider essential. This
kind of decision, when phrased in this way, obviously implies a Subjective point of view from which these judgments
are made.
10See Dreyfus (1972/79) and Bateman (1983) who make very similar points with particular reference to cognitivist
philosophy.
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existence, it can guide and shape our understanding and apprehension of the world: if two
things are given the same name, they will seem the same; if something is named by a noun,
it will seem like a thing; if by a verb, like an event, and so on. This is the point made by the
much-misunderstood11 linguist, Whorf. There are limits to what an individual can do, set by
the existing structure of a language12.
"The speaking agent is ... enmeshed in two kinds of larger'order which he can never fully
oversee, and can only punctually and marginally refashion. For he is only a speaking agent
at all as part of a language community,... and the meanings and illocutionary forces activated
in any speech act are only what they are against the background of a whole language and
way of life." (Taylor 1985:11)
Again though it is necessary to pull up before going too far in the direction of language-as-a-
system at the expense of language-as-individual-action. I have noted already the dangers of
drawing too rigid a distinction between "authentic" and "sedimented" speech. However
sedimented a piece of language, its use always involves a judgment made from a Subjective
point of view (perhaps a judgment made in a pre-reflective way) whether to apply that term in
a particular instance. That judgment certainly depends on the Thing given in the real world.
But it also depends on the context in which it occurs and on the Subject's point of view -
which do not endure unchanging. If there is a change in any of the three, the classification of
the "reality" can change. Less obviously, if there is stability in any of the three, the
classification can stay the same. Which one of these will be focussed on is not externally
specifiable. The attitude of the Subject is part of the meaning of words and sentences,
though we rarely notice the contribution of our own Subjectivity.
It follows from all that has been said so far that we cannot rely on language to give a
perspicuous representation of reality. Language can make it seem that things have enduring
essences in and of themselves, by pointing our attention away from ourselves, and towards
the Objects that we speak of. But language use is not an automatic13 association of a
symbol with an Object, or a representation with a represented. Similarly, describing a
situation with a sentence is not an automatic or formal procedure, but involves interpretation
and judgment by a Subject, as well as the relevant arrangement of reality and the context in
which it occurs. The fact that as members of a community we often reinforce each others'
judgments tends to hide the fact of the judgment itself from our view: if everyone agrees on a
description, we feel it is simply reading off a label, rather than constituting an Object.
Neither, on the other hand does language necessarily distort or obscure reality, since it is
partly implicated in creating that reality, by allowing us to articulate our understanding of our
world. There is no sense in claiming that ordinary language is in some general way
11Though understandably so, given the way he expressed his ideas.
12The English pronoun system provides a good example: new words can be coined apparently indefinitely for
new technologies, social phenomena, etc, but a good way of expressing the simple concept "he or she" has not yet
emerged.
13lt might be "automatic" in the sense that it is not deliberated over; it is not in the sense of being "algorithmic".
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incoherent - though of course particular uses of a particular language can certainly be
criticised as incoherent or misleading. Nor is it sensible to try to replace an entire language
with another in the hope of providing a more accurate representation of reality. No single
linguistic description can show us reality - though with careful use of many descriptions from
different perspectives, surely we can, as Merleau-Ponty believed, achieve increased
understanding of our world and ourselves.
Language is our tool for understanding and communicating, but it has limits which must be
taken into consideration in interpreting what it shows us. One of its uses, as has been seen,
is precisely to help create the "local foundations" that are part of the basis of our community
lives. In communicating we are not transferring a representation of a meaning that will be




Taken together, these observations make the antifoundationalism I am advocating a radical
antifoundationalism: there really are no objective or foundational facts, essences or
definitions. Not just the Objects, but also the criteria according to which judgments are
made, explanations are accepted, relationships and categorisations observed, methods
deemed reliable, and so on, are necessarily and profoundly Subjective14, in the sense that
they rest on a view of the world as seen from Subjective perspective. (Consider how often
the truths of science or philosophy rest on Subject-concealing words like "obvious",
"possible", "indubitable", "obscure", "apodictic", "strange", "familiar" or, importantly in the
present context, "abstract", "ideal".) These criteria include tacit or implicit biases and values
as to analogies, directions of appeal for authority, etc. Though aspects of these criteria can
sometimes be made explicit in an act of reflection, of course this can never be wholly or
objectively achieved, or universally justified. All this can be summed up by simply saying
that the philosophical or scientific researcher, the Observer, is a Subject in the full sense of
the word as it has been developed here.
This radical antifoundationalism is, I believe closely related to Derrida's diffSrance, the
"force" he sees as underlying and undermining all dichotomies; though I prefer, in the
context of the present project, to think of it in terms of this relationship between a Subject
and a World, both of which are complex and changeable. This relationship accounts for all
the effects of "diffdrance", but lessens the problems associated with the use of a word which
can give the impression that it names an entity.
14This is riot of course the same as being "subjective" in the (often pejorative) everyday sense of "idiosyncratic"
or even "unfair".
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This view has major implications with respect to some common ways of thinking. The
general point is that it necessitates a more rigorous distinction between existence and
existence-as, and implicates in any existence-as - description, interpretation, classification,
etc - the point of view of a Subject. Any philosophical view which rests on the notion of "the
given" is thus faced with the problem of justifying the description of the given (Spiegelberg
1982:115, 116). Any philosophical or scientific enterprise which starts by imposing a definite
ontological system is faced with the need to justify the Subjective values the system
depends on in terms of the domain to which it is applied. Any use of the notion of
representation must be prepared to account for the constitution of the Objects being
represented (Judge 1985).
The next sections draw out some specific implications of radical antifoundationalism for
philosophical and scientific enquiry.
4.3.2. Implications for Philosophical Enquiry
One way of phrasing the argument so far would be to say that an attempt to work out a "first
philosophy" in the old-fashioned sense of the term is futile. There is no universal ontology
and epistemology which can be worked out in abstract terms and then used as a guide to
reliability in other areas of philosophy and science. Questing after "truth" in the sense of an
accurate or perspicuous reflection of reality is pointless.
"Philosophy does not hold the world supine at its feet. It is not a 'higher point of view' from
which one embraces all local perspectives." (Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Schmidt 1985:37)
Taking this position opens up various extremely interesting lines of philosophical enquiry that
follow on from the discussion of Chapter 3. Some of these are topics of current research in
philosophy.
One kind of question is whether there might be a kind of "first philosophy" in a more modern
sense: the position from which it is possible to say there is no first philosophy in the old-
fashioned sense15; a position for example which emphasises the Subjectivity of our view of
the world and reminds us that every distinction depends on not only the nature of reality, but
also the vague but complex conglomerate of attitudes brought to it by the Subject. Or is
there indeed some kind of limit on our ability to understand ourselves in our own terms -
something analogous, in the case of non-formal beings, to the limit that Godel proved with
respect to formal systems. If there is such a limit, could we "prove" it in that sense? Or would
the proof itself constitute a "place to stand" and thus involve a Subjective point of view?
"If one of the fundamental uses of language is to articulate or make manifest the
background of distinctions of worth we define ourselves by, how should we understand what
is being manifested here? Is what we are articulating ultimately to be understood as our
15Clearly enough, the position I am putting forward in this thesis is the product of a particular Subjective point of
view in a particular context. It would certainly not be difficult to "deconstruct" my text. That is because, though I am
using philosophical arguments, I have a particular practical or scientific aim in mind, rather than a purely
philosophical one. The question I am posing in this section is whether it might be possible to elaborate a
philosophical position, perhaps along similar lines, for which one could claim some universality.
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human response to our condition? Or is our articulation striving rather to be faithful to
something beyond us, not explicable simply in terms of human response? ... If... the ultimate
basis of naturalism turns out to be a certain definition of agency and the background of
worth, does the critique terminate with the proof that this is so..., or is there a way we can go
on and rationally assess this and other definitions of worth?" (Taylor 1985:11-12)
Some of the statements made by the phenomenological philosophers in the previous
chapter are very much open to these kinds of questions: whether, with their arguments
against formalism, they are substituting another view or a better view. After all, the more
their positions are regularised and systematised, the more they become influenced by the
Subjective values of the particular philosopher. For example, Derrida's view that differance
means that each term includes some of the meaning of its opposite is itself a very
"systematic" view: why should the meanings included in a term fall so neatly into opposites
and dichotomies, rather than into more ragged relationships, or no relationships at all?
Derrida and Heidegger both make heavy use of the device of claiming that the views they
put forward are in some sense implicit in the work of other writers. Is this because there is
some kind of "truth" in their views? Or is it merely a legitimate rhetorical device? Or is it a
use of hindsight, showing their own historicity, a sign of the ineluctible contingency of their
own Subjective views?
Similarly, Heidegger makes several dichotomies in the course of presenting his view of
human being: that between at-hand being and to-hand being for example. It would seem that
this is at least not an exhaustive classification, and indeed there are some questions that
arise with respect to the validity of his description of the categories (see Rouse 1985 for a
discussion of issues related to this dichotomy). It seems to me, for example, unlikely that the
"breakdown" of an item being used is the primary cause of change from a to-hand to an
at-hand mode of being. Is this merely a minor point, requiring some elaboration of
Heidegger's treatment (or an explanation of some misunderstanding on my part)? Or is it a
sign of an inevitable incompletability of any philosophical view? If the latter, then it is
tempting to speculate about the more fundamental dichotomies of his work: that between
being and knowing, being an obvious one. Though his aim is to break down the distinction
between them, is there a sense in which his own work relies upon it, as Husserl's is said to
rely on the distinction between Subject and Object? If so, is there some other way of looking
at things which avoids this dichotomy? Would it inevitably rest on some further, equally
non-objective dichotomy?
These kinds of questions inevitably raise the meta-question of the role of philosophy and
philosophers with respect to the rest of society. Do these kind of considerations make
philosophy more divorced or less divorced from the practical concerns of life? Should
philosophers pursue the kinds of questions raised here? Or leave them aside as
unanswerable and turn towards more situated tasks, such as the unravelling of whatever
conceptual issues arise in the natural or human sciences?
Interesting and perhaps relevant as some of these topics are, pursuing them here would
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take me beyond the scope of a thesis on speech perception theory, so they must be left as
provocative questions16.
4.3.3. Implications for Scientific Enquiry
Radical antifoundationalism as a philosophical stance certainly does not imply either that
"science" is impossible, or that some kind of "antifoundational science" - whatever that might
mean - has to be developed. Philosophy and science are very different kinds of endeavours,
though no doubt with considerable relevance to one another. I have said already that local
foundations are not only possible but essential for any kind of organised, systematic,
intersubjective knowledge: it is upon such local foundations that scientific frameworks are
based.
Radical antifoundationalism does have implications for how scientific results should be
viewed. It sees science as a Subjective enterprise - carried out by Subjects in cultural
contexts - and situates any results within a local foundation of assumptions. No scientific
endeavour can be undertaken except on the basis of some such local foundation - from a
point of view - to give meaning to the domain, allowing Objects to exist as what they are in
that context. Whether the framework is explicit or implicit, consistent or inconsistent, sensible
or crazy, there must be some Subjective point of view (or several). Without it there could be
no interpretation - "description", "observation". And certainly no "explanation" or "theory". No
scientist works exclusively by pre-defined algorithm; there is always a strong element of
"intuition" and interpretation (often involving hindsight) of the significances of the situation. It
is at a later stage of development (or presentation) of a theory that it is formulated in explicit
logical steps (eg Verhaar 1970). This is certainly not to downgrade the achievements of
scientists; if anything it makes them more remarkable and admirable than an understanding
of science as the rigorous following of a method allows. (See for personal accounts of this
aspect of scientific endeavour, Medawar 1979, Feynman 1986, Polanyi 1966, and even
Chomsky 1988:190.)
Nowadays, such an opinion is rather commonplace within philosophy of science, and even in
science (Chapter 2). However, it is necessary to stress some implications of this view which
are not always followed through in cognitivism, as I will demonstrate shortly. Seen this way,
scientific results and theories are bound to the domain in which they were achieved. Within
that domain they may be considered true, valid, or otherwise. Nothing that can be said about
them in their own domain though can guarantee their status when they are transferred to
another domain. Importantly, as has been seen, it is not just the results in terms of facts
which are thus tied to their domain. More subtly, Objects, methods, and criteria are also
constituted within a domain. For example the understanding of what is a "cause" and what
16See Rorty (1980), Llewelyn (1985, 1986), Staten (1985) Taylor, (1985), Judge (1985), Mitchell and Rosen
(1983), for just a few of the interesting discussions on and around these questions.
128
an "effect" is not universally applicable, but tied to a particular background framework as
seen from a Subjective point of view. "Rationality" itself cannot be given a universal or
formal definition, in terms of externally applied rules or standards. Even the basic
categorisation of Objects as "same" or "different", on which so much depends, cannot be
done purely objectively.
It is therefore necessary in evaluating a framework to interrogate its Objects, criteria and
methods in the context of the domain in which they were constituted, to appreciate the
values of the point of view that make them what they are. This becomes particularly
important in developing a new domain of scientific endeavour, or repairing one that is
considered to have gone awry: attention should be paid to the validity of the entities,
concepts, methods, criteria, etc, in terms of the new domain, whatever their status in some
other domain, to determine whether they should still be considered valid. Rasmussen
(1988) gives a very clear discussion of an issue of this sort with respect to the issue just
mentioned of ascription of cause and effect, showing how the criteria used in assessing the
cause of an accident can mean that blame is attached to, variously, a machine, the user of a
machine, or the designer of the machine.
Naturally the particular criteria according to which a decision as to appropriacy of methods,
etc, should be made cannot be specified universally, but must depend on the judgment of
the Subject making it in the context. Radical antifoundationalism thus gives a very important
role to the judgment of the scientist in particular contexts17. Rigour is of course desirable -
and possible - but it is self-defined and self-imposed18 within a domain.
A very significant dichotomy of scientific domains, in my opinion, is that between domains
which do and do not include Subjects among the Objects of study. This would seem to be
related to the often-discussed difference between the so-called natural sciences and human
sciences. It is sometimes suggested that different general methods are relevant in these two
domains. In particular, that where an "axiomatic" method - in which initial locally foundational
facts are assumed, as axioms, and built upon by deduction - is appropriate for natural
sciences, human sciences are better studied by a hermeneutic method. In the hermeneutic
method, the subject-area is thought of as analogous to a text, and the task of the scientist as
its interpretation (Taylor 1985, Mitchell and Rosen 1983).
Of course, there is considerable debate as to the general validity of such methods, as well
as the possibility of studying human sciences according to natural science methods. There is
some discussion, for example, as to whether the difference, if there is one, between these
domains is due to the relative "maturity" of the two areas, rather than to the nature of their
objects of study (eg Bateman 1983:49). This is not the place to enter into discussion of this
17More so perhaps than the well-known anarchic philosopher of science, Feyerabend (eg 1975), allows.
18Not necessarily by each individual as a deliberated decision of course. The role of tradition and consensus is
not to be ignored.
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as a general point in philosophy of science, which would require definition and analysis of a
range of human sciences.
I do wish to make the point however that in the context of a domain like speech perception
research, Subjects cannot be treated as if they were like other (non-Subjective) Objects (and
I suggest in Chapter 5 that in the particular case of speech perception research a
hermeneutic-style method is a fruitful approach).
"Human beings tend to construe themselves on the model of things. This does not mean, of
course, that they overlook the ontological distinctions between 'person' and 'thing' entirely,
but that they mistake what that distinction is; they tend to construe the distinction between
'person' and 'thing' as if it were a distinction between two classes of things..." (Schmitt
1969:206, explaining Heidegger's view)
In a domain with Subjects in the sense meant here it is necessary to have an understanding
of the world in respect of Things as well as of Objects (for reasons which have been pointed
out already but will be made more explicit below). In many domains, the point of view of the
researchers can be more or less fixed, with an agreement not to question the validity of the
perspective within the relevant domain; not to doubt what there is, for practical purposes, no
reason to doubt (Spurling 1977:69). However, in studying a domain which includes
Subjects, in the sense meant here, it is necessary precisely to question the perspective, to
look at the World deliberately from different angles, to look at familiar Objects as Things. In
particular, it is necessary to take into account that our society happens to give a very
foundational status to the discoveries, descriptions, concepts, etc, of the natural sciences.
This is because of our cultural values - point of view - not because these things really or
objectively are what they are in the scientific domain. It is not the case that the "scientific"
way of looking at the world is the only, the best or even necessarily the most scientific way.
Finally, several of the points made in this section can be summarised by introduction of a
further terminological distinction necessary in domains which include Subjects among their
Objects, that between Subject and Observer (or Researcher)19. The Observer here is a
Subject in the full sense of the word as developed over the last chapters, with the additional
aspect of point of view that it is a Subject trying to understand the nature of Subjects. The
Subject is the Object of such an enquiry. It is essential not to confuse the point of view of
these two, especially not to attribute Objects constituted from the Observer's point of view to
the Subject. Much more will be said about this below, as I believe that many of the problems
I find in cognitivism can be traced to just such a confusion.
19A similar distinction is considered essential to the biological sciences by Maturana (eg 1978).
4.4. Subject and World in Cognitivist Philosophy
4.4.1. Introduction
In the discussion of Chapter 2, I began an argument that the symbol-manipulating Subject
presupposed in cognitivism could only operate in a World of pre-constituted Objects - ie that
it assumed a foundational World. Here I will develop and extend that argument with the
background gained in the intervening discussion. First I will argue that despite a surface
agreement with some aspects of the view I have put forward here, cognitivism is indeed
foundational in non-trivial ways. Then I will show how this affects the Subject postulated by
cognitivism, and argue that such a Subject simply could not do some of the things required
of it - notably, of course, speech perception.
4.4.2. Cognitivist "Foundationalism"
Cognitivist philosophy, as has been seen, actually proclaims a relatively anti-foundationaiist
view itself. Some would perhaps agree in large part with the view given so far, and might
well be surprised to find themselves described as "foundationalist". Despite this however, I
will argue here, cognitivism's problems stem in large part from various kinds of
"foundationalism" in its world-view.
One relatively straightforward aspect of this foundationalism is cognitivism's confusion
between Subject's and Observer's point of view. This amounts to a "sedimentation" of a
particular description of some aspect of the Subject or its world. For example, in speaking of
language-for-the-Subject, it looks to descriptions gained in linguistics, the study of language-
for-the-Observer; in speaking of thinking-for-the-Subject, it looks to descriptions in terms of
"mental states", again, description by an Observer. Even in accepting the dichotomy of the
whole person into mind and body, it sediments a self-reflective description. In using
methods and criteria of the natural sciences, it is accepting these as genarally valid, beyond
the domain in which they were constituted20.
A more important kind of foundationalism is connected with the central tenet, monism, which,
as pointed out briefly at the end of Chapter 2, has precisely the force of making a description
from the point of view of the physical sciences into a foundation. Although the intention of
monism is the claim that only material things exist, as interpreted by cognitivist philosophy,
monism implies that one aspect or description - a physical one - is more salient, basic or
real, no matter what the context. Actually, though, the issue here is somewhat complicated
by the confusion, also pointed out in Chapter 2, involved in cognitivist philosophy's actual
20These kinds of importations could of course be defended as being transfers between domains with sufficient
similarities to make them appropriate, rather than ascription of universality. I will not argue against this opinion;
conceding the point would not affect my argument here, since it is not the motivation for the transfer, but its
appropriacy that is the point at issue.
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implementation of its principle of monism. On the one hand cognitivist philosophy depends
on various differences in the kinds of entities in its framework - the difference between for
example a thing, a symbol and a symbol-user - which it cannot account for satisfactorily
because it concentrates only on their material/physical properties. On the other, cognitivism
depends on various kinds of non-material "entities" - eg functions, features, abstract
processes - being included in the realm of the "material". So ultimately the force of monism
as it operates in cognitivist philosophy practice is that a set of descriptions, rather than a
single description, are deemed basic. Nevertheless, it is a pre-defined set of categories that
are given this privileged status in cognitivism - though without the tacit background
understanding of a cognitivist philosopher it is hard to find a simple rationale for selecting the
members of the sets. There is no scope for the idea that in interacting with the World, the
Subject interprets uncategorised Things according to the current context and point of view.
To account for the flexibility of interpretation, cognitivism has to postulate a conversion by
the Subject of one Object into another. I will give examples of the operation of this kind of
foundationalism in speech perception research in Chapter 5.
The third, related, sense in which cognitivist philosophy is foundational, is the one most
central to the overall trend of my argument. The whole framework of cognitivist philosophy
depends upon the understanding that at least some things in the world must simply exist as,
in themselves, what they are. Although they might sometimes be seen differently in different
contexts, that is a transformation of their more fundamental nature. These are the "raw data"
and the abstract functional processes that cognitivism's Subject operates with. This is the
way cognitivism's view of the World and the Subject are intertwined: its Subject must be able
to symbolise features of the World at "low levels", therefore the existence of such features as
what they are is implied. The burden of my argument so far, however, has been that this is
impossible. There can be no representation without a point of view of the kind described
above. This point is made at length by Judge (1985). Interestingly her philosophy does
incorporate centrally a representational view of human thought and language. The argument
I am making here is not against the idea that cognition is representational. It is against the
particular understanding of the nature of representational thought put forward by cognitivism:
if you want a representational theory of cognition, you need a Subject which can make and
use representations. This I claim cognitivism's Subject could not do.
4.4.3. The Subject in Cognitivist Philosophy
4.4.3.1. Symbol-Manipulator
It will be recalled that I started the argument against cognitivism by showing a particular kind
of inadequacy of the Subject it postulates: crucial stages of the symbol-manipulating process
- constitution of Objects, attachment of symbol, interpretation of transformed symbol -
require a kind of background understanding of the meaningful situation, which understanding
cannot itself be explained as symbol-manipulation.
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From the present perspective it is possible to see more clearly what is at stake here. I
pointed out at the end of Chapter 2 that cognitivist philosophy operated on the assumption
that small entities with physical descriptions in regular or well-defined relations were "more
concrete"21 or "lower level" than larger things defined in terms of vaguer meanings - and I
argued that this is an erroneous assumption, because a physical description does not make
a thing any more "concrete" than any other kind of description.
I can now expand this point by recalling (from Sec. 4.2.2) that from the Subject's point of
view, the relationship of abstract to concrete is the reverse of what it is in cognitivism's
assumption. The larger meaningful things in vague and complex relationships are the
Objects that emerge for the Subject. The smaller, well-defined ones in regular or simple
relationships are the products of abstraction, idealisation and refinement, according to a
background understanding and purpose22.
This is an example of the operation of precisely the confusion between Subject's and
Observer's perspectives that I described above, a species of foundationalism. The Observer
reflects and describes according to criteria and values, and then, forgetting the role of his or
her own point of view in constituting the Objects that result, creates an ontological hierarchy
of those Objects according to Subjective criteria like size of unit or vocabulary of description.
My argument here is that the ontological hierarchy more relevant to the Subject is one that
takes into consideration the process of constitution itself, rather than one of already-
constituted Objects, ranked according to the values of the Observer.
Whereas cognitivism's Subject goes through processes of recognising and combining small
meaningless entities into larger ones which can be associated with meanings, the
interpreting Subject goes through processes of analysing larger Objects which have
emerged as meaningful from a background of meanings, into smaller more regular sets,
meaningful in a different kind of way, against a different background. The background of
meaningfulness, it will be recalled, is necessary even for such "fundamental" classifications
as "same/different"23. The Subject's "creativity" is thus about constitution and reconstitution
of Objects and relations between them from a changing background of the meaningfulness
of the World in the Subject's (changeable) point of view. "Creativity" seen in terms of formal
tokens and rules of logic for their manipulation is something quite different - valid enough24
but it could never achieve the cognitive abilities of the human Subject.
21 Even though it might be an abstract or functional entity.
^Compare the discussion of the "three worlds of perception" in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in Spurling
(1977:32ft), which, though having a slightly different emphasis, is similar in spirit to my discussion here.
^Lundh (1983) develops his alternative framework (different from the one I am putting forward here) on a similar
understanding: "... similarities, just like everything else, are perceived in terms of meaning structure..." (Lundh
1983:73).
24l should perhaps reiterate that I am not suggesting here that people never use symbols and processes in
reasoning; only that this could not be the basis of all our reasoning and other cognitive processes.
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So the interesting thing about human cognition from this perspective is not how Subjects
manipulate representations of Objects, but how they constitute Objects as what they are (for
the time being) from a background of meaningfulness which does not already include
Objects. Understanding that, I argue, requires postulation of a Subject like the one described
above. Whether it is best understood in terms of some sense of 'representing', as Judge
would argue, is a matter for debate; my claim is that it should not be understood as
representation in the sense cognitive science means the term.
If I am right in this, it becomes clear why the two major problems (recall Chapter 2) for
cognitive philosophy are provision of accounts of consciousness and meaning, which I will
treat next, in turn.
4.4.3.2. Consciousness
Firstly, "consciousness" is not a separable, definable "characteristic" or property which
entities might or might not have or be given. It is not something that "intelligent" entities
might or might not have; an extra feature of human beings that a good theory of cognition
ought ultimately to be able to account for, but that intermediate theories can put to one side
for the time being. The "property" we call our "consciousness" is an essential part of our
nature as living and self-reflective beings. Thus it is not something to be explained by an
account of cognition; it is part of the explanation of cognition. Any explanation of
"consciousness" would have to be in another domain, in which it was not presupposed by
the terms of the explanation.
I am putting the word "consciousness" in scare quotes here because it is not a word that fits
neatly into the vocabulary of the account of Subjectivity I am developing. It does not
comprise a natural division of our nature. Rather it cuts across other, more relevant,
classifications. This I believe is the reason that cognitivism has so much trouble with the
definition of consciousness, and the decision as to whether it is an essential feature of
intelligent systems (cf Chapter 2)25. The particular definition and connotations
"consciousness" has depends on the context in which and point of view from which the
abstraction is made. Thus the word has different meanings depending on how and when it is
used: for example in contrast with "unconscious", "non-conscious", "sub-conscious", "pre-
conscious", and so on.
The attempt to clarify the issue by substituting the term "intentionality" I think can fairly be
25lt will be recalled that Searle (eg 1984) is an example of a philosopher who takes an anti-AI stance based on
the opinion that consciousness or intentionality is a necessary prerequisite for true intelligence. Thus he believes
that the difference between machines and humans is that humans really have intentional mental states, whereas
machines are only imputed intentionaiity by humans. He demonstrates the difference with the "Chinese Room"
example (which I believe addresses adequately neither the cognitivist position nor the kind of position I am putting
forward here). This view allows him to keep all the parts of cognitivist philosophy that appeal to "common sense"
views of the world (in fact Searle frequently uses common sense or "obvious facts" in support of his arguments)
while opposing the arguments of "strong Al". In my opinion, this involves him in significant incoherence of ontology
and epistemology, for just the reason that "consciousness" is not itself one of the essential characteristics of
Subjectivity, but an abstraction derived from more fundamental characteristics.
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said to have failed, since "intentionality" now has nearly as many meanings as
"consciousness" - some of which were pointed out in passing through chapters 2 and 3; and
has changed very considerably from its original intentions in the course of translation into a
form suitable to cognitivism (Chisholm 1960; Dennett 1972). Any definitions or explanations
of "intentionality" rely greatly on the fact that we can "catch on" to what is meant. To say that
intentionality is "aboutness" or "having a content" means almost nothing in itself. Aboutness
and content are both being used in very idiosyncratic, non-literal ways. I conclude then that
while "consciousness" is a bad term to use, "intentionality" is no better.
Another important contrast between my view and that of cognitivism can be seen in the
relationship between subconscious and conscious processing. Cognitivism considers that
the kind of processing that takes place "below the level of conscious awareness" is of the
same nature as that which we do consciously (Chapter 2). I claim, by contrast, that the
"subconscious processing" must be different from conscious reasoning using external
symbols.
Our "conscious awareness" of ourselves is, like our description of everything else, an
interpretation of an aspect of the World from a point of view. We can claim no special
"rightness" for the particular descriptions we give to aspects of consciousness26. When we
"look inward" what we describe is partly a product of our point of view in exactly the way that
is true of the descriptions we make when we look outward.
The "introspectionists" are of course well known for making the error of claiming reliability for
their view of the workings of their minds27. But they are not the only ones who make this
error. Husserl as was seen in Chapter 3 placed heavy reliance on the notion of "presence" of
an Object to consciousness, depite his criticism of philosophers of the Natural Attitude who
did exactly the same with respect to things in the world. More importantly, for present
concerns, cognitivism makes an entirely analogous error when it gives equally heavy
reliance to the notion of representation and belief. To look inwards and explain behaviour on
the basis of desires, fears, knowledge, goals is to make an interpretation - description - of
what one "sees". Such an interpretation is a perfectly adequate description for everyday
purposes. But to use that interpretation in the very different domain of cognitive psychology
is, once again, to confound the Subject's and Observer's points of view, to "sediment" an
interpretation and suggest that there is something "real" about the particular categories
^Though clearly this is different from claiming the general existence in the World of whatever-it-is that we call
consciousness, "...when we ask what distinguishes persons from other agents, consciousness is unquestionably
part of the answer. But not consciousness understood as just... the power to frame representations of independent
objects. Consciousness ... is as it were the medium within which they first arise as concerns for us. The medium
here is in some way inseparable from the content; which is why .. our self-understanding ... is constitutive of what
we feel." (Taylor 1985:103).
27Brentano's variation on the theme, mentioned in Chapter 3, suggested that in treating consciousness as an
activity rather than a container he was able to overcome the problem and claim infallibility of inner perception.
According to the argument I have given here, this is not a valid claim.
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"belief", "fear", "goal" and so on28.
4.4.3.3. Meaning
It will be recalled that meaning, like consciousness, is one of the topics that is most difficult
for cognitivism to come to grips with in filling out its understanding of cognition as symbol-
manipulation. The fact that this should be so can also be understood in the light of the
preceding discussion. There are two major kinds of problem with cognitive science's
treatment of meaning, both of which are directly attributable to the understanding it has of
the nature of the Subject and the World.
First, cognitivism, as will be recalled from Chapter 2, sees meaning as something associated
with some otherwise meaningless form, whether a linguistic form, or the form of objects in
the world. Much of the debate in cognitive science concerns the problem of how to
characterise the meanings and the relationship of meanings to forms. Most of the
problematic of cognitivist research on perception is, as has been seen, motivated by the
need, in their scheme of things, for the Subject's processing system to change the form from
in
what is given^the stimulus into something that can be matched in memory.
But of course the idea of a meaningless form has now been shown to be incoherent; it
suggests that such Objects simply exist as what they are, irrespective of any point of view - a
foundational^ assumption. For a form itself to exist as what it is, it must be meaningful to
the Subject. The reason cognitivism has trouble deciding the relationship of form to meaning
is similar to the reason it has trouble deciding the relationship of mind to body: they are not
two separate things, joined together as halves forming a whole. They are aspects of a whole
which is more than the sum of these two parts, and in which the two parts are not already
differentiated prior to the abstraction by a Subject that brings them into being. To understand
the relationship of form to meaning requires understanding the Subject's relationship with the
whole from which they are derived. In this case, the form that is "meaningless" to
cognitivism's Subject is meaningful (as an ideal or abstract Object) to the Observer. Thus
we have here another kind of way in which cognitivism confuses the perspective of the
Subject and the Observer (or researcher): the cognitivist Observer abstracts two aspects of
a whole, Objectifies them, and then incorporates them as already constituted into a theory of
the Subject. I hope to clarify and exemplify this point in several places below (notably in the
Sections on Perception and Language in this chapter, and in detail with respect to the IP
account of speech perception in Chapter 5).
The second major kind of problem, clearly related to the first, is that cognitivism sees a
meaning as something definite associated with a form. The whole point about meaning, in
the view I am putting forward here, is that explicit, definite meanings are constituted by
28A problem not often addressed by cognitivism is that of the definition of these categories as such; what is there
that distinguishes all beliefs from all fears or all goals, that does not make use of our common understanding of how
to use the English language?
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Subjects, in contexts, from a background of (inexplicit) meaningfulness. To put the definite
meanings already constituted into a theory of the Subject in the way that cognitivism does, is
to deny the Subject the flexibility and creativity that are at the heart of human cognition.
Certainly cognitivists realise this. As was seen in Chapter 2, a great deal of their research is
devoted to the problem of how to give their Subject back the kind of flexibility that this
conception takes away from it. Again, more will be made of this point at appropriate places
below.
These two insufficiencies in cognitivism's account of meaning are, I believe at the heart of its
problems in accounting for the way its Subject interacts with the World. They are caused by
its inability to account for the origin of anything meaningful at all in the World, which in turn is
related to its understanding of what it is to be a Subject in a meaningful relationship with the
World, as discussed above.
4.5. Reappraisal of Cognitivist Framework for Speech Perception
4.5.1. Introduction
In this section, I will point out the implications of the view given in this chapter for some
areas of cognitivist philosophy discussed in Chapter 2, which have particular relevance for
speech perception theory. I will do this rather briefly here, since I will largely be exemplifying
points already made, and the ways in which they are relevant will be made more explicit in
the following chapter.
At the end of Chapter 2, I suggested that cognitivist philosophy's pre-theoretical
commitments as to the nature of the Subject and the World could be seen as the source of
various of the more explicitly stated tenets. In this present section I will expand on the
relation between these deep assumptions and some of the features of cognitivist philosophy
set out in Chapter 2. The general direction of this section's discussion will be towards the
claim that it is the stance taken on these two issues that gives cognitivist philosophy the
features that make it inappropriate as a background framework for understanding human
speech perception. Thus it will be evident that in each case, a feature of the cognitivist view
can be traced to the underlying position with respect to Subject and World that I have been
discussing up till now. Many of the problems of cognitivism seen and discussed by its own
practitioners can then be seen as symptoms, whose cure requires treatment of the cause at
this deeper level. This will lead me to the suggestion that a change in orientation at this level
would provide a good starting point for a new and perhaps fruitful alternative framework for
the study of human cognition.
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4.5.2. Perception
Cognitivism's general account of perception will be recalled as: the transformation of a
stimulus, according to computational rules, to allow the matching of input with a form stored
in memory, and thus the accessing of the meaning of the stimulus.
The problems with this view from the point of view of this thesis have now been brought out
clearly. Firstly, the description of the stimulus (meaningless form, usually in terms of the
physics of light or sound) is made from the Observer's point of view, rather than the
Subject's, according to the Observer's background understanding of the meaningfulness of
the perceived Object and the criteria and values of a scientific description of the World.
Certainly, as already argued, the Subject cannot be said to be perceiving a "meaningless
form", at any "level of description". Thus the "lowest level" description of the World attributed
to cognitivism's Subject is quite an arbitrary description from the point of view of the
perceiving Subject. When it is recalled that this description is (part of) what motivates the
postulation of processes to transform the input into a matchable form, this can be seen to be
a significant point29.
Similarly, the description of the "stored" canonical forms into which the stimulus has,
according to cognitivism, to be transformed for recognition is an idealisation made by an
Observer from a background understanding of the whole context; they are constituted by
processes of abstraction and idealisation based on experience of many examples. Here
again, the choice of stored forms has a profound effect on the need for postulation of a
processing mechanism.
Ultimately, then, the cognitivist view of perception as involving matching of forms is
incoherent. It has has already been shown (Chapter 2) that the kind of "matching" that is
required cannot be achieved without the kind of background understanding that is
supposedly being explained by the symbol-manipulation mechanism (and which I have
argued a purely symbol-manipulating Subject can never have). Now it can be added that this
kind of matching is not just impossible for a symbol-manipulating Subject, but unnecessary
for the kind of Subject that could have a meaningful relationship with the World. The stimulus
form and the canonical form are not relevant to such a Subject's perception; there is no need
to transform one into the other. The description of the World that is relevant to the Subject is
already meaningful. In particular, for Subjects - eg IP researchers - to formulate the symbol-
manipulation theory, they must themselves have an understanding of the meaningful
situations in order to describe the "forms" and "meanings" and "rules".
28,t is interesting to note a close similarity between cognitivism and Husserlian phenomenology here. Each of
them, from their very different perspectives, starts from the assertion that it is "indubitable" that what is given, in, say
reading a page, is a collection of squiggly black marks (Spiegelberg 1982:126; Neisser 1976). The point is, that,
indubitable as the experience may be, what is given is not given as "squiggly black marks". It is given as an
uninterpreted Thing.
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This general view of perception has a major effect on the kinds of problems cognitivism
faces, and which cause the difficult issues discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 - of architecture,
processes, knowledge, integration, interpretation, and so on. For example, cognitive
philosophy is certainly right to attribute knowledge to the Subject as an essential
characteristic (compared to behaviourism). But here again there is a confusion between the
Observer's description of the knowledge the Subject needs or has, and that knowledge from
the Subject's own perspective. This has two sides, one to do with the kinds of knowledge
postulated, and one to do with the form that the knowledge is presumed to take. Firstly,
much of the detailed knowledge is postulated because it is considered necessary for
transformation of the stimulus into the canonical form. If that is not seen as the major part of
the Subject's task, the knowledge is not needed. Secondly, the cognitivist Subject's
knowledge is definite and explicit. This is because it is an explicit description of knowledge
by an Observer. Recall the problems cognitivism has in this area, and the attempts to
develop models of knowledge that allow more fluid application, content-addressability, and
so on. From the perspective being developed here, the Subject's knowledge is, at bottom,
fluid and inexplicit, and has no separation between form and content to cause problems of
"access". "Knowledge" itself is a word in a language, which cannot be taken to refer to a
pre-existing definite part of the World; the fact that in our particular language it is a noun
should not mislead us into assuming that it is a "thing" stored in a "place".
More detailed application of these points about perception will be given in the following
chapter with specific reference to speech perception.
4.5.3. Language and Communication
Language for the Subject, in the view I am developing here, is not something it has or does
but an integral part of what it is. Any description of language as an entity or system in its
own right will inevitably be incomplete, since it must be an abstraction made in an act of
reflection. More importantly, any such description must imply the existence of a Subjective
point of view from which it is made.
Recall cognitivism's view of language as a system of relations between sounds and
meanings. This conception of language rests necessarily on two dichotomies - that of sound
from meaning, and that of language from thought. In both cases, the argument of this
chapter and the last has been towards the conclusion that, valid and useful as these
dichotomies are for many purposes, they cannot be considered basic from the point of view
of the language-using Subject. I will discuss them here in turn.
First, consider cognitivism's separation of sound and meaning, or form and content:
"... earlier views, those of Hobbes or Locke for instance, ... understood meaning in terms of
designation. Discovering the meanings of words is finding out what ideas or things they
stood for. We are much more sophisticated in the twentieth century, and especially in the
English speaking philosophical world, which has been through the Fregean revolution. But
some of the basic ideas of the Hobbes-Locke tradition still survive in transposed form. With
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truth-conditional theories of meaning, for instance, we still have the basic notion that
meaning is to be understood in terms of the things language is used to talk about. The
crucial unit is now the sentence and not the word, and relations like 'making true' and
'satisfying' replace the earlier emphasis on designation ..., but meaning is still explicated by
some notion of representation; the meaning of a word is to be explained by the way it can be
used to depictthe world." (Taylor 1985:9, his emphasis)
All of linguistics, whether the linguistics of Saussure, Bloomfield or Chomsky, rests on this
separation of sound (or form) from meaning. Much of linguistics has to do with the problem
of the way that these two aspects of language are related to each other - in fact the
differences between schools of linguistics can be described in terms of how this relationship
is seen.
However, this separation is an abstraction which depends on an understanding of language
as a Whole30 - a Whole in which the two are not already distinct, and which involves more
than just these two parts31. Valid as it is for linguists to operate with the distinction of the
Whole into those parts, it is not valid to consider these two Objects as already constituted as
separate entities for the Subject32, or to see the Subject's use of language as involving a
bringing together of the two. To do so is to confuse an Object constituted by a Subject
(Observer) with something given in Reality. No linguistics could be done without a
background understanding of the meaningfulness of the Whole of language (ie a Whole
which comprises both sound and meaning before their abstraction and constitution as
Objects). That is the kind of linguistic meaningfulness that is relevant to the Subject33. At
that level the sound and the meaning are not separate; they are certainly not in an arbitrary
relationship. Though the arbitrariness of this relationship is a fundamental tenet of linguistics,
it is an arbitrariness of a special kind, not relevant when the domain is changed to that of
language for the Subject.
Saussure of course made a point similar to this one - he emphasised the fact that the sign
was a whole consisting of both signifier and signified, and that neither could exist without the
other, as one side of a piece of paper cannot exist without the other. My point here is
somewhat different however. I am claiming that, for the Subject, the two are not separate but
will use "Whole" in the general sense of a unity from which Objects are abstracted; the term is closely related
to "Thing" which has been used up till now, merely emphasising a different characteristic. In the case being
discussed here, that means speech or language as "linguistically-meaningful-forms". It should not be taken to
suggest that there is some defined "whole language" which a Subject has to know before it can understand any part
of language.
31 It might be worth digressing here briefly to point out an important difference between "Whole" as meant here
and the "whole" of a "holism" sometimes discussed in cognitivism (eg Minsky 1987). Holism in that sense is the
claim that the whole is made up not just of atomic parts but of the parts plus some specified extras, such as their
"functions". The point about the Whole as I mean it here is that it is not possible to state what the "extras" are in
themselves (eg "function" arises in relation to a Subject). Any Object or description is an abstraction from a Whole.
Decisions as to what is basic and what is extra involve Subjective judgment.
3ZGoldberg (1981) likens the meaning of a sentence to the humour of the sentence, emphasising that to speak of
meaning as an entity is already to speak of something very abstract.
33And it is this Whole which is represented by writing, alphabetic or otherwise, not the sound alone - a point made
at length by Harris (1986).
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are derived from a Whole, bigger than the sum of these two parts, which includes both as
aspects or features, not entities.
This is precisely the reason that defining the relationship between sound and meaning is a
problem for linguistics: meanings are not stable things that exist separately from their
embodiment in language. In order for there to be such an Object as a word's "meaning" or
it's "sound", there must be a Subject who understands the whole word. A word is not a
complex entity made up of two conjoined but separate parts; it is a Whole in which the two
are not distinct, but of which they are aspects, and from which they can be abstracted and
Objectified.
Cognitivism does more than treat sound and meaning as two separate entities related or
combined to form language-as-a-Whole, whose relationship must be discovered or specified
by researchers. It makes further abstractions and idealisations of both entities, constituting
as Objects various small units of sound and meaning, and, again, working to discover or
specify the (regular, formal) relationships among these Objects (phonemes, morphemes,
features, semantic primitives, etc). Thus cognitivism sees language as system made up of
groupings of small bits into bigger bits, and the bigger bits into yet bigger bits. The
perspective of this chapter gives a very different view: it sees language-for-the-Subject as, at
the most "concrete" level, patterns of meaningful units. The smaller, meaningless units are
derived by abstraction from these meaningful units. The exercise of arranging the abstracted
Objects into regular or formal patterns is a valuable one with many uses. But the patterns
and Objects thus achieved should not be considered "more concrete" or "lower level" for the
Subject of a speech perception theory.
As for the separation of language from thought, much has been said already about the need,
in the perspective being developed in this thesis, to see language as manifesting and
articulating thought, not translating it.
Cognitive philosophy's view of language is made possible only by the focus of attention on
particular types of language and language-use as central examples: the literal statement,
transferral of information, etc. Other views of language, including some put forward by
cognitivists, or found attractive by cognitivists (as was seen in Chapter 2) have made strong
cases that this focus is unjustified and restrictive, but it has proved difficult to adapt the
cognitivist view to incorporate these criticisms. While it is possible to explain cognitivist
philosophy's explicit, rule-governed system of language in terms of the vague, inter-
subjective uses that, say, Merleau-Ponty sees as central, the opposite derivation, I argue, is
not feasible.
Finally, consider the cognitivist understanding of the nature of communication, which is
powerfully influenced by its understanding of the nature of language, as a packaging of an
idea (meaning) into linguistic form, and the form into a sound, and the retrieval by the hearer
of the form from the sound and the meaning from the form. Again, the present perspective
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makes natural a very different understanding of communication. The same kind of
paradoxical situation exists here as has been met before: on the one hand linguistic
communication is only possible if it is embedded in a larger kind of "discourse" or sharing of
Life-world; on the other, we cannot share explicit definite constituted meanings, since each
person has to constitute them him or herself. Thus what we share that enables
communication is not a neat system of sound-meaning pairs; but rather the kind of
understanding from which such pairs can be defined34. In communication, there is no
transfer of a definite meaning from one head to another. Rather a speaker articulates
something on the basis of an understanding of the world, the situation, the addressee, and
so on; and the hearer interprets the expression according to an understanding of the world,
the situation, the speaker, and so on. (Clearly, then, the units of such communication are
not seen as small, formal, linguists' Objects, but as a series of entities meaningful to the
Subjects involved.) The times when meanings seem to be shared are better seen as special
cases of the general case that meaning is individual. Again this turns cognitivist philosophy's
view of "central vs peripheral" around. And again, accounting for the times when
communication seems like "message-transfer" is much easier this way, than an account of
Kundera's "susurrus" is for cognitivist philosophy35.
If communication is not a mechanical process of encoding and decoding, it becomes clear
that the ability to communicate implies a certain kind of Subject - it cannot be done by mere
symbol-manipulators. Communication requires an addressee who can "catch on" to the
meaning, which will necessarily be inexplicit and incomplete. Wittgenstein makes much of
this point with his undermining of the belief that "knowing how to go on" (or understanding)
consists in operating according to a rule. Similarly, Derrida {eg 1977) recommends that
written, rather than spoken, communication should be taken to be the norm: this would help
undermine the belief that in face-to-face communication, the message transfer is accurate,
and only in understanding of texts, when the author is not present, are there difficulties of
interpretation. There is a sense, he says, in which the "author" is "absent" in all
communication. An interpretation is always the interpretation from the receiver's point of
view; there is no way to make a real comparison of intended and received meanings.
So far I have dwelt mainly on the impossibility of "meaning transfer" in the sense that
underlies most speech perception research. This should not give the impression that there
is no possibility of mutual understanding. On the contrary, the other half of the view given
above is that communication is only possible when there exists understanding.
Communication is thus often a highly cooperative enterprise, with the participants using their
34"... it is speech, above all, which develops, expands and puts flesh on the seed of intersubjectivity latent in all
experience." (Spuriing 1977:52)
35"Now, perhaps, we are in a better position to understand the abyss separating Sabina and Franz: he listened
eagerly to the story of her life, and she was equally eager to hear the story of his, but although they had a clear
understanding of the logical meaning of the words they exchanged, they failed to hear the semantic susurrus of the
river flowing through them." (Milan Kundera The Unbearable Lightness of Being Part 3, Chapter 2).
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understanding of each other's Subjectivity, and the situation, to guide each other's
understanding through language. This topic will be taken up again in the following chapter.
4.5.4. Intelligence
Cognitivism develops out of a tradition which puts very high store on rationality and
intelligence (Rorty 1980, Taylor 1985, Polanyi 1958). It was seen in Chapter 2 that
intelligence is considered by cognitive philosophy to be a characteristic separate from other
attributes of an entity - in fact cognitive science is more interested in the study of intelligence
as such, than in the study of the beings which exhibit intelligence.
From the perspective of this chapter, a very different view arises. The situation is similar to
that discussed in relation to "consciousness" above. Intelligence is not a separable or
definable characteristic, except insofar as a particular point of view in a context allows this.
When we speak of the "intelligence" of a person, we mean different things in different
contexts. It is often, for example, a complimentary term, having political and other
connotations.
To define and explain intelligence or rationality in terms of some evolutionary advantage it
confers assumes, like all such explanations, the direction that evolution has taken, a
particular understanding of what constitutes "survival", and values as to characteristics that
confer survival. In other words, "intelligence" is a characteristic that we like and that we see
as the cause of the aspects of our survival that we like when compared to that of crocodiles,
cockroaches or other creatures which have survived a long time.
This view, it should perhaps be noted, does not imply that computers "are not" intelligent.
We can call them intelligent. But this should not mislead us into equating "intelligence" in the
domain of computers with "intelligence" of human beings, or into assumption of "similarity" at
a deep level. Even among humans, as just noted, "intelligent" does not have a clear and
unambiguous definition. Speaking of the "intelligence" of a computer system is using the
term in quite another domain. It is not wrong to do so, or even misleading, unless the
mistake is made of thinking that because the same word is used, it must have the same
connotations and implications.
A computer is certainly not "intelligent" in the same way as a human being is intelligent, for
ail the reasons I have used to explain why cognitive science's Subject is inadequate as an
understanding of human beings. To make some (inanimate) thing intelligent-like-human-
beings would mean giving it a Subjectivity - a point of view. Doing that would not necessarily
give us what we wanted in the way of intelligent machines, since these created entities
would also have other characteristics of Subjectivity that we might find less useful in a
machine36.
^"Who would want ... a machine ... which is no more predictable than the human being who made it." (Rychlak
1976:219)
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I would like to stress that nothing I have said in this entire thesis has any implications for, or
makes any predictions about, the kinds of computing machinery that will or might be
developed in the future. Unlike Dreyfus (1972), I am not concerned about what computers
can't or won't "do"; I am interested in what humans can and do do. Development of
"intelligent" computing machinery would appear to be in general a useful and interesting
pursuit, though I believe the erroneous equation of human and machine intelligence can do
little but hinder the enterprise. "Knowledge-based systems", in my opinion, reflect the
knowledge of their designers; they do not themselves "have knowledge". I am in sympathy
with those who believe that, for example, expert systems are more useful if they are
designed to complement rather than mimic human capabilities. As Winograd and Flores
(1986) suggest, rather than aim to discover what computers can do, we should consider how
computers can be used - what we can do with computers. (On this topic, see also Blokland
1984, Winograd and Flores 1986.)
4.6. The Two Alternatives
4.6.1. Introduction
The two major alternatives to the IP approach to speech perception discussed at the end of
Chapter 1, have, as mentioned in Chapter 2, philosophical frameworks which stand in some
sense as rivals to that of cognitive science. It is worth considering whether either or both of
them offer solutions to the problems that I hope to have raised for cognitivism in this
chapter37. In this section I will argue briefly that they do not. Each focuses on a particular
aspect of cognitivism's problem, without, in my opinion, reaching the key to understanding
the origin of the difficulties. Thus, while each is useful in certain respects, the insufficiency of
their analyses means that the alternatives they offer retain some of the crucial features of
cognitivism.
4.6.2. Parallel Distributed Processing
PDP was introduced briefly in Chapter 1, in setting out its alternative approach to speech
perception research. It is relevant here to consider its philosophical framework, in relation to
the one I am developing in this thesis.
In fact, the philosophy behind PDP is virtually identical to that of cognitivism as set out in
Chapter 2 with respect to the issues I have raised in this chapter. The major difference
between the two approaches is in the mechanisms of cognition they propose. PDP is
certainly different at that level: opposing the cognitivist view of cognition as symbol
37l will discuss these philosophical alternatives briefly here in the light of the perspective being developed.
Consideration of the effects the different frameworks have on how speech perception research itself is conducted
will be reserved for Chapter 5.
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manipulation, and seeing it instead as patterns of activity in massive arrays of simple units
linked by connections which propagate the activity to adjacent nodes. This difference has an
important philosophical effect - it avoids one of the homunculus problems I raised at the end
of Chapter 2. If there are no levels of symbol manipulation, the problem (that symbol
manipulation requires background understanding of the kind symbol manipulation is
purported to explain) does not arise. Similarly, the fact that the system's "knowledge", being
stored in the weights of the connections, can be apparent without being explicitly
represented in propositional form, is also an advantage, overcoming some of the difficulties
of the regress of knowledge needed to apply knowledge, and decisions about which kinds of
knowledge are represented and which inferred.
However, in other respects, the PDP framework is the same as that of cognitivism, and
suffers from analogous philosophical problems, when considered as a general account of
human cognition. It is still representational in the sense that it is a mechanism for achieving
representations of input. Thus it still requires a homunculus in the form of a programmer,
particularly to interpret (give meaning to) the nodes in the speech perception model as
representing features, phonemes and words (see Section 2.6.1.2 above). It does not
address at all issues of Subjectivity, meaning38, "consciousness", "control" as they have
been raised in this chapter and the last. Thus PDP retains the framework of cognitivism, and
its basic questions about cognition: it differs in the way those questions are answered. It is
an innovation on the level of mechanism. This is, of course, not a denigration of that
innovation: its usefulness in Al applications (where the cognitivist framework assumptions
are relevant) is not questioned. In any case, many PDP researchers do not make any claims
beyond this. It is however important to be clear that hopes that PDP overcomes the
problems of cognitivism as a general account of human cognitive abilities would be
unwarranted.
There is another recent innovation which bears some resemblance to PDP but is more
explicitly philosophical in orientation, which can perhaps usefully be mentioned in this
context. This is represented by Churchland's "neurophilosophy" (1986). Ghurchland has a
strong commitment to the principle that the brain and the mind are identical (cf Chapter 2
above); in fact she generally uses the term "brain/mind" to make this explicit. Her goal is a
unified science of the brain/mind which includes all levels of description. Thus the
fundamental tenet of neurophilosophy is the belief that neuroscience is relevant to
philosophy.
"...neuroscience will undoubtedly change out of all recognition a host of orthodoxies
beloved in philosophy. Barring a miracle (or a calcified stubbornness), it will in particular
transfigure epistemology, as we discover what it really means for brains to learn, to theorise,
to know, to represent. Neuroscience may even teach us a substantial thing or two about how
science and mathematics are themselves possible for our species." (Churchland 1986:482)
^This is shown well by an informal, but telling, remark of J. Hinton's (on the television interview "Voices" shown
by the BBC on 19th April 1988) "I don't think there's anything about biological stuff that makes meaning stick to it
any better than it sticks to silicon stuff".
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Churchland shares my criticism of cognitivism's reliance on sentence-like symbols and
reasoning as the basis of cognition, but for different reasons and with a different solution.
She sees cognitivism as relying too heavily on the principles of "folk psychology" and
ordinary language:
"Folk psychology has no more epistemological privilege than folk physics." (Churchland
1986:312)
She believes instead that with better knowledge of neurology, we will be able to develop a
more perspicuous vocabulary for mental (ie brain) states, and that this will eventually help us
to discover what we, as human beings, really are.
Clearly, this is a very different view from the one I am developing in this thesis, and in some
respects opposed to it. It is quite explicitly making a definite (and rather general) foundation,
whereas I have argued the need to account for the ability of Subjects to make foundations.
No doubt Churchland would respond that such an account should be given in terms of
neurology. We must await developments in both areas to find points of confrontation.
Perhaps the two approaches will simply pass each other by.
4.6.3. Direct Perception
Direct Perception has also been briefly described in Chapter 1 in relation to its use as an
account of human speech perception. In fact, it is only rather recently that the DP approach
has been extended to provide so detailed an account of speech perception as such (though
speech perception has been mentioned in earlier works). The general DP approach was
developed by the psychologist, James J. Gibson (1966, 1979, Shaw and Bransford 1977), in
opposition to the computational style of understanding39. The main focus of disagreement is
that IP-style models postulate too much internal processing or computation; they are too
"mental" and intellectual. All the computation is found to be necessitated by the way these
models choose to describe the stimulus, relative to the observer, rather than to the
perceiving organism. It is because of this initial description that the computational view of
perception is forced to postulate that the stimulus is processed, to change it from a series of
static presentations of physical "cues" into information which the animal can use in the
pursuit of food, shelter, support, danger, and so on.
In the DP account the organism perceives, not according to the language of physics, but
according to the "affordances" (opportunities) the environment presents to the organism. The
theory which develops from this framework is based around the claim that if the stimulus is
described appropriately, in respect of the organism rather than the physicist, and including
the time-dimension, then the affordances of the environment for the organism will be
specified by invariant features of the stimulus, and the organism need only "pick them up"
39Gibson's work started around the time of World War II, before the fully fledged IP model had been developed.
His later work, and that of his followers speaks directly to IP modelling.
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directly from the environment. Gibson's framework emphasises the complementarity of the
animal and its environmental niche - hence the name "ecological" - which are seen as
reciprocals of each other, fitted to each other by evolution. The organism is thought of as an
active system specifically adapted to pick up the invariants in its environment which specify
the affordances relevant to its survival and well-being in a direct (unmediated) way.
This emphasis on the inappropriacy of observer-relative descriptions to perceptual theory
has something in common with the view I am presenting in this thesis. However, as in the
case of PDP already discussed, the DP approach goes only part of the way towards
addressing the problems I see as central to the IP model.
It will perhaps be apparent that Gibson's major concerns were animals' perception and
visual perception, rather than human auditory linguistic perception. He does, however, make
various statements about specifically human perception, including speech perception, and
also his work has been extended by various of his followers to cover this area. It is from this
extension that the inadequacy of the account of human speech perception arise, I believe.
Language is seen in DP as an extension of human perceptual abilities over and above those
of animals, allowing us to perceive at second hand, as it were. If one person tells another
about something, it is, to Gibson, as if the first had personally perceived it - except there is
no opportunity of reality-testing. This gives humans an important evolutionary advantage,
and allows education and the transmission of culture. For Gibson, then, linguistic ability
simply sits as an additional layer on top, as it were, of the perceptual and other abilities that
we share with the animals. So that while children learn more with language than they would
without, it is more of the same kind of thing; and culture is transmitted from one generation to
the next, in the sense that each generation is saved the necessity of repeating some of the
work of the previous ones, allowing cultural progress. This amounts to a rather naive version
of the representational view of language, with its sound-meaning-thought trichotomy that I
criticised above.
This view also, like PDP, is foundational in the sense that I have been using the word -
although in this case the foundation chosen is rather different: the animal-environment unity,
rather than the nature of the brain. It is necessary in this account to assume that there is a
definite and particular meaning associated with things in the world:
"The ecological approach is based on the fundamental belief that man is indeed the mirror
of nature." (Shaw and Bransford 1977:6)
"...humans do not perceive chairs, pencils, and doughnuts; they perceive places to sit,
objects with which to write, and things to eat." (Michaels and Carello, 1981:42).
[A stone] can be a paperweight, a bookend, a hammer or a pendulum bob...If you
know...what it can be used for, you can call it what you please." (Gibson 1979:134).
Such a foundation may be relevant for some kinds of perception, such as animal
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perception40, but the argument of this thesis suggests strongly that it is not appropriate for
human cognition like speech perception41, where the emphasis should be on the process by
which Things can be constituted as Objects - requiring an understanding of human
Subjectivity such as that outlined in this chapter.
The difference between DP and the present view can perhaps be clearly seen by the
following comparison. Consider first a cognitivist definition:
Surely we all agree that anything that has all the relevant causal powers of food - it saves
one from starving, sustains growth and repair, tastes good, etc - is food." (Dennett in Dennett
and Searle 1982:56, his emphasis)
Gibson, by contrast, recognises (1966:19) that "food" is a relative term: for any animal, food
is what it can eat. My position, while acknowledging the improvement of Gibson's view over
Dennett's, insists that it is necessary to go considerably further to differentiate between
animals and human Subjects. In human language, we can certainly mean more by even a
literal use of the word "food" than "something I can eat", which is what Gibson's view would
limit it to.
One final comparison can round off this section: In my view, in considering human cognition,
and especially in the domain of speech perception research, it is not our sensory end-organs
which mediate between the World and the organism (Sanders 1977), but rather our
interpretive ability as Subjects that is seen as making the most appropriate local foundation
for this domain.
4.7. Conclusion
I hope to have shown in this chapter that accounts of human cognition characteristic of
cognitivism are underlain by a particular understanding of the nature of the Subject and of
the World, and further to have argued that this view of Subject and World is inappropriate to
a domain hoping to understand human cognition. I believe many problems in cognitive
science can be traced to this inappropriacy - but I will not argue this as a general point, since
this thesis is about human speech perception research, not about cognitive science. In the
next chapter, I will show in some detail how some key problems with the IP model of speech
perception, founded on the cognitive science tenets, can be traced to the cognitivist
understanding of Subject and World. This will lead to the suggestion that making changes in
the assumptions at that level would be a fruitful way to seek a genuine alternative to IP.
40Though it should be noted that at least some DP theorists would reject this limitation of the scope of their
domain: "... we must reject any suggestion that direct perception might account for certain lower-order perceptual
abilities while a mediational theory is required to explain fancy perceptual abilities such as those entailed in speech
perception and reading." (Michaels and Carello 1981:164), though as answer to the question (posed by
themselves): "How can the ecological approach account for experiential dimensions of hedonic tone (humor,
pleasure, amusement) that appear to have no stimulus referents?" they can provide only: "The invariants must be
very high order indeed" (1981:178). Verbrugge (1985), on the other hand, seems very open to the problems posed
for DP by human linguistic and cultural dimensions, and is working on developing Gibson's views to take account of
these issues, in an approach based on the work of Humboldt and Pearce - so again developments should be
awaited before judgment can really be passed.
411 will discuss this more specifically in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK
5.1. Introduction
The discussion of the last three chapters has been conducted on a fairly philosophical plane,
as I have uncovered the understanding of Subject and World which supports cognitivist
philosophy and thus the IP theory of human speech perception, and presented reasons to
suggest that this understanding is not the most appropriate in the context. It remains then to
relate this discussion to the specific domain of human speech perception research and
theory; and it is the purpose of this final chapter to make that relationship. The chapter has
two main aims. The first is to present a brief analysis of the IP model of speech perception in
terms of the philosophical position outlined in Chapter 4. This will allow me to highlight what I
see as ill-formulation of the questions IP seeks to answer, and to show how these and other
problems with IP can be traced to certain incoherences in its basic assumptions about the
nature of the Subject and the World. The second aim is to present a preliminary outline of
an alternative framework within which available knowledge about human speech perception
can be interpreted, and according to which further speech perception research might be
conducted. This approach takes as its starting point a quite different understanding of the
Subject and World to that of IP.
5.2. IP Reconsidered
5.2.1. Introduction
At the end of Chapter 1, I discussed briefly the status of the IP model in the eyes of the
speech perception community, showing that some conceptual problems are acknowledged,
and an increasing amount of metatheoretical research is being done, to rationalise
terminology, make explicit - and in some cases, change - assumptions, and so on. I also
stated, as motivation for the analysis carried out in this thesis, my own view that the
problems faced by IP are actually more serious than is generally acknowledged in the field,
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and that this state of affairs suggests a need for deeper metatheoretical analysis than is
usually given to the IP theory. I therefore turned to consideration of the (cognitivist)
philosophical views according to which the IP framework is justified. Based on the discussion
of these views, it is now possible to say what kind of metatheoretical analysis IP stands in
need of. One of the consequences of the view of the constitution of Objects by Subjects I
have been developing over the preceding chapters, is that scientific theories are seen as
relations between Objects, which are themselves products of a relationship between a
Subjective point of view and an aspect of the World in a context. This understanding of the
relativity of Objects to a domain and point of view emphasises the importance for the
coherence of a framework of its Objects and their relationships being constituted from
commensurable perspectives. One way of uncovering incoherences in a theory is to
analysise the constitution of the theoretical Objects and their relationships.
In this first section of Chapter 5, then, I would like to look more closely at the rationale
behind the proposal of the IP model as an account of speech perception. I hope to show that
it relies on the bringing together of Objects of different ontological status, constituted in
different domains; and the relating of these Objects according to a point of view which is not,
in my opinion, appropriate for understanding speech perception. I will do this by reviewing
the rationale behind the IP approach, as given in Chapter 1, but this time stepping more
slowly and considering each of the points in the light of the perspective that has been
developed over the last three chapters.
5.2.2. Motivating Considerations
It will be recalled that IP takes as its starting point, both theoretically and historically, the
observation that, despite expectations to the contrary, there are no segments corresponding
to phonemes1 clearly discernible in an acoustic representation of speech.
Introductions to IP often begin by outlining a plausible but false idea of the mechanism by
which speech perception is achieved; one in which the individual segments of speech are
recognised one by one, to be concatenated into short sequences which can be matched with
forms stored in the hearer's memory, and associated with the meanings stored with them. A
view very like this was in fact the account of speech perception associated with the
structuralist/behaviourist conception of language and language users2, in which
communication was seen as a transfer of a message by the medium of a string of
phonemes; and speech perception was understood to involve recognising the phonemes,
1Of course, the significant fact is that there are no segments corresponding to linguistic units of any kind clearly
discernible in the speech wave. Historically it was phonemes which were first expected to be found and whose
absence was seen as significant. For convenience, I will use the word "phoneme" here to refer to "phonemes or
other linguistic units".
2For an account of structuralist linguistics and behaviourist psychology, see for example: Bloomfield 1926, 1933;
Hockett 1955, 1970; Fry 1974; Anderson 1985; Waterman 1963; Boring Langfeld and Weld 1948; Stevens 1951;
Leahey 1980; Wann 1970.
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concatenating them into word-units, and associating these with a meaning stored in the
memory. This was not a theory arising from research specifically concerned with speech
perception. Rather it was an assumption grounded in the understanding of linguistics and
psychology of the time, which was in fact used as a premise in certain kinds of theorising3. It
is this account of speech perception which predicts that the speech wave should be
composed of a series of phoneme-like elements, much as writing consists of individual
letters. Since speech perception as such was not a focus of particular interest in either
linguistics or pscyhology before World War II, the assumption was not much challenged
within these disciplines.
It was mainly after the War that the significance of counterevidence was widely accepted
(Joos 1948, Liberman 1957). Work at Haskins laboratories, especially spectrographic
speech analysis, convinced many that if phonemes were not evident in the speech wave, the
assumptions regarding speech perception would have to be modified. It is interesting to note
the level at which this modification of assumptions took place. The challenge was not to the
idea that communication involved the sending of a message from one mind to another4, or
perception involved matching and association; but to the idea that achieving matchable
forms from speech was a simple matter of recognition. It was this last assumption that was
modified.
The suggestion was made that the phonemes, rather than being transmitted directly, were
coded by the speaker for transmission to the hearer. This idea was derived from work in
communications engineering, a field which had been very active in studying the acoustic
features of the voice and the characteristics of hearing and psychoacoustics, in order to gain
the knowledge necessary to transmit speech intelligibly and efficiently along
telecommunications channels (Fletcher 1929/1953, Pierce and David 1958, Miller 1951). A
major breakthrough had been the demonstration that the efficiency of transmission of
messages along limited bandwidth channels was greatly increased if the message was
coded in some way (eg Dudley 1939). Use of a code meant that less information needed to
be transmitted, since the sender could rely on the availability at the receiving end of the
knowledge necessary to decode or reconstruct the original message. This idea became the
basis of information theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949, Hockett 1953), a powerful
mathematical tool for quantifying and optimising efficiency of mechanical communication,
which has been extremely influential in many fields (Campbell 1982). Several important
concepts of information theory have become widely accepted. One major theme is the
3For example, the assumption that perception must work in some way similar to that just outlined was given as a
reason for the structuralist methodological constraint of "no level mixing" (Anderson 1985:285). This assumption
was also the basis of the design of early reading machines (Cooper 1950, 1983; Liberman 1984).
4The strict behaviourist view did not allow the "mind" as a theoretical term, and the definition of communication
was modified to exclude it: communication was thought of as verbal stimulus of one organism by another rather
than transfer of a message from one mind to another (see Bloomfield 1933:26). This alternative formulation can be
seen as a brief interlude in the historical development of speech perception theory, and is not especially significant
in the present context.
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conceptualisation of information received as reduction of uncertainty in choosing among a
number of possible message elements. Another is the idea that efficient communication
could be defined as sending only essential, ie non-reconstructible, information. The now
well-known notions of "channel", "signal", "noise" and "redundancy" also stem from this
work.
These ideas about communication were a source of inspiration to early speech perception
researchers. When it became known that phonemes were not readily apparent in speech, it
seemed likely that they had undergone an analogous coding process, perhaps evolved to
improve the efficiency of speech communication. This idea resulted in an embellishment of
the original structuralist/behaviourist view: communication was now seen as coded message
transfer; speech perception as decoding, concatenating, matching and association with
meaning. Thus in verbal communication the speaker was sending not a message, but a
"recipe" for making or reconstructing a message (Cooper 1980). Of course, speech was far
from being a maximally efficient recipe. This was explained as necessitated by the noisy
channel that has to be used: a degree of redundancy was built in to the system to counteract
the noise by coding the same information in different ways. This could help explain, it was
argued, the "robustness" of the speech signal: considerable portions are predictable and can
be lost with little harm to intelligibility.
This view proved very productive in defining a research programme for speech perception
research over the next decade (Rubenstein and Aborn 1960, Diebold 1965,
Fischer-Jqrgensen 1958, Fry 1974, Lehiste 1967). Much work was done, using synthesis
and spectrographic analysis, to identify information-bearing cues in speech that the hearer
could use in reconstruction of the speaker's message. There was also considerable research
into the statistical properties of language, since knowledge of the frequency of occurrence of
sounds and sound sequences was thought to be an important aid in perception - based on
the idea, described above, that receiving a message involved selection from a known
inventory of possible elements.
However, several problems for speech perception theory emerged from this work. It turned
out that cues and segments were not found in any very clear relationship. The extent and
unpredictability of coarticulatory processes meant that the effects of context, both acoustic
and linguistic, were very strong, it seemed that hearers made use of more than statistical
knowledge about language. They could apparently use syntactic and semantic knowledge as
well, though there was at the time no clear idea of how to account for this ability.
It was as a solution to these problems that the mechanism of information processing was
seen as a great breakthrough in psycholinguistics. Around this time the new discipline of
cognitive science was being born5. The central concept of cognitive science was that
5The philosphical background to cognitive science has been discussed at length in Chapter 2. For more historical
surveys and interpretations, see Machlup and Mansfield 1983, Gardner 1985, Baars 1986, Hirst 1988, McCorduck
1979, Weizenbaum 1976/84, Dreyfus 1972/79.
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cognition could be thought of on the analogy of computation. This provided, as was seen in
detail in Chapter 2, a mechanism whereby knowledge, goals, plans, etc, could be used in
psychological processing. Clearly this was extremely relevant to the problems faced by
speech perception theorists. Computation is the heart of the basic information-processing
model that has underlain almost all work on speech perception since about 1960 - as
described in detail in Chapter 1.
This brief consideration of the motivation for the IP model highlights several remarkable
points, from the perspective of the present argument, some of which will be commented on
in following sections. At this stage, I would like to note that the issue that has been all along
the key to the understanding of speech perception is that of the description of the speech
signal. In the first stage, the signal was described in linguistic terms; later it was described in
acoustic terms; currently there is considerable debate over the question of whether the
description should be acoustic, articulatory or auditory, or should focus on static or changing
features, and so on.
The discussion of the last three chapters has had a great deal to say about the notion of
description, directed towards the conclusion that any description involves the point of view of
a Subject in a situation, and that deciding upon the most appropriate description of a Thing
in a domain requires consideration of the point of view of the Subject for whom it is Object.
In the development of IP, however, it is nearer the truth to say that the characteristics of the
Subject in the theory have been determined by the description of the signal. From which
Subjective point of view then is the IP signal-description constituted? The answer, I believe,
is: that of the researcher, the Observer. Of course an implicit understanding of the nature,
abilities and needs of the Subject has been influential. This understanding is seen in
operation in the drawing of analogies between human communication and message transfer,
or between human perception and computation. It is also crucial in motivating a description
of speech in terms of invariant relations between acoustic features and formal linguistic
segments. In the next sections, I hope to show that, first, IP pays insufficient attention to the
distinction between the point of view of the Observer and that of the Subject of the theory;
and second, that the understanding it has of the nature of the Subject is inappropriate.
5.2.3. The Subject's Task
In this section, I would like to consider in more detail the understanding IP has of the task
that the Subject faces in understanding speech. It has been seen that it is thought of as
essentially a process of transforming sound into meaning. Crudely stated, IP's position is
that the hearer's goal is the speaker's meaning but what enters the ear is the speechwave:
it is therefore necessary to convert one into the other. This conversion is supposed to be
achieved by matching the incoming form against a form stored in memory with a meaning
attached to it.
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Before considering this statement of the task of perception further, it is worth noting that it is,
as it stands, entirely suitable as a description of the task in any of the accounts that have
been considered, whether structuralist/behaviourist, coding or IP (or, indeed, as I will show
below, the alternatives to IP mentioned in Chapter 1). Each of them sees speech perception
as a conversion of sound to meaning achieved by matching; the differences revolve around
the issue of how the matchable form is attained. Though the introduction of the
computational view of cognition was "revolutionary" in many respects, as far as the basic
understanding of the nature of communication and perception were concerned, it involved
little change. It is the relative complexity of that process that makes the Subject in IP more
"active" than that of structuralism/behaviourism. The basic task is exactly the same in the
two accounts - conversion of sound to meaning by matching.
Consider then the postulated method of achieving this transformation of sound to meaning -
matching - in the light of the position reached in the last chapter. Matching implies
designating two things as "same", which can only be done, I have argued, from the point of
view of a Subject who understands the purposes and criteria of similarity. To designate the
forms of words as "the same" it is necessary to understand the context and criteria of the
designation - which in this case involves understanding the meaning of the words being
compared. But this is of course precisely what the theory that includes the matching process
is purporting to explain: how Subjects come to understand the meanings of words. This is
why I claim IP is a theory which invokes a homunculus. The problem here can be seen to be
an instance of confusion of point of view of Observer (for whom the two Objects are already
constituted and named, and are "obviously" "the same") and that of the Subject, who is
necessarily in the process of constituting Objects as what they are in the context.
Next, consider the task that this matching is proposed to achieve: conversion of sound to
meaning. Again the argument of the preceding chapters has had a good deal to say about
this. "The sound" and "the meaning" are not given as the two component parts of speech.
They must be (like everything else) constituted as Objects by a Subject: which means (in this
case) that they must be abstracted on the basis of an understanding of speech as a Whole
greater than the sum of these two parts, since "sound" here is a physical description of the
Thing "speech"; and "meaning" is a semantic description of the Thing "speech". The
Observer can make the relevant kind of abstraction and constitute these Objects; but they
should not be attributed as ready-made Objects for the Subject - to do this is to forget the
role of the Observer in their constitution, and thus inevitably to invoke a homunculus to
explain their existence-as Objects for the Subject.
In fact, though, IP claims more than that "sound" and "meaning" are separate Objects to the
Subject. It presupposes that the description of speech as sound is more "concrete" or
"neutral" than a description as (abstract) meaning - as seen by the account of speech
perception as conversion of sound into meaning. But of course, it has been shown that any
description is abstract with respect to the Thing described. Ranking the descriptions involves
an Observer with values to provide the criteria of ranking. I will return to this point below.
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5.2.4. A Mechanism for the Task
it is, I have argued, as a mechanism tor achieving the sub-goal of providing matchable forms
that the computational analogy was considered highly attractive. Though I have now, I hope,
cast doubt on the validity of the IP formulation of the task of perception, it is worth
considering the mechanism by which it was to be accomplished for the insight it can provide
into IP's understanding of the nature of the human Subject. Though, as I have argued, IP
has been more concerned with the nature of the speech signal than of the Subject, it is clear
that its description of speech rests on an idea of the Subject as a perceptual system for
which certain things are possible or impossible, simple or complex, and so on. As I will show
in this section, IP has been mainly concerned with constraints the Subject is thought to
operate within.
First, the Subject is presumed to be able to operate only with material entities. Recall,
however, what this means in the "monist" philosophy that supports IP: that the Subject can
operate only with physically described entities. We have just seen how this constraint
influenced the formulation of the task of perception: since "sound" (ie description in
acoustic/physical terms) is "more material" than "meaning" (ie description in non-physical
terms) it must be that sound is converted into meaning. Second, the Subject is presumed to
be able to operate only according to formal rules, which, though abstract, are still allowed in
the monist ontology. It has been shown that it was as a mechanism which operated on these
principles, but could nevertheless achieve complex, "intelligent" behaviour, that computation
was so attractive.
These two constraints allow two kinds of processing. It will be recalled that IP's computation
is seen as a combination of bottom-up and top-down guided transformations. How
plausible are top-down and bottom-up processing as kinds of processing that human
Subjects perform?
Bottom-up processing, it will be recalled, is simple "recognition" of what is "there". Already
in this statement, however, the central problem of bottom-up processing is evident. The
antifoundationalist argument of Chapter 4 concluded that Things do not simply announce
themselves as what they are. They must be interpreted as what they are by a Subject in a
context. This is just as true, as has been seen, of "low-level" as of "high-level" Objects. IP
however depends crucially on the understanding that the results of the kinds of descriptions
and abstractions done by linguists give the definition of the sounds that is most basic or
low-level for the Subject.
The question that must be asked in thinking about speech perception is "As what kinds of
Objects are the Things we call speech sounds initially constituted by the perceiving
Subject?". The argument of the preceding chapters has made the point very forcibly that the
answer must be "As something that is meaningful to the Subject in the situation". There is no
way for features, phonemes, syllables, or any of the other formal unit to emerge as
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meaningful Objects except to a Subject with an understanding of the Whole of speech.
Speech is not a compound of such "bits"; the features, allophones and so on are abstracted
from the Whole, which incorporates the aspect that can be Objectified as the "meaning".
Most importantly, analysis into these kinds of Objects depends on the Subject's
understanding of meaningful speech, as well as the point of view of an analyst with certain
values, criteria and purposes. This is the reason that such formal units do not easily fall into
neat, regular patterns. Of course, linguists can attempt to make the patterns more regular, by
further abstraction and idealisation. But from the perspective of the present train of
argument, this is exactly the wrong way to go about clarifying what these relationships are
for the Subject. In the process of this kind of tidying up, the Objects become more and more
abstract, and the point of view of the researcher (as opposed to the perceiving Subject) more
and more part of their constitution. Units thus produced are, from the Subject's point of view,
high-level, not low-level units.
I should make clear that demonstration of the existence or otherwise of so-called
"physiological feature detectors" makes no difference to this argument. If they do exist, what
they "detect" is not "features" in any linguistic sense. They respond to some uninterpreted
features of the World: it is the Subject as a Whole which interprets such features as
meaningful sounds. If "feature detectors" - ie cells or cell-groups which respond to stimuli
that we as linguists can equate with linguistic units - are found to exist, that would be
extremely interesting and useful. Even if they are not, though, there must still be some such
physiological "substrate" to speech perception. Whatever its nature, it should not be
described - in any context purporting to describe the Subject's point of view - as resulting in
"output" of any linguistically-described forms.
It is worth pointing out here a problem to which the IP account of bottom-up processing is
prone, even in its own terms - that of normalisation. If bottom-up processing were to work, it
would require the cancelling out of many non-significant differences among speech sounds,
and the focussing on some significant "same" features. This problem is addressed to some
extent by IP researchers (see Chapter 1), but in general it is left aside as a task to be
addressed sometime in the future. The fact that humans somehow do manage to normalise
over the many different voices and dialects that they understand makes it seem, in IP terms,
that it must be a problem with a solution, hard as it might be to determine what that solution
is6. From the point of view developing here, though, such a sanguine attitude is not
warranted: the difficulty of normalisation is a symptom of the deep problems with IP's
conception of the process of perception. The source of the problem is evident in the use of
the terms "significant" and "same". The Subject would need to be able to compare Whole
words to discover which aspects of them are the same across many different productions.
6The situation is of course very different in automatic speech recognition, where the issue of normalisation has to
be faced as a matter of priority. It is a big enough problem to have prevented, so far, the development of large-scale
multiple-user systems.
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To summarise the argument of this section - There may well be a sense in which the Subject
goes through "stages" of "processing" in understanding speech. But the "lowest" stages will
not involve the processing of "meaningless" phonological units. It could not be so: there can
be no Objects for a Subject that are not meaningful to that Subject. Phonological units are
certainly meaningful to the linguists who constitute them as (linguistically) meaningless, low-
level units. But they can be constituted as such only on the basis of an understanding of the
meaningful Whole. The confusion arises from the assumption that once constituted as "low-
level" by linguists, such Objects must also be iow-level for the Subject.
The second general kind of computation in IP models - top-down processing - is invoked
when there is not enough information in the representation itself for the Subject to identify it
as what it is, thus requiring the use of knowledge to help in the identification. It is significant
that IP models (with a few modern exceptions, mentioned in Chapter 1), invoke top-down
processes only when it becomes clear that bottom-up recognition is impossible: "recognition"
in this sense is universally considered "simpler" for the Subject. The differences of opinion
are around the question of the extent to which the signal allows such recognition. The ability
to incorporate some kind of "top-down" processing when necessary is what distinguishes IP
models from previous accounts of speech perception.
Once more, there is a problem here caused by confusion of the Observer's and Subject's
points of view. Information is necessarily information-to (some Subject). What the IP phrase
really means is that there is not enough information-to the Subject of IP theory in an IP
Observer's description of speech for the IP Subject to identify the IP Observer's description
of the matchable (canonical) form. This confusion is responsible for the fact that (some of)
the knowledge invoked in an IP model is the knowledge that would be needed for the
Subject to convert one of these descriptions of speech into another. But, from the point of
view of the Subject, both of these descriptions are quite arbitrarily defined. Thus the
knowledge that is needed to convert one into the other will also be relative to the Observer,
rather than the Subject.
A second problem is that the way in which knowledge application and other top-down
processes are said to operate is quite different from the way human Subjects, as seen in this
thesis, understand their world. In IP, a Subject's knowledge has to be formulated as an
explicit representation to allow it to interact according to formal computational rules with
other representations of other information from other sources, also formalised and
represented. Previous chapters have discussed at length major problems associated with
representing information, interpreting representations, and defining and applying rules. It is
interesting, then, to consider why IP sees the Subject's knowledge in this way. The reason is
entirely the constraint that the Subject should operate only with physically and formally
defined entities, as required by the principle of monism - in short, that the Subject should be
a formal system. But of course, in the present perspective, human Subjects operate under
no such constraint. In fact, I have argued that the human Subject could not be a formal
system: no formal system could exist as a Subject.
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5.2.5. Conclusion
The discussion so far has pointed out several kinds of problems with the metatheoretical
justification for an IP model of human speech perception. After the philosophical work done
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, it is possible to suggest a diagnosis of what causes these problems
in terms of the model's underlying understanding of Subject and World.
jo
With respecyhe nature of the World, IP takes insufficient account of the distinction between
Thing and Object, and the process by which Objects are constituted. Firstly, the model
depends upon the assumption that (some) Objects exist already-consituted as what they are
for the Subject of the theory, to be "recognised" by the perceptual system. But the Objects of
the theory are Objects which could only be constituted by a Subject which understood
speech as a Whole - hence my criticism that IP confuses the perspectives of Subject and
Observer. Secondly, the lack of attention to the distinction between Thing and Object means
that no account is given of how the Subject could constitute linguistic Objects from Things it
experiences.
With respect to the Subject, since the Subject of IP is seen (erroneously) as needing only to
convert or transform one Object into another Object, rather than constituting Objects it can
be understood as a formal system operating with computational rules. Much argument has
been devoted here however to showing that no formal system could achieve the constitution
of Objects from Things - which is the task the Subject really faces in a World where Objects
do not already exist-as what they are.
All the Objects of IP depend for their existence on abstraction and idealisation by a Subject
who understands speech as a Whole: the canonical form of lexical items; the "message
meaning" and especially the other possible meanings from which the "correct" message
must be disambiguated; all the sublexical units and the cues which identify them; the
phonological, phonotactic, and frequency rules that are applied in the course of processing7.
Speech for the Subject must be more than the sum of all these Objects (for reasons
explained in the preceding chapter); it must be a Whole from which all these, and infinitely
more, can be abstracted. It is this Whole which is meaningful to the Subject. Perception of a
"message" is not (could not be) integration of all these kinds of Objects; it is abstraction
(Objectification) from the Whole Thing. I will return to these points in the remainder of this
chapter.
7Cutler (1981) makes, very entertainingly, the serious point that such rules depend on abstraction from actual
occurrences.
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5.3. Effects of IP Framework on IP theory
5.3.1. Introduction
My disagreement with the IP model, I have just argued, turns on a disagreement with its
underlying assumptions about the nature of the perceiving Subject, which in turn depend
upon assumptions about the nature of the task the Subject needs to perform in order to
perceive speech.
In the next section I would like to review briefly some of the main areas of debate within IP,
as discussed in Chapter 1. Though there is considerable sophisticated argument in IP
around these issues, the level of assumptions that I have been addressing here is little
mentioned. The understanding of the task of speech perception is stated as a ground from
which further argument is developed. It is not considered and defended in terms of the
nature of the human Subject. Rather it is used as the basis for stating the nature of the
Subject.
5.3.2. Invariance and Segmentation
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that one of the key issues in IP research has been to
discover the extent to which the speech wave contains invariant cues to any linguistic units.
There is, as was described in Chapter 1, currently considerable disagreement as to whether
speech does in fact contain invariants of this kind, and if so, what form they take.
Although the reasons for taking one or other of these views are usually clearly stated, there
is little explicit discussion of the criteria as such. What is needed here, in my opinion, is an
exposition and critique of the rationale behind the search for invariants. Behind the
disagreement as to whether there are invariants, there is agreement that if there were
invariants, perception would be "simpler". The implication is that with more invariants, more
of the processing can be bottom-up, and there is a simpler route from signal description to
canonical description. This is a case, then, where an idea of the nature of the Subject has
influenced the IP understanding of the nature speech.
Following the discussion above, the problems with this rationale are evident: "invariant" is a
special case of "same". Both definition and use of invariants requires a background
understanding of the Whole; incorporation of a notion of invariants in a theory of perception
invokes an unacknowledged homunculus. The problems in specifying invariants then arise
from the lack of attention to the fact that they are derived from Whole speech and a
Subjective point of view.
On the other hand, from the perspective I have developed, the Subject does not need there
to be formal invariants in the speech wave. What the Subject perceives is meaningful
speech; the task the Subject has to achieve is to identify the words and other meaningful
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units as Wholes. It is because they are (linguistically) meaningful that they can be perceived
as (linguistic) Objects.
Thus the question of whether there are invariant acoustic correlates of linguistic units in
speech - while an interesting one with potential usefulness if answered in the affirmative - is
really not relevant to the perceiving Subject. Such invariants are high-level abstractions from
the Subject's point of view (as seen by the work done to abstract them by researchers). IP
theorists incorporate them at low levels of the processing mechanism because of
considerations to do with their own philosophical framework.
The other traditional problem of the IP approach, closely related to the first, is that of
segmentation of the (quasi-) continuous speech wave into discrete, linguistically relevant
units. Again, comments based on the preceding discussion can be brief. Consider the
constitution of these Objects, the units of speech. Linguists - using their understanding of
speech as a Whole, and their ability as normal speakers to abstract from it "sounds" and
"meanings" - abstract and idealise systems of sound-segments of different sizes. There is
no reason, from this point of view, to think that an acoustic record of speech sounds should
show clearly distinguished linguistic units. Speech is not made up of a sequence of
concatenated formal units8. It is made up of meaningful units, and the formal segmentation
of sound depends upon the understanding of speech as meaningful. The units into which
the perceiving Subject "segments" speech initially are, and can only be, meaningful units -
eg words, with their sound aspect and their meaning aspect. There is no particular reason
why there should be a neat segmentation in the sound aspect alone - and if there were it
would not be of any particular help to the Subject in understanding the speech. In cases
where such a segmentation is possible, it is purely fortuitous, from the Subject's point of
view. Both the segments and the (invariant) cues to the segments are Objects constituted by
a Subject who understands the Whole of speech - ie the Observer.
5.3.3. Model Architecture
Several issues of model architecture were discussed in Chapter 1, notably the problem of
the number of modules or stages of processing, and the problem of the degree to which
modules should be able to interact.
From the present perspective, the modules are more closely related to descriptions linguists
can make of speech, than to descriptions that are relevant to the Subject in the course of
perceiving speech. This is related to the long tradition in speech perception research of
considering the "speech chain" as a series of transformations of a message (Joos 1948,
8Modern non-linear phonology makes the same point very strongly, although from a quite different perspective.
(Linell 1982 discusses the relationship of psycholinguistics and phonology very clearly and insightfully.) These
hierarchical accounts however are still attempts at a formal segmentation of speech as sound-only, without
including its meaningfulness. As such, valuable as they may be in their own right, from the present perspective, their
applicability in a theory of speech perception from the Subject's point of view is highly problematic.
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Fischer-Jergensen 1958, Lehiste 1972). Of course, here too the IP community shows
considerable sophistication in considering which of these descriptions should be
incorporated into a model of perception (see Chapter 1). But again, in my opinion, it is
necessary not to argue for one or other model, but to discuss the criteria according to which
a model should be chosen.
The result of the change from the structuralist/behaviourist view of perception to the coding
view was that where there had been two parts to speech - sound and meaning, there were
now three - sound (acoustic description), form (phonological description) and meaning
(semantic description). In developing this view, IP has generally increased the number of
intermediate levels. Each suggested configuration of modules is proposed as a set of
landing stages in the process of transforming "sound" into "meaning". But I have argued
above that each of these levels is equally abstract to the Subject, and each depends for its
existence as an Object on an understanding by the Subject of the Whole of speech. It is
according to the linguist's values that the descriptions are arranged in the order they appear
in the models: ranked according to the size and "concreteness" of their units. The problem of
specifying the relationship between the levels has been discussed since the early days
(Fischer-J0rgensen 1958). Again, from the present perspective, there is no more reason to
expect a neat relationship between intermediate levels than between "sound" and
"meaning". Postulating intermediate levels does not help solve the problem; it merely shifts
its focus, and perhaps helps disguise the real difficulty with any IP formulation, which is
exactly the same as the difficulty with the structuralist/behaviourist formulation - the idea that
perception consists in converting sound into meaning.
Of course, as was seen in Chapter 1, some IP researchers themselves question the
relevance of various particular levels, or even of the notion of multiple intermediate levels at
all. The arguments they use are cogent in themselves, but again they do not strike at the
root of the problem. For example, to propose a lexicon with precompiled phonological
information certainly decreases the amount of computation needed - no doubt useful in an
automatic speech recognition device. But its difficulty is shown by the very term
"precompiled": the problem of the homunculus is only shifted to a different level, not solved.
One of the major issues, as was also seen in Chapter 1, is that of the interaction of modules,
and the flow of information. From the present perspective, this can be seen as the attempt to
cope with the problems caused by the formulation and constraints of the task, rather than as
reflecting a significant phenomenon of human speech perception as such. The same is true
of the interaction of speech perception processes with other related cognitive processes.
Any IP model attempting to allow the kind of fluidity and flexibility apparently characteristic of
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human perceptual skills9 is faced with the major problem of control10. A "control module",
admitted or implied, is simply another word for a homunculus, and the need for such an
entity is a symptom of the inappropriacy of the Subject postulated by IP.
5.4. Comparison with Existing Alternative Frameworks
It will be recalled that two alternative frameworks for the study of speech perception have
been attracting an increasing amount of attention recently - Gibsonian Direct Perception and
Parallel Distributed Processing, or Connectionism. I have already outlined the main features
of these approaches (Chapter 1) and commented on their philosophical frameworks in
comparison with the one I recommend in this thesis (Chapter 4). Here I would like very
briefly to make explicit why, in my opinion, they do not overcome the problems I have raised
above for IP. In short, my argument will be that while they do present good arguments
against some aspects of IP, they do not address what I see as its most salient difficulties, as
uncovered above, and therefore in the end do not offer significantly different alternatives.
I can deal first briefly with Parallel Distributed Processing, and the TRACE model discussed
in Chapters 1 and 4. Although this alternative deals well with one of the kinds of problem IP
suffers from - the kind caused by the view of perception as serial, symbolic processing
involving application of explicitly represented knowledge - it does not change the
fundamental understanding of speech perception at the level of assumptions about Subject
and World. The task of perception is still seen as the matching of sound with meaning; the
approach still confuses Objects constituted by an Observer with Objects that exist for the
Subject, and keeps the same (inappropriate) criteria of concrete/abstract as IP.
Turning to Gibsonian Direct Perception - this, too, is successful in focussing on a serious
problem with the IP account - the confusion of the perspective of the Subject with that of the
Observer involved in assuming that the speech signal exists as a physically-described
Object for the Subject. However, in my opinion, the solution offered by the DP alternative
does not reach to the core of the problem. The main difficulty that it still faces is that of
meaning. It will be recalled that DP proposes that in perceiving speech the Subject is
perceiving not an acoustically defined Object, but the articulatory gestures which caused the
acoustic signal. By this redefinition of the task, DP hopes to overcome problems of variability
and the consequent need for computational processing to achieve a canonical form.
The issue DP does not address is the distinction between Thing and Object, and the need to
Especially clear for example in Bannert (1987:74), in whose model "All information of a linguistic and pragmatic
kind may be used by the various stages and processes of speech recognition at all times and wherever necessary
and useful. A close and optimal acting together of bottom-up and top-down information even at low levels where the
first linguistic interpretation of auditive-acoustic information occurs and non-linguistic short cuts by-passing all the
hierarchically structured acoustic and linguistic levels, are assumed for speech recognition."
"This too is a difficulty ASR modellers are forced to confront.
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account for the Subject's constitution of Objects from Things. DP still sees the Subject's task
as the matching of one Object with another - a sequence of articulatory gestures with a
meaning. But how could "articulatory gestures" emerge as Objects for a Subject? Of what
"ecological significance" are articulatory gestures to the Subject11? How is the "meaning" of
speech constituted as a separate Object to the articulation? How is the process of matching
the articulation and the meaning achieved? All of these processes require a Subject who
understands speech as a Whole - ie the Observer.
These difficulties are related, I believe, to the inadequacy of the Gibsonian understanding of
human Subjectivity and language. It was seen in Chapter 4 that for Gibson, speech
perception is a two-stage process: first the shape of the words is direcjy perceived, and then
the meaning is recognised. This must be so, he says, because, whereas the connection
between a stimulus and its source is necessary, lawful and specific, that between a word
and its meaning is arbitrary and conventional.
"The pick-up of sounds, including speech sounds, is a one-stage process. The
apprehension of things referred to, however, is a two-stage process, since it involves both
the discrimination of the vocal articulators and the learning of what they stand for. The
acoustic sounds of speech specify the consonants, vowels, syllables and words of speech;
the parts of speech in turn specify something else." (Gibson 1966:91).
Thus, I believe, DP keeps the crucial aspect of the IP (and behaviourist) conception of
speech perception, and for this reason, is subject to analogous problems. Questions arise
for the approach as to how the two stages (recognition and matching) interact: how much of
the first stage is completed before the results are passed on to the second? In what ways
can considerations from the second stage influence the operation of the first? For example,
when Gibson states that in cases where there is incomplete information, the system hunts
for more, he implies that the system somehow know what it is hunting for - ie must have
some understanding of the meanings in the situation. But in the case of speech, according
to Gibson, the meaning is only given as a second stage. Since these are precisely the
problems that led to the elaboration of the IP theory into its modern form (as shown in
chapter 1), it would seem that if Gibsonian theory is to come to grips with these questions,
while still maintaining the two-stage model, it will develop along very much the same lines as
IP has. Consider for example Gibson's remark:
"If invariants still do not appear [after hunting], a whole repertory of poorly understood
processes variously called assumptions, inferences and guesses come into play". (Gibson
1966:303-4)
This suggests that the simplicity of the Gibsonian model of speech perception compared to
the IP model, is due not to its superior conceptualisation of the phenomenon, but rather to its
ignoring of the problems that arise within a basically similar conceptualisation. Some of the
IP criticisms that DP fails to account for errors and context-dependency in speech perception
would thus seem to be justified - though missing what I see in this thesis as the crucial failing
of the approach.
11 Diehl (1986) makes a similar point.
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There is one further possible alternative to an IP theory of speech perception that should
perhaps be considered here - that of phenomenological psychology, a healthy field of
psychological study based on some of the phenomenological principles outlined in Chapter 3
(see for example, Valle and King 1978; Giorgi 1970, 1976; Bolton 1979). In general, this
approach seems to be preferred for clinical and social psychology, though certainly
theoretical work is done. I think it is fair to say that cognitivist styles of psychology are not as
a rule held in high regard among phenomenological psychologists. To my knowledge, very
little research in this field has been concerned with the issue of speech perception as meant
here (though much work has been done on perception more generally); certainly there is
little appreciation of the more technical aspects of speech perception research in linguistics
(egHollnagel 1978 sees a similarity between analysis-by-synthesis theory and hermeneutic
method).
It is difficult then to assess the aptness of this approach for speech perception research. My
opinion, however, is that, to the extent that an approach was based on the phenomenology
of Husserl (as much phenomenological psychology is) it would be unlikely to overcome the
problems I have uncovered with respect to IP, and, for the reasons suggested in Section
3.2.4 is liable in fact to become rather similar to IP. To the extent, on the other hand, that an
approach was based on the philosophy of Heidegger (or Merleau-Ponty), I believe it would
be necessary to tailor the approach to the particular domain, rather than sedimenting a
particular part of his philosophy - again for reasons given in Chapter 3.
5.5. Conclusion
I hope to have shown that the defining problems of the IP approach, which arise (naturally
enough) from its conceptual framework, are ill formulations of questions about the process of
speech perception from the Subject's point of view. The most serious problems are not
those specific to the computational analogy itself, but those relating to the formulation of the
problem to which that analogy was seen as the solution. Thus I hope further to have shown
the problems with the conceptual framework that underlie these theoretical difficulties. In
particular, I have pointed to the incoherence of the (mis)understanding of the nature of the
Subject (as a symbol manipulator) and the World (as composed basically of small physically
or formally described elements in regular relationships) as the source of problems with IP,
both those identified by its own practitioners, and those raised in this thesis.
This understanding unifies IP despite its very real and serious lack of unity with respect to
more superficial commitments. In fact, I believe that it is this understanding which in a sense
causes the lack of unity, by encouraging formulation of unanswerable questions - a classic
case of it being not the answers that are wrong but the questions. There are thus created
conceptual difficulties which cannot be solved without considerable analysis of a kind indeed
not much encouraged by the IP framework: the means of solving them are denied by the
initial tenets.
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Significantly, in uncovering the conception of Subject and World which underpin, and
undermine, IP, I have shown that it is identical to that of the preceding
structuralist/behaviourist understanding of speech perception, which is the view in opposition
to which IP defines itself. It is possible then to interpret the history of speech perception
research as a series of attempts to overcome the inadequacies of this understanding. On
this view, the decisive historical moment was the demonstration of the nature of the speech
wave, in the 1940s. This could have led to a reappraisal of the understanding of
communication and perception which had spawned in the first place the idea that speech
might consist of separate phonemes. However, as we have seen, this was not the step that
was taken. Rather the attempt was made to patch up the insufficiency of the "recognition
and matching" conception with the "decoding, recognition and matching" conception. This in
turn was found inadequate and replaced by the early, rather simplistic IP models; which
once again are being shown to be inadequate.
Modern work concentrates to an unprecedented extent on conceptual and philosophical
issues, but still, as I have argued, no enquiry has reached the level from which the difficulties
of all these conceptions stem. IP's arguments against the structuralist/behaviourist theory of
perception and communication, cogent as they admittedly are, are not in themselves
arguments for an IP theory. The same remark goes equally for the two alternatives currently
challenging IP. As i have argued, though each of them improves over IP in terms of the
specific features it tackles, each nevertheless rests on the same basic conceptual underlay,
and suffers in the end from problems analogous to those of IP.
However, my analysis has done more than point out a lot of problems with IP speech
perception research and trace them to confusions in its conceptual framework; it has also
thereby suggested the direction in which it would be most fruitful to look for an alternative.
In a nutshell, I hope to have made clear two major points. First, that a Subject such as that
implicit in an IP account of speech perception (ie a formal symbol manipulator) could not
perform the task of perceiving speech as that task is formulated by IP (ie computation,
matching and access). Second, that a Subject such as a human being is need not perform
any such task in order to perceive speech.
It was seen how it was the formulation of the task faced by the Subject that made the
computational analogy relevant. If the task is described differently - in particular, if the
Subject does not need to match forms to access meanings - the computer no longer seems
to provide a useful mechanism for achieving it. The problems of invariance and model
architecture and the rest - shown to be insoluble because they rest on a confusion of
Subject's and researcher's perspectives - do not arise at all. Rather, with a different
background understanding of the Subjectivity of both the perceiver and the researcher, a
quite different formulation emerges of the task of speech perception, and a quite different
empirical framework develops around it.
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It is to consideration of the characteristics such an alternative framework might have that I
turn in the second half of this chapter.
5.6. Towards a New Framework
5.6.1. Need for Hermeneutic Approach
In Chapter 4, I considered briefly two basic kinds of framework for scientific research - the
axiomatic and the hermeneutic, sometimes associated respectively with the natural and the
human sciences. In an axiomatic framework, a small number of assumptions, definitions and
methodological principles provide a (local) foundation according to which the basic questions
of the research programme are formulated. Research within the framework is designed to
provide answers to these questions, or sub-questions defined with respect to them, and
practictioners agree not to doubt or question the local foundations of the framework in any
major way. There is thus derived, over the course of time, an edifice of theory and
explanation grounded in the local foundations.
In the hermeneutic method on the other hand, the topic of enquiry and the methods for
stating and answering questions are not initially definable in an explicit and generally
accepted way. The task of the researchers is to constitute the Objects of the domain, rather
than to accept Objects as given by the foundation. It will often be the case that no single set
of Objects is adequate to describing the domain. In the hermeneutic approach, mindfulness
of the antifoundational nature of the world is more relevant. Researchers want to come to an
understanding of an aspect of the Life-world in its pre-Objectified nature, and see their task
as its interpretation and explication. It is therefore crucial precisely not to accept as given a
pre-defined set of assumptions, definitions and methods; but rather to be able to look at
Things from different points of view, attempting to see behind and between the categories
inevitably involved in any description and Objectification of them. Such a method will not, at
least in early stages of development, result in so impressive an edifice of theory as the
axiomatic approach. But then that is not its aim. Its aim is explication, which adds detail at
the same level rather than moving up to higher levels (resulting in theory like a many-roomed
bungalow, as opposed to the sky-scraper of the axiomatic method).
IP, clearly, is a theory of the axiomatic kind. By contrast, I wish to recommend here that the
hermeneutic method offers a potentially fruitful approach to development of an alternative,
perhaps complementary, framework.
A case could perhaps be made that in any domain which includes Subjects among the
Objects it studies the hermeneutic method is preferable. In such domains it is necessary to
attain some understanding of the Subject's point of view as distinct from that of the
Observer, since the Subject's own understanding influences the structure of the domain. In
order to distinguish adequately between these two points of view, it is necessary to come to
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an understanding of the pre-Objective Life-world and the points of view of the (observed)
Subject and the (Subjective) Observer. Neither of these requirements are easily met by the
axiomatic approach.
In any case, whether or not this general point is valid, I think a hermeneutic approach is
appropriate in an instance where there is unclarity with respect to which Objects, facts and
methods to accept as the local foundation of an axiomatic approach. Accepting any one
such set inevitably limits what can be discovered from that foundation (which is precisely its
advantage in domains where this approach is successful). However, unless the practitioners
of such an approach are very clear about what these limits are, and the effects of imposing
them on the research programme, conceptual problems are almost certain to arise. These
kinds of problems are then very difficult to overcome within the framework itself. This is the
situation I believe IP to be in at the present time; and it is this state of affairs which I consider
to be the major reason to suggest a hermeneutic approach for the new framework for
speech perception research.
Naturally, given its character, "the hermeneutic method" is not a single well-established,
externally imposable set of procedures, but rather a set of general principles whose details
must be worked out according to the character of the problems to which the method is
applied. What I give here, then, is an adaptation of these principles in the light of my
understanding of the problems of speech perception.
I suggest starting with a broad statement of the domain of enquiry - so broad as to be
generally acceptable without need for special qualifications and disclaimers. Subdivisions of
the domain will emerge readily on further enquiry, according to criteria developed within the
framework (compare the alternative of deciding on subdivisions from the outset according to
criteria which may turn out later to be inappropriate). This broad starting statement defines
literally and wholly what is to be explicated and understood. There is no foundational
metaphor or analogy (though surely minor metophors must be used as part of the theory). It
may of course prove necessary at a later stage to modify the starting statement, but this can
be done with relatively little loss of the understanding gained on its basis (compare the
problems that arise if the axioms of an axiomatic theory are modified).
Deciding on the formulation of the broad starting statement is clearly a crucial step in the
hermeneutic approach. Such a statement must obviously be chosen and justified according
to an understanding of the domain of enquiry; it cannot be defined in a vacuum. Thus it is by
no means the first step in setting out a theoretical framework, but rather the culmination of a
considerable amount of work: it is the interpretation of the essential characteristic of a
domain by a Subject with experience and understanding of the domain, as well as
pretheoretical commitments and values, some of which will have been made explicit,
debated, defended and refined.
It is from the broad statement that the research begins which will constitute the approach
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and theory. The general character of the method has already been foreshadowed: that of
explication of questions and observations which arise with respect to the broad statement
and the general orientation of researchers with respect to point of view, values and so on.
Some of the questions for exploration will already have emerged from the earlier process.
Others will arise in the course of explication. The hallmark of the hermeneutic approach is
its "circularity"12 in the sense that there will be frequent change of focus from the details to
the broad statement and back again, so that understanding at different levels can influence
each other. Conceptual and empirical work are thus very closely connected. All work at the
level of detail must always be related to the level of generality, the whole seen in terms of
the parts, and vice versa. The "rigour" of this approach resides in the thoroughness with
which responsibility for this relationship is undertaken.
Again, though, it is in the nature of this method that there will be no very reliable, detailed,
explicit guidelines for how to go ahead with development of the theory. These too must be
worked out according to the character of the emerging domain. The role of the judgment of
the research community is thus emphasised (as discussed in Chapter 4). Again, though, this
should be seen not as a loss in comparison with the axiomatic approach, but as a gain,
achieved by acknowledgement of the non-existence of a certain kind of reliability. All
research depends upon this kind of judgment (understanding, insight) by practitioners,
whether or not the results are couched in terms of rules or formal procedures followed. All
domains are studied by both good and bad researchers, with good or bad judgment. I will
say a little more about method in a later section.
5.6.2. Suggested Framework for Speech Perception Research
The following ideas are my suggestions as to how to begin to develop such a framework for
the study of speech perception. It will be clear that it is greatly influenced by the philosophy
discussed in Chapter 3 in its ideas of what human beings are like. I would like to stress my
acknowledgment that it is also strongly influenced by and indebted to my understanding of
research in cognitive science, speech perception, phonetics and linguistics.
From the perspective of these two sets of considerations, the broad, general statement that
can be made about speech perception is that there are people and they communicate with
each other by means of speech as well as in other ways. So far of course this says very
little that would differentiate it from any other approach to speech perception: it is necessary
to explicate its meanings before the statement can be fully understood. Its "obviousness"
however should not be seen as a defect. In the course of its development, the method will
explicate the obvious statement, and uncover less obvious features of the phenomenon.
The statement provides a background understanding which can be accepted and appealed
12This feature is sometimes spoken of, preferably in my view, as a spiral rattier than a circle [eg Radnitzky
1968:25).
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to in explaining facts which arise with respect to this background, rather than as something
that has itself to be explained in some other terms. The terms of the statement are accepted
as the domain of enquiry - there is no suggestion that we should think of people in this
context as such and such, or of communication as such and such. Similarly, it is the whole
statement that forms the domain; there is no suggestion that we should focus on the process
of communication or on the system of language or the sounds of speech in preference to
people.
The next step in developing the framework is to make some preliminary divisions of the
general statement. Again the following is my suggestion based on the considerations of the
preceding chapters. I think we can understand the situation by giving it a tripartite division
into Subject, Object and context, and considering the contributions of each to communication
by speech. I will look next at each of these divisions in turn.
5.6.3. The Subject
The "people" in the broad statement can be thought of as Subjects in the sense developed in
Chapters 3 and 4 (especially Sec. 4.2.2). A good deal has been said already about the
nature of the Subject in speech communication, so the most important points can be briefly
recapitulated here, in the context of the speech perception framework.
The Subject is a Whole13, incorporating both "mental" and "physical" aspects, and
possessing a point of view. It is the nature of the Subject that gives meaning to the World
(which becomes the Life-world of the Subject). Thus the meaningfulness of the Life-world for
the Subject is one of the basic facts assumed by this framework, which can be appealed to
in explanation of other observations. The task of providing an explanation of meaningfulness
and Subjectivity is thereby assigned to some other domain.
The Subject's point of view can be articulated to some extent by an Observer (who may be
the same person in a self-reflective mode), but any such articulation is itself necessarily
derived from a Subjective point of view, and can therefore never be claimed to be complete
or accurate, expecially since the Subject's point of view is not fixed or constant, but varies.
It is from the combination of a point of view and an aspect of the world that Objects14 are
constituted in situations. Thus a crucial concept of this framework is that of the distinction
between an aspect of the uninterpreted Life-world and any Object that can be spoken of.
This distinction was discussed at length in Chapter 4.
13That is, a Whole for the purposes of this framework; there is also of course the sense in which the individual
Subject cannot be rigorously separated from the society, or from the World (see footnote 6, Chapter 4); on the other
hand, from other points of view, the Whole person can be (tentatively) subdivided in other ways - eg (some
branches of) medicine can concern themselves with the physical (in this case "physiological") aspect only.
14lt is perhaps useful to reiterate the point that "Object" is used here very broadly, and not in its everyday sense.
An Object is not necessarily a concrete "thing" - though it can be. Events, abstract entities, relationships, feelings,
etc, can all be Objects. There is no special status for Objects with physical descriptions.
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There thus arises in the present framework a very different understanding of "levels" of
Objects from that of IP. At the lowest levels are the Things of the Life-world, with which the
Subject can interact in some way; which have being ("ecological significance" in the
Gibsonian phrase) for the Subject. They are not named; they have no essence, though they
do have existence. They cannot be spoken about except by an Observer, who can constitute
them as Objects from the Observer's point of view. At this level humans can be seen as
similar to non-linguistic animals.
At intermediate levels Objects are constituted, given essences and named in their contexts.
The Subject is aware of informal analogies, and reasons according to informal
understanding. Analogies and comparisons can be made according to any dimension or
aspect of the Whole; they are all equally "abstract". Language and culture, as well as our
animal-like nature, have a strong influence on the way we perceive and understand.
Importantly, however, at these levels we do not attempt to regularise and systematise the
classifications and abstractions we use. We simply accept Objects as they are constituted in
their contexts. To an Observer, therefore, these classifications and abstractions will be
irregular and fuzzy. For example, to be a fully competent user of language, it is necessary to
be able to abstract from language some formal Objects, such as "sounds", "meanings",
"words" and so on. Individuals will do this in ways that show strongly influences such as
those of the culture and its language-teaching policies. It is certainly not necessary for
speakers to be linguists, or to know, at any "level of awareness", formal rules and patterns
such as those regularised by linguists.
The "highest" levels are those of meta-reflection, the level at which we attempt to "make
sense of the world". The Subject tries to take into account the context of an Object in giving
it its essence. This level is highly influenced by cultural (and sub-cultural) effects in subtle
ways which affect the Subject's point of view, criteria, values, etc. One way of making sense
is deliberately to try to organise the world into regular patterns15, which seem not so
dependent on the contexts of an Object's occurrence. To continue the same example from
above, this is the level at which linguists constitute linguistic systems and theories and their
Objects.
This present analysis into levels is of course itself the result of activity at the third level.
These levels have no "reality in themselves". People are not "made up of" a combination of
the three: they have been "analysed into" three levels by me. I believe it is a useful way of
understanding human Subjects in the present context, as I hope to demonstrate (especially
in contrast with IP's understanding of levels of concrete-abstract.) However it is most useful
if it is acknowledged as a "merely" useful analysis. Then the three levels can be understood
as interacting in various ways. It might be rather rarely that some effect is best understood
as being the product of only one level's activity.
,5Our Western culture seems to incorporate traditionally certain kinds of values according to which sense is made
of the world by setting its Objects out in neat logical patterns. It would be very interesting to explore any ways in
which other cultures with highly developed meta-reflective systems are similar or dissimilar in this respect.
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5.6.4. The Object
IP makes a tacit decision to isolate the "speech signal" as the Object of perception in verbal
communication. I will agree with the result of this decision -1 think it is speech as sound that
should be considered the most appropriate Object in this domain. It is important to be clear,
though, that it is not the case that the actual acoustic "signal" is the only aspect of the
situation which contributes to the hearer's interpretation of what the speaker is saying. It is
not even the case that the entire communicative situation is a sum or complex made up of
the "speech signal" plus other components such as gesture, visual cues, contextual
information, and so on. Rather each of these is constituted, by an act of analysis, as an
abstraction from the Whole. Crucially, the ability to understand speech in isolation from a
situation is grounded in the ability to engage in linguistic communication in meaningful
situations. People understand speech from radio, telephone, tape-recorder, etc by analogy
with and abstraction from their experiences of speech in situations.
Thus in studying speech perception, we restrict the topic to cases where the speech is
understood according to its linguistic meaning, excluding the (perfectly natural and common)
case in which the sounds are meaningful is some other way, eg as indicating the presence
of an angry French woman; or where the meaning is derived from the situation as a whole,
more than from the particular words spoken16.
So, though the speech signal is appropriately the aspect focussed on by those especially
interested in speech perception as opposed to other aspects of the processes involved in
communication, there will be times when it is necessary to invoke other aspects of the
communicative situation in accounting for observations. It is important to be able to do this
and to know when it is necessary.
Although I agree with IP as to what should be isolated from the situation as the Object of
perception, I disagree as to how that Object should be described. As was seen above, IP
equates "speech signal" and "speech signal physically described" (though of course the
choice of which physical description it should be given was seen to be an issue of debate).
In the present framework, the whole issue of description is acknowledged as more
problematic. The most important distinction to be borne in mind, as already discussed, is the
difference between a description from the Subject's point of view and a description from the
Observer's (ie researcher's) point of view.
From the Subject's point of view, of course, the most basic description of speech is one in
16An everyday example shows the interaction of these two modes of understanding: If one is sitting in crowded
railway carriage, or bar, with an empty seat nearby, and someone comes over, obviously wanting to sit in the empty
seat, one's answer "yes" or "no" will frequently be formulated in response to either "May I sit here?" or "Is this seat
taken?" without full attention being paid to which of them has actually been said - often resulting in an entertaining
social dance.
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terms of meaningful units (here, the question of which meaningful units is the issue
analogous to IP's problem). So a general description of speech as heard by the Subject can
be given as - a series of linguistically meaningful sounds. Such a definition of course will
have to be further explicated - more below.
It is important not to understand this point wrongly. It is sometimes taken to imply that the
Subject "hears" the meaning first and then the sounds - some bizarre kind of telepathy.
Clearly that is not what I intend. To interpret it this way is to be stuck with the dichotomy of
speech into "sound plus meaning". In the new framework, speech is "(linguistically)
meaningful sound". It is sound that "enters the ear" - not disembodied meaning, but
meaningful sound. To say that if we hear sounds we must be "really" or originally hearing
acoustic features, and only then "converting" them into linguistic features is to confuse, as IP
does, the Observer's derived description with the Subject's basic one. To the Subject, the
Objects "sound" and "meaning" are equally abstract, both derived from a Whole "meaningful
sound".
In my perspective, the Thing that is "entering the ear" can, from the Subject's point of view,
be described17 basically in terms such as "the word X", or "a word spoken by X", or "an
English word", etc. There is no need for the conversion of a meaningless entity into a
meaningful one, which, it should be stressed, motivates the whole machinery of the IP
model.
From the Observer's point of view, the sounds can be described in any way that is deemed
appropriate to the purpose. I believe, as I mention below, that this strict separation of the two
perspectives can actually have a liberalising effect on some topics of research.
5.6.5. The Context
At this stage, "context" is a very general category, which will need to be further subdivided
according to the needs of the domain. I can take only small steps towards this explication
here. In IP, "context effects" can include anything from the effect of the acoustic nature of
adjacent sounds, to the linguistic meaning of the speech within which a sound is heard, to
the general meaningfulness of the situation in which an utterance occurs.
The first of these will be of less interest in the new framework, which studies speech
perception from the Subject's perspective. It seems to be a product of a view of speech as a
sequence of small acoustically-defined units which must be individually identified as such by
the Subject. In the new framework, the Subject is not faced with this kind of task, as speech
is organised at "low levels" (from the Subject's point of view) into larger meaningful units.
More will be said on this topic below.
17The point is that in attributing an Object to a Subject, an Observer must take the responsibility of demonstrating
that the Thing from which the Object is abstracted could exist (/e be meaningful for) the Subject.
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The other kinds of context, however, which are only beginning to be studied in detail by IP,
will be of great importance in the new framework. At this stage a preliminary division can be
made into linguistic context and non-linguistic context. A proper theoretical exploration of this
division would have to consider in detail the the relation of the general meaningfulness of
situations in the Life-world to linguistic meaning; and the use of language itself in the
creation of situations - in short, what it means for a Thing to be "linguistically meaningful".
Such an exploration would make a very relevant topic of study with considerable influence
on both conceptual and empirical research in speech perception. Clearly an undertaking of
this kind is well beyond what can be achieved at this early stage, and no definitive statement
of the dichotomy can be made here. For the time being, I think it is fair to accept the division
of linguistic and non-linguistic context as a practical guide. Exploration of the limitations of
such a dichotomy can be part of the research undertaken in the new framework.
Accepting this, the non-linguistic context will not strictly be the focus of speech perception
research, although it is clear that it affects speech perception in a major way. In particular, it
is the basis of the possibility of speech communication. It is, as already discussed, through
interaction with the non-linguistic context that speech sounds become linguistically
meaningful to the Subject, and can be abstracted from such situations. The non-linguistic
context however is notoriously difficult to study in a scientific way18, and shades off rapidly to
merge with non-linguistic sociology.
The linguistic context, on the other hand, will be a central focus of speech perception
research. Perhaps the easiest way to maintain the distinction in the early stages of research
is to focus especially on the process of understanding speech from radio, recording or, more
problematically, telephone. Though the new framework dissolves some traditional problems
IP faces in studying linguistic context, it has some other conceptual problems in their place. I
will discuss these details more fully below.
5.6.6. The Subject's Task
It is now possible to consider the activity of speech perception itself as understood in the
context of the new framework. Recall first, by way of contrast, the IP conception of
communication as coding and transfer of a message, and of speech perception as decoding
or conversion of sound to form to meaning. In the new framework, the very different
understanding of communication gives rise to a very different understanding of speech
perception - as a process of interpretation. Again this needs some explication to distinguish it
18Such research has been undertaken by two groups that I am aware of, though without in either case making
particular reference to the problems of the perception of speech as addressed by iP. The first stems from the work
of Malinowski and Firth on context of situation. Its best known research is by Halliday and Hasan (Hasan 1985,
Halliday and Hasan 1985, Fawcett and Young 1988). The second is the research done by ethnomethodologists and
conversational analysts, on the intersubjective constitution of situation and dialogue (Werth 1981, Schenkein 1978,
Mcllvenny 1987). At least some of this work takes its origin from a philosophical perspective not unlike the one I
have outlined in the preceding chapters. The relationship between these two research-areas and speech perception
would appear to be a mutually fruitful topic to investigate.
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as more than a terminological difference from the "decoding" of IP. The Subject is seen as
interpreting some Thing of the Life-world (recall this means something not already described
or categorised in any way) as some linguistically meaningful Object(s). This does not imply
transformation of one thing into another; or even interpretation of one thing as another. It is
interpretation of some uninterpreted aspect of the World as meaningful according to a
Subjective point of view in a context. We can call this Thing "sound" or "speech" or "an
utterance", provided it is borne in mind that this is the Observer's shorthand. What the
Subject will interpret the Thing as will vary according to a number of factors. It might in fact
be found, as I suggested above, that in some or many cases interpretation as word-like units
involves prior interpretation of the sound in some other way en route to its interpretation in
terms of words. For example, in some circumstances a "pragmatic" or "discourse" meaning
or even meaning as just-sound could be in some sense basic. This kind of question is a
matter for research in the new framework. I will discuss it more fully below.
5.6.7. The Researcher's Task, Method and Tools
In the new framework, the task of the researcher (who is also a Subject in the sense meant
here) is to understand, articulate and explicate - or describe in ever-greater detail - the
Subject's activity in coming to understand the meaning of speech (bearing in mind the
focussing of the topic as discussed in previous sections). The goal here, in particular,
(though other valid goals are quite possible) is the description of speech perception from the
Subject's point of view - with attendant caveats.
The general outline of the hermeneutic method has already been discussed, but a good deal
remains to be specified with regard to the procedure of investigating speech perception
within this framework. An important part of the task is not the application of a method, but
the constitution of a method. A method is an abstraction, idealisation and formalisation of
"what works" based on observation of many cases. As. such it is necessarily tied to the
domain in which it has been evolved. In the case of speech perception no specific domain is
considered sufficiently analogous to allow the importation of its method as something to be
appealed to in deciding how to go on. Rather it is necessary to develop a method
appropriate to the study of speech perception as such (though of course, parts of methods
from other domains can be used as deemed fit). The role of researchers' own judgment is
therefore emphasised.
In developing a new framework for a new domain, especially one where the problems of
conceptualisation are as great as they are here, it must be better to evolve a method slowly,
comparing the kinds of reasoning and judgement that seems to "work" in different cases. In
general this means that there will be an emphasis on informal observation, and description19
,9Recommending informal description, I should perhaps note, is far from recommending either atheoretical
description (which I have argued is impossible) or undirected or loose description (which would not be considered
rigorous in this framework either).
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from varying perspectives, of the process of coming to understand speech. On the basis of
this kind of observation, experiments can be designed to allow exploration of ideas or
hypotheses that arise. Note here the contrast with IP, in which ideas arising from
experimental work are to be validated by application to "real speech". The reason for this
attitude in IP is, as seen in Chapter 1, that direct study of real speech in everyday settings is
prone to too many problems of control and interpretation. In the new framework, exactly the
same reason is given for avoiding too early a retreat to the laboratory.
It is perhaps worth pausing here briefly to say a few words about methodological constraint
and rigour. Naturally rigour and "objectivity" (in the sense of "intersubjective validity") are
important qualities, in the new framework; but these are not seen as following necessarily
from the application of an externally imposed method. Trust in particular methods or
standards can easily be misplaced, especially if they are being applied outside the domain
for which they were developed. IP puts a rather high premium on the formalisation of
theories. "Rigour" in the new framework, as has been mentioned, is more concerned with
interpretation and harmonising of details and broad views in terms of the hermeneutic spiral,
than with the development of a formal theory. The ability to formalise an understanding can
be useful; but too great an emphasis on formalisation can mean the sacrifice of
understanding in terms of the relating of the theory to the actual situation - as IP itself
acknowledges (see Chapter 1). IP suffers in particular, in my opinion, from a need to
constrain what is studied, and how, to fit the needs of a particular idea of theoretical rigour -
to the extent, often, of having to leave out of consideration factors that seem to have a major
effect on perception.
In defence of the method recommended here, it should also be pointed out that even in its
own estimation (recall Chapter 1), IP falls considerably short of an ideal of explicitness and
formality. This is certainly not a criticism, since in my opinion to aim singlemindedly at such
an ideal would be to miss most of the points about human speech perception. It does
suggest though that declining to adhere to (all) the standards of IP rigour might not be too
dangerous. It also suggests that in comparing the framework presented here with IP it
matters whether one chooses as the comparison what IP really is, or what IP ideally hopes
to be.
One particular point over which I disagree with IP method is that of the amount of attention
paid to the experience of coming to understand speech. In the new framework, analysis of
Subjects' own interpretation of what is going on as they listen to speech will be an important
facet of the research programme. This is not the old bogeyman "introspection"; it is not to
Subjects ql/t of whutrhty hta.r
suggest that whatever description is simply to be accepted as evidence
without the kind of critical examination such reports
require. (Particular examples of this point will be given below.) But descriptions and
explorations of Subjective experience can and should be weighed in with all the other
evidence on which judgments are reached. After all a Subject's "behaviour" is not more
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reliably or unproblematically interpretable than his description of his experience20. In this
respect I am in agreement with the framework for studying cognition developed by Lundh:
"That verbal reports can give only a limited knowledge of what goes on in a person's mind
... is no argument against the use of verbal reports... Even if the data are incomplete, they
are still data, and the more we have of them, the better." (Lundh 1983:166, his emphasis)
Regarding the tools that can be used for investigating speech in the new framework, these
are basically the same as those available to IP researchers. The differences between the
two approaches are more significant at the level of interpretation than of gathering of data.
Many of the experimental paradigms developed in IP will continue to be useful, as will the
techniques of modern speech analysis and synthesis. Obviously computational tools will be
utilised for collection, storage and analysis of data. There is though one important difference
- in the new framework, computational models of the perception process will not be relevant.
Subjectivity in the new framework is thought of so differently that the analogy probably would
not arise, and there would be no need to address the issue of how the success of an ASR
system should be interpreted in relation to its success as a model of human speech
perception. Enough has been said already for it to be clear that in the new framework, no
such system, however well it performed, would be taken as evidence supporting the claim
that human Subjects perceive speech in the same way. In fact, I believe that ASR systems
are fairly good tests of the IP model, and, as has been seen, I take the fact that they suffer
from difficulties in the areas of segmentation, normalisation, control and interpretation as
significant in showing some of the shortfalls of the IP model as a description of human
processing.
5.7. Effects of New Framework on Speech Perception Research
5.7.1. Introduction
It should be emphasised that the change of framework recommended here by no means
entails that all the work on speech perception done so far should be thrown out, and a fresh
start made. Much valuable understanding about speech and speech perception has been
gained with the IP approach; indeed, as acknowledged above, development of the new
framework would have been impossible without knowledge of the preceding thirty years'
research. Many of the topics of research proposed in the new framework are similar to IP's,
and in fact suggested by IP's own experimental program. However, the interpretation of
results, and the way results lead on to posing of further questions, differs considerably.
Having this new framework allows a statement of the current state of understanding about
speech perception which highlights different aspects from those which are brought out by the
^The situation here is similar, I believe, to that of medical interpretation: a doctor would certainly be hindered by
being unable to question the patient about the symptoms experienced, though surely accepting a patient's
self-diagnosis at face value is not to be recommended either.
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IP framework (see Chapter 1). Incorporating IP's results into the new framework sometimes
involves reinterpretation and a change of direction. In the sections which follow I will mention
some of the similarities and differences between IP and the new framework, by outlining the
central areas of empirical research opened up by the understanding of speech perception
set out in the first parts of this chapter.
5.7.2. Factors affecting Perception
The preceding discussion has allowed a preliminary characterisation of the domain of
enquiry, and abstraction of a particular aspect of it as the topic of research. In the present
case, the topic has been provisionally defined as the process by which Subjects interpret or
come to understand utterances in situations. The next step in the defining of the framework
that I would like to address is that of abstracting, again in a preliminary and provisional way,
the factors that can be seen as affecting the process and its outcome - loosely, the factors
that cause a Subject to understand an utterance in a certain way.
It may seem rather long-winded to go through this whole process of definition, rather than
simply accepting the obvious. However I believe it is important to take time over this stage,
for several reasons. Firstly, it emphasises the point that the factors so defined are indeed
abstractions from a Whole, and imply a Subjective point of view. There is no "real" or
"objective" sense in which the factors isolated here are "causes". It will undoubtedly be
necessary in various instances to break down the divisions between these factors, or to refer
to aspects of the Whole situation not neatly included in this categorisation. Doing so will be
much easier if the abstract nature of the categorisations is clearly perceived.
A second advantage of taking some time to deliberate over the constitution of factors is that
it should encourage awareness of the distinction between the Observer's and the Subject's
perspectives, which I have argued is crucial in this domain. Of course, it would be quite
untrue to suggest that the Subject's point of view as described here "really" represents the
Subject's "true" perception of the World. It will be, necessarily a description of the Subject's
point of view, and influenced by the Subjective perspective of the Observer. This is the kind
of Subjectivity that I argued in Chapter 4 is absolutely ineliminable from all theorising. The
fact that the goal of describing the Subject's point of view cannot be perfectly achieved,
however, need not deter us from making the attempt: it is, for all the reasons I have given so
far, a valuable distinction to maintain. Acknowledgment of the impossibility of maintaining it
perfectly should in fact be a help rather than a hindrance.
Here then, I present my suggestions for a preliminary classification, within the domain
outlined above, of the factors which seem to affect the interpretation given to an utterance-
Thing.
The most obvious factor to identify is the nature of the Thing heard: what one hears
depends to a large extent on what is there to be heard. Again, though this might sound so
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obvious as to be hardly worth saying, there are several respects in which great care must be
taken in phrasing and accepting it. Firstly, the problem of the description of the Thing must
be addressed; secondly, the fact that this factor is only ever one, contributing, factor, in an
interpretation, not the sole cause of a percept should be borne in mind in developing a
theory. Both of these points will be taken up in greater detail below.
Another major and obvious factor which can be isolated at this stage is the nature of the
perceiving Subject. This is clearly a complex factor, which will require refinement and
clarification in the course of research. Several points merit some mention here however,
which contrast with the view made obvious by IP. In the new framework, "Subject factors"
are always relevant. This might be argued to be an implicit commitment in IP as well, but the
two positions are not identical (cf the discussion of "top-down" and "bottom-up" processing
above). In the new framework, a system which can be described as responding to stimuli of
certain descriptions is not "perceiving speech" in the relevant sense. But to deny such
bottom-up processing is not to say, as for example Cole does (cf Chapter 1), that all
perception involves an IP-style top-down component. His reason is that without this, the
ambiguity of the signal would prevent effective recognition. My position is that without the
"Subject factors", there would be, far from too many meanings in the signal, no meaning at
all of any kind, for the Subject.
There is, then, a very loose sense in which these two kinds of "factors" can be compared to
the "bottom-up" and "top-down" processing of IP. It should be pointed out though that to
speak of Subject and signal factors is not to take over, and distort, concepts that arose within
IP, or that depend in some sense on the IP framework for their existence. The idea that
understanding speech depends on the Subject's expectations or "set" or "habits", as well as
the sounds presented, goes back well before IP {eg Scripture 1902). It is also a major
component of "folk" understanding of perception. The "top-down/bottom-up" distinction was
the mechanism that IP provided to account for this feature of speech perception; the feature
did not arise in relation to the distinction.
It will be noted that at this stage in the development of the alternative framework, I am using
a good deal of terminology that belongs with the IP framework. This has the disadvantage
that such terms do not always fit very well with the new conceptualisation of speech
perception. However, it is probably best to keep them for the time being, until more
appropriate ones emerge around research centred in the new framework. One reason is that
since most of the empirical knowledge so far available about speech perception stems from
the IP tradition, that knowledge is naturally couched in IP terminology, and translation is both
difficult and distorting. Another is that it is still unclear, in the early state of development of
the alternative framework what terminology to translate into. Once some empirical work has
been carried out, this problem should be resolved in a more natural way than could be
accomplished by imposition of vocabulary at the present time.
So far I have identified two kinds of factor affecting the Subject's interpretation: those to do
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with the sound and those to do with the Subject. There is a third factor to mention, though its
status is, as discussed briefly above, less clear than that of the first two: the context. The
reason its status is unclear is that it depends on the prior constitution - to some extent at
least - of the Object: it is only with respect to the Object that the context can be defined, as
something like "aspects of the situation other than the Object". It is thus very much relative to
the Subject, and discussion of it is prone to confusions of point of view. Nevertheless, there
does seem to be an important sense in which the context plays a role as a factor in speech
perception21: it seems that "the same Thing" can be held constant, and yet, with a variation
in context, perceived differently. There are however many conceptual pitfalls here, and this
factor will therefore be considered even more provisional than the other two. It might well be
revised, or subsumed into one or both of the preceding factors.
Having thus outlined a general framework for thinking about factors affecting the
interpretation of utterances, I can now look in a little more detail at the consequences of the
new way of thinking for the interpretation of our knowledge about speech perception.
5.7.2.1. Subject Factors
As has already been pointed out, in the new framework, the Subject is always relevant.
Without a Subject, there would be no Object "speech" in any description at all. In the new
framework, then, there is no such thing as "bottom-up recognition" of features, which, in IP
involves recognition by the Subject of Objects as described by the Observer. Rather the aim
is to understand the description of the Thing "speech" as it is interpreted by the Subject.
Naturally, this involves having some background understanding of the point of view of the
Subject (as well as some understanding of the nature of the Thing). The two are
complements and cannot be understood in isolation from one another.
Already in the first stage of defining the framework, a good deal has been said about the
Subject which has significance for the description of the Thing. Given a Subject such as that
described above, any Object must be a meaningful one, either in terms of the situation or
according to a linguistic meaning. Saying even this much makes for some significant
differences between IP and the new framework. In particular, some "obvious" facts that in IP
are "surprising" or "paradoxical", requiring explanation in terms of transformation of "low-
level" units into "high-level" units, are quite straightforward in the new framework:
"One of the most striking phemomena in the perception of speech is the degree to which
our conscious experience follows the semantic intentions of the speaker. Our conscious
perceptual world is composed of greetings, warnings, questions, statements, while their
vehicle, the segments of speech, goes largely unnoticed, and words are subordinated to the
framework of the phrase or sentence. Nor is this 'striving after meaning' a mere artifact,
confined to situations in which we want to understand rather than analyze, since our ability to
analyze speech into its components is itself influenced by higher-level units." (Darwin
1976:175)
21 Cf the discussion above, which mentions several respects in which the understanding of "context" differs
between the two frameworks being compared here
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Similarly, IP phenomena such as the grouping of segments into words, "real word effects", or
"phoneme restoration" are quite unproblematic. Subjects are thought of from the outset as
interpreting speech not as features, phonemes, etc, but as words and other meaningful
units. Compare this to the IP view, which has to invoke subject factors in the form of
knowledge, expectations, response bias, etc, to account for these ubiquitous effects. This is
necessary only in a framework which can (and must) rely to some extent on "bottom-up"
processing. For all the reasons given above, there is no role in the new framework for what
is called in IP "bottom-up recognition".
Of course, it is not sufficient merely to state that whatever the Subject hears will be
something meaningful. Further explication is required. The particular way that "sound" is
interpreted - ie the particular Object heard - depends (partly) on the Subject's point of view
on a particular occasion. Recall what is meant by "point of view" in the new framework. It is
not something made up of component parts or modules (as it is in a cognitivist view like that
of Minsky - see Chapter 2). It is. rather a fluid, non-explicit attitude or way of being. It is
certainly possible to abstract, analyse and describe some of its aspects or characteristics,
which can be spoken of as knowledge, skills, purposes and so on. To speak in this way is to
make explicit and categorise (articulate) from an Observer's perspective. There can be no
suggestion that the Objects thus constituted exist as such in the Subject (though one might
well defend strongly the existence of the Thing that is described).
So this view makes for some significant changes from the IP view of Subject factors. Though
a Subject's knowledge is clearly relevant to the way the Thing is interpreted, the kinds of
knowledge that the Subject is attributed, and the manner in which it is said to exist, will be
different. It is no longer necessary, for example, to account for "acoustic context effects" by
postulating particular kinds of knowledge represented in the processing system22. Also,
since there is no commitment to the idea that the Subject is a formal device, there can be no
arguments based on the notion of formal similarity among Subjects. In this I differ strongly
from Cutler's view (198823) that a single example of an error can be used as evidence of a
general feature of the processing mechanism.
As pointed out above, the Subject's point of view is not fixed and constant, or uniform across
many Subjects. In fact, the dimensions of similarity and difference among Subjects that are
relevant to the domain of speech perception have not yet emerged. Thus it is important in
the new framework to focus on description from various points of view; and on individuals'
interpretation of speech and speech perception in particular situations - what in IP is called
studying individual differences, but might well in the new framework turn out to be individual
similarities. There is in the IP approach a small tradition of research looking at such
^Compare Ohala (1986) who uses Subjects' "knowledge" as evidence for the variability of the signal.
^Though her argument is made with respect to speech production research, I think similar reasoning operates in
speech perception research.
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characteristics of individuals, their personal approach to speech perception (eg Witting 1962)
or their language background and expectations. In the new framework, this will become a
much stronger focus of interest.
The emphasis given in the new framework to the idea that there is no "right" description' of
the sound "as it really is" has implications also for the understanding of the effect of the
Subject's point of view on the interpretation of sound. The Subject does not immediately and
definitely reach a decision as to the "true" description of the sound. Rather the interpretation
of what the speaker has said is a process of interpretation according to evidence. More than
one possibility can be entertained before a final decision is made. The process of
interpretation thus involves the hearer's judgment of the interpretations that arise
spontaneously according to the interaction of Subject and Thing. More will be made of this
concept below. For the moment it is relevant to point out that for IP to speak in these terms -
such as "judgment" and "evidence" (indeed any top-down processing) - involves difficulties
in accounting for the control of the processes of perception. The "control module" often
invoked is simply another name for the homunculus that I have argued the IP model as such
implies. In the new framework, "control" in this sense is not a problem. The Subject as a
Whole is by definition purposeful and able to direct and control its actions according to
whatever projects are engaged in. This is a characteristic, it should be emphasised, of a
Whole Subject, not of a "perceptual mechanism" or "processing system". This is thus a
case, like those of "consciousness" and "meaning" discussed above, where an explanation
of the purposeful nature of Subjects cannot be achieved in the same domain as it is used as
a ground of explanation. Responsibility for any such explanation is thus assigned to some
other domain.
5.7.2.2. Sound Factors
The second major category of factors affecting the perception of speech is those to do with
the nature of the sound heard. This is the area in which we have gained the greatest
amount of empirical knowledge from research in the IP framework. In the new framework
this knowledge is valuable, though some significant differences of interpretation show it to
have limitations which I will mention here. Recall from the discussion above that by "sound"
in this context is meant an uninterpreted or undescribed Thing, which the Subject of speech
perception Objectifies as a linguistically meaningful sequence. The description of this sound
then is a major component of a theory of speech perception. There would seem to be two
kinds of approach to this description: the point of view could be that of an external Observer,
noting relationships between one Object (sound) and another (reported percept), and
developing a predictive theory about these relationships; or an attempt could be made to
describe the sound and the process of its interpretation from the point of view of the
perceiving Subject. IP, I believe, falls between these two possibilities.
Consider first the general approach to the description of the signal in IP. As seen in Chapter
1, this is a major area of research and indeed contention among speech perception
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researchers - whether, in general, an acoustic, auditory or articulatory description should be
used. Though there are many differences between these kinds of descriptions, they are all
alike in being descriptions of the "form" of speech, as opposed to its "content" or meaning.
Much of the argument above has been directed towards the conclusion that any such
description involves the background understanding of a Subject who understands speech -
ie the Observer. None of them could be the description relevant as most basic to the
perceiving Subject. For the Subject, the most basic description must be as (linguistically)
meaningful sound.
Next, consider the more detailed description of the speech signal in IP. This also is a major
area of debate - whether the description should be in terms of features, phonemes, syllables,
or what. Again, these are similar, despite their differences, in being segmentations of the
"form" of speech as opposed to the "content", and again from the present perspective they
are thus abstract, Observer-relative units, rather than being basic to the perceiving Subject.
There is only one exception to this - the choice of the word as unit, it was seen in Chapter 1
that the word has not, traditionally, been a popular unit of description. This is, I surmise,
partly because of the difficulty of defining it formally (though interestingly, none of the other
units have proven easier to define formally), and partly because of a bias towards
considering small things as "lower level" than bigger things.
In the new perspective a very different opinion of words emerges. An informally defined unit
of linguistically meaningful sound is precisely what is sought as the lowest level description
from the Subject's point of view. A word-like unit would seem to be a good candidate for this
role (cfCohen 1986, Nooteboom 1979, 1981, mentioned in Chapter 1). There is no sense in
which, from the Subject's point of view, communication is the sending and receiving of a
stream of phonemes or other such units: these are abstracted from units at the level of
words and phrases by comparison of many instances with a particular kind of guiding
purpose.
Taking this view has significance for several areas of IP research. There is now no reason to
see the process of speech perception as involving a transformation of small units into a more
ideal (canonical) form, or of top-down information overriding bottom-up, or of integration of
various disparate kinds of information-Objects. The cues to speech sounds are thought of
quite differently. It is true that in many cases something that can be described by an
Observer as a small change in one aspect of the signal can cause a major change to the
percept. But this does not imply that the Subject perceives that particular aspect of the signal
as such on the way to forming a percept of a Whole. From the Subject's point of view, the
change is a global alteration of the Whole sound; of the relationships of its parts. (This is the
point made very forcibly by Gestalt psychology.) Here again, the identification of these
"cues" or "features" as such depends on an abstraction from a Whole by a Subject with an
Observer's point of view, identifying them first as literally features or aspects, and then
categorising, reifying and Objectifying them as features or "cues".
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This way of understanding the relationship of cues, features and units would appear to be
helpful in considering an interesting paradox that arises from the IP perspective (though to
my knowledge not often discussed as being paradoxical). From work done over the period
of speech perception research, two general kinds of results have emerged. First that the
Subject can make a linguistic interpretation of sound given only the grossest features, or
under very poor listening conditions. Second, that the Subject's interpretation can be
influenced by what seem very small or subtle changes in the signal. From the IP perspective
this is a contradiction that must be resolved, and has led to considerable debate as to the
weight of arguments based on one or other of these observations, and the implications for a
general processing system. In the new framework however, the apparent paradox provides a
topic for exploration and explication. It can be acknowledged that the measurement of the
salience of different aspects of the sound is done from the Observer's perspective, rather
than the Subject's; and that in any case there is no reason to think that all speech perception
should involve the same kinds of (formal) processes or the same kinds of (formal) units.
Rather there is the encouragement to explore the circumstances under which different kinds
of observations can be made, and interpret these observations in relation to the
understanding of Subjectivity suggested in this chapter.
Finally, we should consider the role of the perceiving Subject as Observer. The ability of
Subjects to reflect on and abstract from their own (linguistic) behaviour, constituting Objects
and (informal) relationships was discussed above. To be fully linguistically competent, a
Subject must be able to constitute as Objects not only word-like units but also units of
sound-only (though of course in the perspective developed here these are more, not less,
abstract than meaningful Wholes). The kinds of Objects that the Subject will constitute in this
way appears to depend on a number of factors, such as language background, educational
culture, literacy, knowledge of alphabet, and so on, as well as on particular characteristics of
the situation.
The knowledge gained from IP research is most commonly of the kind which predicts
segmental percepts from acoustic cues24. Recall from Chapter 1 that an important reason
for the wealth of research in this area has been its relative amenability to IP methodological
constraints: it is felt that since the researcher can control the stimulus and be fairly sure of
the percept (from the Subject's report or behaviour), this research is less prone than others
to major difficulties of interpretation. Of course, this is not the view that arises in the new
framework. Here the description of the stimulus from the Observer's point of view and the
description of the percept from the Subject's point of view are not so straightforwardly
relatable.
In particular, any description by the Subject of a percept in terms of individual speech
24"The bulk of research on speech perception over the last thirty years has been concerned principally, if not
exclusively, with feature and phoneme perception in isolated contexts using nonsense syllable materials." (Pisoni
1981:257)
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sounds or "nonsense words" will be seen as more abstract than a description in terms of real
words or phrases, since it could only be achieved by analogy with abstractions from
perception of speech in real situations. Thus, Subjects can identify sounds like [pa], [ta], [ka]
as such only because they can speak a language: a nonsense word only is a nonsense
word to a Subject who understands "sense words". There should be no suggestion that a
Subject must hear some Thing as a small meaningless unit en route to perception of it as
part of a longer, meaningful word.
This allows a preferable interpretation of the phenomena usually called "categorical
perception". Traditionally, Subject's behaviour in categorical perception experiments has
been taken as evidence of categorisation of units of the signal at low levels of analysis: if the
Subject identifies [pa] [ba] and so on even without any high level information, it is argued, we
can assume that the same ability operates in ordinary speech perception. In the new
framework, however, this argument does not hold. The Subject in this situation is
Objectifying the sound by analogy with what he or she is used to hearing in meaningful
speech, and in accordance with the description of sounds usually used in the community.
There is no reason to suppose that in understanding meaningful speech in an ordinary
situation the Subject "goes through" an analogous stage of recognition. (Considerable
support for this interpretation of categorical perception is to be found among the examples
given in Repp 1984.)
5.7.3. The Process of Perception
In the new framework, as in IP, perception can be thought of as a process taking place over
a span of time (though, as need hardly be said, the characteristics of that process are very
different in the two approaches) and investigation of this process would be as important an
area of research as investigation of the factors already discussed. The focus of interest is on
the process by which a Subject reaches an interpretation of what someone has said. Again,
this statement has a superficial similarity to IP's statement of interest; but again there are
some very significant points of difference. The process can be seen here as one of
interpretation, constitution (Objectification) and judgment. More than one interpretation can
be entertained before one is judged to be the "correct" one. The constraint is that any
interpretation must result in something meaningful to the Subject - but of course as already
seen the kinds of ways speech sounds can be meaningful in situations is very variable. The
process of coming-to-understand can be seen as a process of interpretation and
reinterpretation (perhaps itself something akin to the hermeneutic method of the human
sciences). At each stage, the interpretation is of some Thing as an Object meaningful to the
Subject. In the usual case, after a certain point, the Subject is relatively confident of the
particular interpretation reached, and acts in accordance with it. It is not however always the
first interpretation reached; it is very common that several interpretations are entertained
briefly before one is settled on. The preliminary interpretations are not usually reported,
unless there is some special reason to do so (for instance, if the preliminary interpretation is
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amusing in the context); the evidence required for changing the interpretation arrives very
shortly after the interpretation has been made. This state of affairs is not always the case,
however. It sometimes happens that one interpretation is accepted for some time before
evidence is gained to change it. This is the situation known as a "hearing error"; it will be
discussed in a little more depth below. It also occasionally happens that no satisfactory
interpretation is reached on the evidence available. In that case, more evidence can be
sought, or, occasionally, the hearer is simply left to puzzle over the available evidence.
This view of speech perception as a process of interpretation allows emphasis on the
continuity of different kinds of interpretations-as. Although in speech perception research, as
I have recommended, we should be most concerned with the processes whereby the
Subject comes to an interpretation of a sound as a linguistically meaningful sequence - its
"message-meaning" as it is sometimes termed - this is only one of many kinds of
interpretation that the hearer must be able to make. It is also necessary to interpret an
utterance as part of a discourse or conversation {eg as an opportunity to take a "turn" at
speaking), as part of an interpersonal relationship {eg as an insult or a reproach), or as the
means of maintaining social cooperation {eg as a request), to mention a tiny number of the
possible examples. It is not possible to divide these different kinds of text-like interpretations
clearly from the interpretation-as words and sentences. They will interact in ways which and
to an extent which is yet to be discovered.
Once again, this view has implications for the interpretation of the facts known within IP,
some of which I can perhaps exemplify by considering briefly the research on word
recognition set out in Chapter 1. The main issue there, it will be recalled, was the debate
between the "phonetic" approach, in which word-forms should be (nearly) fully specified
before lexical access, making the investigation of low-level cues to word boundaries a key
topic; and the "psycholinguistic" approaches, in which lexical access is more interactive,
making investigation of "on-line" word recognition a key topic. One can certainly agree with
the criticisms by the psycholinguistic approach of the phonetic: that it is implausible that a
matchable form could be fully specified with no (or little) account being taken of the
meanings of the words. But this need not imply support for the more interactive
psycholinguistic models. The alternative they offer is not nearly radical enough. It still retains
the basic idea that speech perception is a translation or mapping of sound to meaning -
which is the misunderstanding that creates the need for "interaction" in the first place. In the
new framework of course the description of speech as a series of linguistically meaningful
units is basic, and the Subject is assumed to be of a nature which can accomplish this25: no
translation or interaction is necessary. The "word boundary cues", "recognition points" and
so on are, like other such Objects, abstractions from the Whole, requiring background
understanding and comparison of many instances. So again, a fact that is surprising or
25Any Subject which can recognise "features", I have argued, must already be one which can recognise
meaningful speech.
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counter-intuitive to the IP perspective is quite in keeping with the new perspective (recall the
quotation from Cutler 1987 suggesting that it is "odd" that speakers do not mark word
boundaries more "clearly").
The definition of a "recognition point" in the sense meant by IP theories presupposes a
judgment by an Observer as to when the word has been "correctly" identified. In the process
of recognition, a speaker might entertain a series of interpretations, judging them according
to the available evidence (McAllister 1988 gives some examples of cases where the
researcher's judgment as to whether the Subject has "correctly" identified an utterance has
affected the interpretation of experimental observation). A similar point can be made with
respect to acoustic cues to word boundaries: it is only an Observer who can identify words
who can identify word boundaries, classify them, and abstract features they have in
common. Features that tend to be associated with word boundaries might well be used in
the absence of any other information (as in a word-boundary experiment) to make a decision
as to the likely location of a boundary. But this should not be taken to imply that this decision
is in some sense "correct"; much less to imply that an analogous decision is made at "low
levels" in the normal case of perception. The point of the last paragraph can perhaps be
highlighted by contrasting the IP perspective on word boundaries (as given in a quotation
from Nakatani and Dukes 1977 in Chapter 1) with that of the present perspective: Nakatani
and Dukes say that to understand speech, we must know where words begin and end; in my
view, it is preferable to say that to know where words begin and end, we must be able to
understand speech26.
5.8. Errors in Perception
In this final section I would like to provide an example of the effect the new perspective
presented here has on the interpretation of observations in an area of speech perception
research. I have chosen as the topic of this example the interpretation of "hearing errors" or
"slips of the ear". A small but rather well-known amount of research has been done on this
topic in the IP framework, usefully summarised in the Introductions to Fromkin (1980) and
Cutler (1982). Most of the research has involved collecting and analysing spontaneous
hearing errors as experienced by or reported to the researcher. Some has involved
deliberately inducing errors by creating difficult listening conditions, most often by playing
speech to subjects through white noise (the classic example is Miller and Nicely 1955).
Some of the main findings of this work have been, in IP's interpretation, as follows. Firstly,
that Subjects try hard to make sense of what they hear, ie they try to parse it into meaningful
words and phrases. This is taken as a demonstration of the contribution of top-down
processes to perception. Many errors involve the inappropriate application of knowledge or
^"We may write down every sound ... but we shall never be able to analyse the sentence into separate words
until we know its meaning." (Sweet 1906, quoted in Cohen 1987)
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expectations - taken as strong support, as seen above, for an IP model over a behaviourist
or Direct Perception model.
More specifically, it has been found that some parts of the signal are less prone to errorful
perception than others: the general prosodic pattern of an utterance is usually understood
correctly, and within it, the stressed syllables (especially their vowels) are considerably less
prone to error than other parts of an utterance. Consonantal confusions are relatively rather
common, with certain patterns of confusibility {eg among members of the same broad
phonetic class) well known. Errors are generally classified according to the size of the unit
involved (feature, phoneme, syllable, etc) and whether the error involves an insertion,
deletion, etc, of that unit. The fact that these are the units involved is usually taken as
evidence of the salience of such units to the processing mechanism {eg Bond and Robey
1983). Observation of the patterns of errors have prompted suggestions as to the kinds of
strategies hearers use in creating a percept {eg Celce-Murcia 1980:206, Games and Bond
1980:237); and the kinds of response bias that result from exposure to differential language
experience (eg Goldstein 1980).
The new perspective, I believe, allows a preferable treatment of these kinds of phenomena.
In the first place, it questions the definition of "error" which motivates the IP account. IP
seems to accept a "common sense" understanding of "error" as the hearer failing to perceive
what is "really there", or was "really said". This does not bear much scrutiny, however.
Sometimes when the hearer fails to perceive what is "really there" it is considered "correct"
perception {eg when hearers overlook errors of production). Some accounts therefore rely
instead on some notion of an "intended" message which the hearer can succeed or fail in
perceiving.
From the perspective developed here, it is clear that what is going on is a confusion between
a Subject's and an Observer's perspective. The Subject's interpretation is being compared
with some other interpretation. In the new framework, which tries to keep these perspectives
separate, it is clear that to the Subject at the time of perception, there is no difference
between an erroneous and a true interpretation27. It is a later judgment to say that the first
interpretation must have been an error, and to attempt a revision. Thus the decision as to
whether an interpretation is correct or not is seen, in the new perspective, as an integral part
of normal speech perception. Perception involves interpretation and judgment by the
Subject. So "errors" in this perspective become evidence not of the normal mechanism
breaking down, but of its healthy operation, showing the interaction of Subject and Sound
factors in a process of interpretation.
This understanding in fact allows support for some of the remarks made above. Firstly,
whatever is heard (whether judged later to be erroneous or correct) is heard as a sequence
27A similar point is made by Bierwisch (1983).
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of words. This, I believe, lends support to the view that an interpretation as linguistically
meaningful units is the first stage of perception, rather than a sequence of sounds which are
later put together into a meaningful sequence. Compare the IP account of the same
observation, which involves postulating strategies like "find a word" and "find a phrase" (eg
Games and Bond 1980:238), and accounting for how errors at "high" levels can "cause"
errors at "low" levels (Bierwisch 1983).
Consider the classification of errors by IP into those involving different sizes of unit. Of
course it is well understood in IP that the establishment of the size of unit involved in a
speech error (of production or perception) is problematic (eg Cutler 1988) - is the perception
of "fan" for "van", for instance, an error involving a feature, phoneme, syllable or word? From
the new perspective, as outlined above, the position is clear. "Errors" involve the
interpretation of one meaningful Whole rather than another - in just the same way as
"correct" perception does. The description of errors as the mistaking of one segment or
feature for another (or the insertion or deletion of such a unit) is only possible for an
Observer with an opinion as to what would be correct and an framework for analysis.
Of course, some sounds certainly do seem to be more "confusible" than others, and thus
more prone to error. This too can be seen in the context of the new perspective. These
"sounds" are seen as (for the Subject) aspects or dimensions of words - thus literally as
features, rather than entities. Indeed it is from these dimensions of similarity that Objects
such as "sounds", "phonemes", "features", and so on can be abstracted.
Here I have talked very generally about the interpretation of hearing errors in a theory of
perception. There is not space to enter into a detailed consideration of the particulars of error
classification and interpretation. However, I would like to mention an interesting area for
future investigation which arises from consideration of the topic of hearing errors in this
perspective. A rather "obvious" interpretation of errors - in both IP and the new framework -
would be the suggestion that the hearer initially interprets the Sound in terms of expectations
arising from the communicative situation. However, although it is often the case that
expectations affect perception in an apparently straightforward way28, this is by no means
always true29, as also observed by Fromkin:
"To 'hear' prodigal son when the speaker said popping really slow is more mind-shattering
than hearing carcinoma for Barcelona, although even this incorrect phonologically similar
word ... must have created a very anomalous utterance." (Fromkin 1980:11)
It would seem then that the "obvious" understanding of the interaction of Sound, Subject and
Context factors will have to be modified.
28Such as "But lizards don't even have teeth" heard as "At least when it's done we can have tea".
^Compare "Edinburgh's slightly superior" heard as "Edinburgh's in the Soviet Union"
5.9. Conclusion
This thesis has been mainly concerned to provide an analysis of the philosophical
foundations of the IP model of speech perception. In this last chapter, however, I have also
been able to suggest an alternative approach to speech perception, stemming from insights
gained in the course of the analysis. This alternative is likely to prove fruitful as a framework
for exploration of a wide range of issues of speech perception and also other topics. The last
part of this chapter has made a few suggestions as to how study in such a framework could
be conducted and the effects that the change of framework might have on the interpretation
of various observed phenomena. It is important to note that these suggestions and remarks
have been made with reference to the similarities and differences between the new
framework and that of IP. This is necessary at this early stage, largely because explication of
the new framework requires relating it to more familiar concepts. Of course, it will not be for
long that the new framework must, or even can, continue to develop in explicit contrast to the
existing framework of IP. After a time it will gain its own identity, and establishment of points
of commensurability will cease to be the responsibility of its practitioners.
One key characteristic of the new framework, as already stressed, is the extra dimension of
rigour given it by its commitment to the "circle" of interpretation. Any observations or
theoretical conclusions must always be related back to the broader perspective - to what
they "mean" in terms of what the Subject is doing in the communicative situation. This
means there is far less distinction in the new framework between "conceptual" and
"empirical" work - the two are intimately related, and both are essential components of good
theory. (I will say a little more about the feeling that "philosophy" is "speculation" and distinct
from "observation" below.) The strong commitment in the new framework to the relativity of
Objects, criteria and methods to the domain of their constitution should perhaps also be
reiterated: this also increases the need for rigorous conceptual work in evaluating the
relevance of the "obvious" in this particular area. The subdivisions of the field will emerge
more clearly as work progresses.
Naturally it is impossible to predict what research in the new framework will be like in the
future, but it would seem interesting to mention the directions I see the work taking, from the
standpoint of the present - though unfortunately there is not space to do more here than
mention topics. Here I will consider briefly the use of this framework for studying speech
perception. In the general conclusion, below, I will consider some implications the analysis I
have conducted would seem to have in other areas.
One strand of work in the development of research in the new framework will involve
observation and experimentation of speech perception in a wide range of different settings.
Here the decreased emphasis on development and defence of theory as such will allow
more flexibility and less constraint than is found in IP. The new framework encourages
breadth rather than depth - though of course observations will be interpreted in terms of the
broad statement and its elaboration in the framework. Studies of perception of languages
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other than English and European would seem to be especially important; and research on
perception of non-native languages of subjects would be useful to both theory and practical
application. The understanding of perception presented here has also, I believe, important
implications for the interpretation of work on children's perception of speech, and research in
this area could contribute greatly to our understanding of the nature of language and
linguistic meaning. One area that might provide an interesting path of extension of the
speech perception work is that of conversational interaction. Considerable work, as already
mentioned, has been done in this area by other groups. Collaboration, I would like to think,
could be mutually beneficial.
Another, closely related strand of research will involve refinement and extension of some of
the more philosophical discussion of the last two chapters, especially those parts that have
to do with language and communication for the Subject. The nature of linguistic meaning,
for example, which has barely been touched upon above, provides a rich area for exploration
of many issues around the concepts of representation and symbol. Perhaps a comparison of
the approach of the approaches of semiotics (eg Eco 1984) with that of phenomenological
philosophy would provide a starting point.
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Conclusion
The analysis reported in this thesis has had a very specific aim - that of uncovering what
seem to be essential features of the philosophical foundations of the IP approach to speech
perception - and has therefore been rather narrowly focussed. In the course of achieving this
aim, however, it has made a number of points that I think have consequences beyond the
particular domain of speech perception research. As a footnote to the research I have done
here, therefore, I would like to exemplify the kinds of implications the analysis has.
Perhaps it is useful to begin by recapitulating some of the most general points I have made
here. Firstly, in considering the nature of the world (the Life-world), I made the distinction
between Thing and Object. What is given (encountered, experienced) in the Life-world is the
Thing: a Whole in the sense developed above, which has, in a sense, a nature, but no
meaning or essence in and of itself, and no objective description. The Thing is thus very
difficult to conceive of, or talk about. In describing or classifying the Thing, we create the
Object. Though commonly in the normal course of our lives, we accept the essence of the
Object as if it were given in its own nature, I hope I have been convincing in arguing that any
Object implies the operation of a Subjective point of view (in the sense developed above).
Creating an Object always requires abstraction from the Whole, which can only be done
relative to the purposes and values of a Subject in a context. Taking these points seriously
has major consequences for the nature of the Subject postulated in a philosophical
framework. Most importantly in the contemporary academic climate, it implies that the
Subject could not be a formal device or system.
I have made a good deal of these points in the preceding pages - but always with respect to
the specific domain of speech perception. It seems likely that some of my points have
relevance beyond this, especially to other areas of cognitive science. For example, the idea
that perception can be seen not as transformation of one Object into another, but as the
constitution of Objects; or the general need to consider explicitly the Subject for whom an
Object exists, and demonstrate the meaningfulness of some Thing from which it could be
abstracted: or the careful distinction between Observer and Subject would all seem to be
widely applicable ideas.
Considerable caution is needed, however, in making such an application. It is important that
the results of the particular analysis undertaken here should not be sedimented and
extended beyond their proper limits. Consider the topic of speech production (eg
Macneilage 1983, Butterworth 1980, Levelt 1989, Perkell and Klatt 1986). On the face of it
this might seem a domain very closely connected to that of speech perception. Like speech
perception, is studied by both phoneticians and psycholinguists, and, like speech perception,
almost exclusively according to the information-processing approach: the Subject is seen as
transforming an idea or message into a sequence of linguistic units, and thus into a set of
muscle commands, in something like a reverse operation to that of speech perception.
Although I believe that some of my general points about the nature of Subjectivity have great
relevance to this view of speech production, it is certainly not possible to take over specific
points I have made about one domain into the other. This is thus an illustration of the
principle of domain-relativity just discussed. Speech for the speaker is a different Object from
speech for the hearer (as shown for example by the very different patterns of "errors" made
in speaking as opposed to hearing speech). An analysis of the information-processing
approach to speech production analogous to the one I have undertaken above would have
to involve consideration of the philosophy of praxis, and consider the Subject as agent. Work
of this kind has been done by phenomenological and other philosophy, but I have not
touched on it at all here.
The kind of relevance I would like to see my work as having for an area like speech
production is thus at a deeper level than the transferral of particular results. Speech
production research, too, involves the choice of a relevant description of speech. So the
principle of seeing a description as a product of a relationship between a Subject and an
aspect of the World is relevant. The key point is to avoid confusion of the point of view of
Observer and Subject. For the Observer, the description might be of physical or
physiological Objects emerging from consideration of a moving vocal tract. For the Subject,
these movements must be meaningful - though there would seem to be added dimensions of
complexity here over and above those of speech perception, since there is, I think, a clearer
distinction between the message and its form for the speaker than for the hearer. One area
where the ability to describe speech in appropriate ways is particularly crucial is that of
speech pathology (Caplan 1987, Kent forthcoming), where describing the situation is a large
part of understanding the problem.
In the course of this thesis I have mostly been concerned to develop the implications of my
view of Subject and World in an account of speech perception. But I also showed in passing
its implication of the concept of antifoundationalism: the understanding of the scientist as
Subject, and of a theory as a system of relations among Objects constituted in a context or
domain. This understanding is applicable, I believe, to all scientific endeavour; but it is
perhaps of more relevance to scientists themselves when they work in domains whose
Objects include Subjects. These domains would seem to have greater dimensions of
ontological complexity than the so-called "natural sciences", related to the distinction
between the perspectives of the Subject being studied (or observed) and the Subject doing
the studying (the Observer), and the need to differentiate rigorously between Objects
constituted according to these two distinct points of view. Researchers in such domains
therefore have the responsibility not only of justifying the relationships among Objects
established by their theories, but of justifying the relevance of the Objects themselves and
the point of view which gives them being. With this responsibility of course comes a kind of
licence to constitute Objects in ways other than those sanctioned by the fact that they are
"obvious". I hope I need not add that such licence is supposed to be used judiciously and
cautiously.
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If this understanding of antifoundationalism is particularly relevant in domains involving
Subjects, it is surely in cases where the focus is on the Subject's linguistic abilities that it is
most crucial. This is the reason for my belief that philosophical thought is indispensable in
these areas. There is an opinion prevalent that philosophical thought is "speculative"
thought, and only necessary in domains which lack an empirical methodology. I would like to
think that this thesis itself constitutes an argument against this idea. "Observation" and
"demonstration" are of course powerful tools in developing scientific understanding - but they
are not straightforward processes, especially not, as I have suggested, in domains dealing
with human Subjects as language users. Indeed some of these domains are commonly
agreed among their practitioners to be in need of detailed conceptual analysis or even
revision. I hope that the schema outlined above allows such topics to be viewed with
increased clarity.
An area perhaps less obviously related that I hope my analysis can help to shed light on is
that of phonetic and phonological theory1. Something very like an IP understanding of
communication and speech perception in fact underlies almost all work in these fields - as
evidenced by the almost universal preoccupation with defining formal units and formal
patterns, the ontological hierarchy, and so on.
Consider the relationship between phonetics and phonology, a topic of considerable debate.
From the perspective of this thesis, both these areas are abstract; both are delineated by the
(tacit) consensus of the Subjects who study them; both are concerned with language as a
"cognitive" ability of Subjects. There can be no suggestion that one is concrete and the other
abstract, or one is cognitive and the other physical, or one is taxonomy and the other theory.
One can speculate - interestingly - on what speech would be like if it was not about linguistic
communication, or what linguistic communication would be like if it was not accomplished
(primarily) by speech, but to try to actually conduct research as if either were the case would
seem to miss most of the points about both phonetics and phonology.
Explicit acknowledgment of the complexity of issues such as description, representation,
classification, existence and so on would be of great benefit in these areas, and I hope that
my framework of understanding Subject-Object-Thing-World would provide the subtlety
necessary to progress in long-standing debates over issues like the existence of the
segment.
1Allowing me to enter discussions such as those in eg Nolan (1982), Linell (1982), Diehl (1986), Liberman (1983),
Laver (forthcoming), Perkell and Klatt (1986), Docherty and Ladd (forthcoming), Hardcastle and Marchal
(forthcoming).
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